Question. What is the projected weight of the fully laden block 04 aircraft as configured for the shootdown demonstration? Please compare this to the gross takeoff limit of a 747 airframe? Answer. The weapon system aboard YAL-IA (which includes lasers, optics, surveillance system, and the 12,000-pound nose turret) is expected to weigh approximately 200,000 pounds. The takeoff weight of YAL-1A is about 700,000 pounds. A basic Boeing 747-400F has a gross take off limit of 800,000 lbs. Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request was reduced $220.4 million from the previous FYDP level. Please explain why. Answer. Funds for the ABL Block 2008 weapon system and the ABL Ground Test Facility (a.k.a. Iron Bird) design efforts were rephased to fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 006 as the result of more detailed planning for these efforts and to accommodate MDA funding priorities in fiscal year 004. Question. The Committee understands that part of the funding reduction compared to the previous FYDP is the result of a change in budgeting practices for aircraft termination liability. Please explain. Answer. The reduction in funds from the previous FYDP was not affected by aircraft termination liability. RUSSIAN AMERICAN OBSERVATION SATELLITES (RAMOS) Question. The Missile Defense Agency budget materials explain that RAMOS is not an operational element of the overall Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). It is a cooperative effort with the Russian Federation on "mutually beneficial" research that is missile defense related and serves as the basis for future cooperative efforts. The planned launch of satellites developed in this program is fiscal year 2008 with a two-year on-orbit life expectancy. The budget request for fiscal year 2004 includes $29.6 million for this program. Through the current FYDP, the program totals $329.8 million. What is the objective of the RAMOS program? What contribution does it make to missile defense capabilities? Answer. The program content has been jointly defined so as to not violate the technology export protections of the two countries. There are two objectives to the RAMOS Program: (1) to increase cooperation and trust between U.S. and Russian Federation (RF) agencies by developing working relationships within the scientific community in order to establish the groundwork for future cooperative efforts between the RF and the U.S. to improve early warning and theater missile defense related technologies and (2) to develop mutually beneficial research such as measuring missile warm body intensities against earth background using mid-to-long wave infrared (M/LWIR) in order to demonstrate the potential effectiveness of tracking sensors in this band for below-the-horizon (BTH) to above-the-horizon (ATH) trajectory determination; study the application of M/LWIR and stereo for missile tracking; measure the utility of infrared passbands to mitigate clutter and reduce false alarms and to study the use of multi-spectral stereo observations for environmental monitoring and forecasting. Specific contributions to missile defense are technical research on potential spectral regions for missile hardbody tracking, techniques for multi-sensor data fusion, mitigation of early warning false alarms, and environmental monitoring of weather systems. This research is intended to benefit spacebased missile defense systems by validating polarization solar clutter mitigation techniques for shortwave infrared (SWIR) acquisition sensors, by improving robustness of BTH midcourse tracking, and by demonstrating detection and geo-location of missile ignition through clouds. Question. The Committee understands that a government-to-government agreement with Russia needs to be signed for the program to proceed. Approval of this agreement is currently predicted for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2003. Do you view this as realistic? Answer. Yes, that is feasible. The Russian side claims to be prepared for finalization this year. The U.S. side has identified no "show stoppers." However, final agreement may not be reached until after calendar year 2003. Question. What program costs are paid by Russia? Answer. Russian program costs include nonrecurring engineering for the satellite platform used for both satellites; nonrecurring engineering for defense conversion of launch vehicles and launch services for both satellites; development of a satellite ground station network; ground station equipment and mission operations center manning and facilities; scientific, thematic analysis of shared data, and management and administrative support. It appears by their development pace that the Russian effort is supported with funds in addition to what is provided by the U.S. KWAJALEIN ATOLL TEST RANGE FACILITIES Question. The United States State Department is currently engaged in negotiations to continue U.S. access to test range facilities on Kwajalein Atoll. General Kadish, the Committee understands that the State Department is presently engaged in renegotiating use of the range facilities at Kwajalein. How are the negotiations proceeding? Answer. Negotiations are complete. Formal signing of the renegotiated Compact of Free Association as well as the amended Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the amended Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement (MUORA), occurred on 30 April 2003. The renegotiated MUORA extends U.S. access to the Kwajalein defense sites until 2066, and possibly to 2088 if the U.S. so desires. The State Department will submit the amended Compact texts, including the MUORA extension, to Congress. Question. In your view, is there a risk that we may lose access to this facility? Answer. At this point there does not appear to be any risk of losing access to the facility. Both the State Department and the Government of the Republic of Marshall Islands appear to be satisfied