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Mr. Schulte. General Holland said it exactly right. It is an ACTD, an advanced concept technology demonstration. It is not an acquisition program at this point in time. The idea is to go out and say, hey, can you make this thing work and if it can work, does it have any military utility? Is it of any use to you? We are putting a laser on a C-130 to see what kind of power we can get out of it and see what kind of military utility it has. The answer may be. hey, this is great stuff because you can go after targets that you can be very precise. It is covert. You won't have to bank the airplane the way you have to do for a gunship because there will be a turret right on the bottom you can shoot all the way around and you can kind of dial up the power you want to do that. What kind of effect do you want? Do you want to burn something up? Do you want to just stop it? What do you want to do? You can have those kind of things.

For instance, if you have got a vehicle next to a mosque, which is not all that farfetched these days, you could go down and do something to that vehicle without worrying about blowing up the mosque or something like that. So it has potential. I can't tell you right now how any of this is going to come out. We are just not that far along on the program.

What