with the renegotiated agreements. Question. If DoD were to lose access to the facility at Kwajalein, are there other facilities that afford the Missile Defense Agency with similar capabilities? Answer. The other Pacific test ranges offer some similar capabilities. However, the radar instrumentation suite at Kwajalein is unmatched in terms of capability and until the GMD test silos are complete at VAFB, Kwajalein is the only facility that can launch GMD interceptors. PATRIOT PAC-3 MISSILES Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request proposes $561.6 million to procure 108 Patriot PAC-3 missiles. Including the acceleration of this program funded in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act, $592.2 million is available for this program in fiscal year 2003. The Omnibus added $104 million to the program and increased the procurement quantity to 100 missiles. The fiscal year 2004 budget also proposes transferring funding and management of this program from the Missile Defense Agency to the Army. Please explain the results of the Patriot PAC-3 acceleration funded in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act. Answer. In September 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the acceleration of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile production. The fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Bill passed on 20 February 2003, contained $104 million for the accelerated delivery of PAC-3 Missiles already on contract (LRIP2 and LRIP-3) and the procurement of 12 additional missiles in FY03, for a total of 100. On 10 March 03, the Lower Tier Project Office and AMCOM Acquisition Center executed the contract modifications to implement the acceleration. Accelerated deliveries were first realized in April 2003. ĹRIP-2 (40 missiles) will be delivered 3 months ahead of the contracted schedule and LRIP-3 (72 missiles) 10 months ahead of schedule. Question. Does the quantity proposed in the fiscal year 2004 budget rely on the acceleration funded in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act? Answer. No. Question. What quantity of Patriot PAC-3 missiles is proposed in fiscal year 2004? Through the FYDP? Answer. Previous-264, fiscal year 2004-108, fiscal year 2005-131, fiscal year 2006-144, fiscal year 2007-144, fiscal year 2008-184, fiscal year 2009–184, TOTAL 1159. Question. Please explain how accelerating the Patriot PAC-3 program fits into the Administration's plan to deploy a Ballistic Missile Defense System in 2004-2005? Answer. The PAC-3 acceleration decision in September 2002 was required in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom and was unrelated to the Presidential decision to deploy a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in 2004-2005. The added missiles will remain in the Army inventory and unless expended will be available for missile defense missions. Question. In April 2003, the Department announced the intent to merge the Patriot and MEADS programs. Please explain the intended effect of this consolidation. Answer. The Department of Defense has directed the Army to pursue a combined program that addresses the evolution from current PATRIOT capability to an integrated PAC-3/MEADS full capability. Combining the closely related PATRIOT and MEADS programs in an integrated spiral development program will provide Objective Force MEADS capabilities earlier while simultaneously maintaining fielded PAC-3 capabilities. Overall life cycle costs will be reduced for the combined program vice two stovepipe programs while preserving international cooperation. The combined program provides efficiencies in replacing PATRIOT/PAC-3 end items with objective MEADS end items in a streamlined evolutionary and capabilities based acquisition approach. Question. How will the consolidation of the Patriot and MEADS programs effect resource requirements in fiscal year 2004? Answer. None. While overall life cycle cost reductions will be realized from the combined PATRIOT/MEADS program approach, all requested fiscal year 2004 funds are required to initiate this revised program approach. A reduction in funding would signal weak U.S. support for the revised program approach to our international partners. Question. In the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act, funding for an enhancement to the Patriot PAC-3 program was cut to fund accelerated missile production. Please describe this enhancement. Does the Department intend to continue development and implementation of this enhancement to the PAC-3 missile? What is the current state of development of the Pegasus enhancement to the PAC-3 missile? Answer. The PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) program, formerly known as Pegasus, increases the range of the PAC-3 missile against its full compliment of threat systems. The Department intends to continue development and implementation of this enhancement. A sole-source development contract to Lockheed-Martin Missiles and Fire Controls is scheduled for award in July 2003. Question. What is the relationship between the Patriot PAC-3 and PAC-2 missiles. What are the similarities and differences? Do these missiles use common launch hardware? Answer. The PAC-2 missile employs a blast fragmentation warhead. It has a limited capability against ballistic missile threats. The Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM) and GEM+ are improvements to the PAC-2 that increase the capability against ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The PAC-2, GEM and GEM+ launcher load is four. The PAC-3 missile is a hit to kill missile. It has an expanded defended area and a significantly improved capability against ballistic missiles. The hit to kill missile mitigates weapons of mass destruction threat. The PAC-3 launcher load is sixteen. The PAC-2 launcher must be upgraded with the Enhanced Launcher Electronic System (ELES) to fire PAC-3 missiles. An upgraded launcher can fire PAC3, GEM, GEM+ and PAC-2 missiles. Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request transfers Patriot PAC-3 funding and management responsibilities from the Missile Defense Agency to the Army. Why? What criteria were used to make this recommendation? Answer. In a recent decision, USD(AT&L) determined that the PAC-3 interceptor met the criteria of Section 224(b) of Title 10, United States Code in that: (1) sufficient confidence in an improved capability to counter ballistic missiles is based on successful testing (to include the IOT&E program); (2) plans and resources are in place to ensure that facilities are available to support production (production is ongoing and production capacity improvements are on contract); and (3) funds are programmed in the Future Years Defense Program to carry out the production plans (now in the POM). As a result of this determination, USD(AT&L) directed that PAC-3 program management be transferred to the Army. PATRIOT DEPLOYMENT-OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM Question. Reports on the deployment of the Patriot missile system in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom have been mixed. The system successfully intercepted several Iraqi missiles during the operation, but the system was also involved in three friendly-fire incidents including the downing of two coalition aircraft. What types of Patriot missiles are deployed in support of operations in Iraq, PAC2? PAC-3? Both? Answer. Coalition forces deployed PAC-2, Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM), GEM+ and PAC-3 missiles in support of operations in Iraq. Question. Media reports indicate that several Iraqi missiles were successfully intercepted in the early stages of operations. Do you yet know the types of missiles that were intercepted? Answer. The types of missiles intercepted were ABABAIL, and AL SAMOUD. Question. Backup materials for the fiscal year 2003 Supplemental budget request suggest that additional funding is included for additional Patriot missiles. How many and what types of Patriot missiles? Answer. The Supplemental request is for 22 PAC-3 missiles. Question. What is the production lead-time between funding and receipt of additional Patriot missiles? Answer. For the fiscal year 2003 PAC-3 missile production contract, lead time between contract award and first delivery is 17 months. THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM Question. The Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system will provide a deployable defense capability against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Is THAAD part of the initial Ballistic Missile Defense System capability? Answer. THAAD is not part of the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA's) Initial Defensive Operations (IDO), but is part of the planning for MDA's Block 2004 capability. Question. The Committee understands that the THAAD radar may complement the BMD system. How will THAAD be integrated into the larger architecture? Where will the radars be deployed? Answer. Current plans are to integrate all BMDS elements via the BMDS Command and Control/Battle Management (C2/BM) element. The BMDS will take advantage of each element's capability to contribute to missile defense missions. The THAAD system was designed to defeat tactical theater ballistic missiles. The THAAD system (which includes its own C2/BM component) will be integrated into the BMDS primarily to meet this mission need. Plans are to establish connectivity between the BMDS C2/BM component and the THAAD system. This integration will provide for the THAAD system to contribute to other BMDS missions, and to contribute overall BMDS effectiveness. Some of the options include providing cues to the THAAD system and, conversely, using the THAAD radar component to cue other BMDS elements (e.g. Aegis or Ground-based Midcourse Defense). These capabilities will be realized through the BMDS C2/BM_element. Modifications to the THAAD system will be required to facilitate connection to the BMDS and to implement functionality beyond its original mission area. Current plans are to procure additional THAAD radar components and modify them to function as forward deployed sensors to support all BMDS missions. This work involves development of new software to operate the radar differently and to provide connectivity to the BMDS C2/BM element. There are currently no firm deployment plans. Question. THAAD is intended to be a strategically deployable system. Does the fact that THAAD may be deployed to support contingencies limit its contribution to the BMD system? Answer. No. The THAAD element is an integral part of the overall BMDS. The deployment of the THAAD system in support of contingencies will not limit its contribution to the BMD system. Question. Please explain the lift requirements needed to deploy THAAD into an area of operations. The Committee understands that five C-17s are required to deploy the system including the radar, missiles and launcher. Is this correct? Answer. THAAD is C-130, C-141, C-17, and C-5 transportable. Deployment of a THAAD minimal launch equipment requires five C-17 aircraft. Deployment of a full-up THAAD battery requires twenty-one C-17 aircraft. For intra-theater transport all THAAD elements are C-130 transportable except for the radar components which are transportable by C-141 and larger aircraft. Question. The Committee understands that the THAAD system has suffered numerous test failures because of hardware quality. Please comment on the testing difficulties that have affected this system. Answer. During the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PD&RR) phase of the THAAD program there were nine test flights prior to successful target intercepts on flights ten and eleven. Flight one was a characterization flight to demonstrate launch and early flight characteristics of the missile. This flight met all objectives. Flight two and three were not intercept flights, but design defects prevented the flights from meeting all objectives. The design defects were corrected for subsequent flights. Flight four had defective avionics software logic, which caused the Divert and Attitude Control System (DACS) to expend too much fuel. This was corrected for subsequent flights. Flight five had a design defect in the separation connector, which prevented separation of the kill vehicle. This too was corrected for subsequent flights. Flight six failed due to contamination of the focal plane of the seeker. Stringent cleaning and handling procedures were implemented to prevent recurrence of this problem. Flight seven failed due to epoxy contamination of the battery connector on the DACS power system. Fabrication procedures were revised to preclude this problem. Flight eight failed due to contamination of a connector in the Thrust Vector Actuator (TVA) causing an electrical short. Fabrication procedures were revised to correct this problem. Flight nine failed due to a cracked thruster nozzle in the DACS, which prevented flight control of the missile. Fabrication procedures were revised to prevent this problem. Flights ten and eleven were successful intercepts. THAAD has implemented many design changes and greatly enhanced its Quality Assurance program as a result of "lessons learned" from failures due to poor hardware quality during PD&RR. These changes and an increased emphasis on Quality Assurance practices have resulted in a rigorous Quality Assurance program and will preclude the same type of failures experienced during PD&RR. To the present time, testing is being conducted to verify the acceptability of THAAD component design to meet requirements and to verify fabrication processes. Current, rigorous ground testing at the piece part level is greatly facilitating the early identification and resolution of technical issues. Question. The Committee understands that the current THAAD program baseline has added 18 months of testing and $850 million above the previous baseline. Please explain why the schedule and funding requirements have changed. Answer. The additional 18 months of testing addressed compares the current THAAD baseline to the previous phase of the program. For the current Development Phase of the element program in the BMDS, additional time was allocated to comprehensively test the system at the piece-part and sub-assembly levels and to complete the verification of design testing prior to completion of design activity on the program. The current program baseline allows for much more extensive pre-flight qualification testing to occur prior to the first flight. In addition, program funding was increased in fiscal year 2002 to advance design and ground test activities, conduct earlier integrated element testing, and add two flight tests to the program. Hardware deliveries and software upgrades have been re-phased to allow for a minimum of three flight tests a year beginning in late fiscal year 2004 and continuing each fiscal year through the conclusion of the flight test program in second quarter, fiscal year 2009. Program changes have resulted in extending the duration of the flight test schedule to second quarter fiscal year 2009 (originally planned to end in first quarter fiscal year 2008). Question. Please explain the relationship between the THAAD radar and the Green Pine radar used for the Arrow missile defense system. Answer. The THAAD and Arrow radars both provide targeting data that is transmitted to the system interceptors for defensive operations. However, the radars operate in different frequencies with different operational characteristics. Both THAAD and Arrow use Link-16 interoperability, allowing the radars to exchange track and cueing data. a. The Arrow Green Pine is an L-band radar. L-band provides excellent long-range surveillance but has limited discrimination capability. The Green Pine was designed for operation at fixed sites. While the radar is road-mobile, it is not strategically deployable by air due to size and ground support requirements. L-band is generally less expensive than X-band, and the Israelis chose L-band for the Arrow primarily due to cost considerations. b. The THAAD system uses an X-band radar. X-band provides better discrimination and smaller radar antenna size than lower-frequency bands, but the resulting narrower beam width limits its capability for wide area surveillance. The THAAD radar generally uses external satellite cueing for initial tracking. Because of its smaller size, the THAAD radar can be both tactically and strategically deployed by aircraft very rapidly anywhere in the world. SPACE TRACKING AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (STSS) Question. Formerly the Space-Based Infrared Surveillance-Low (SBIRS-Low), the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) will place satellites in low earth orbit to demonstrate this technology and enhance tracking performance of BMDS interceptors. The Missile Defense Agency plans to launch two satellites to complement BMDS radar assets. A key aspect of this program is the additional discrimination that infrared sensors provide as a complement to the radar systems used in the BMDS. Please explain how the infrared capability provided by the STSS program complements tracking radars that operate within the earth's atmosphere? What is timeline for implementing these capabilities? Answer. A constellation of STSS satellites would provide global tracking of missiles from the boost phase through interception filling the gaps in terrestrial-based radars. STSS' infrared sensors complement radars as the two phenomenologies perform differently against countermeasures. Radar countermeasures do not have much effect on infrared tracking and discrimination and infrared countermeasures do not have much effect on radar tracking and discrimination. STSS will field two R&D |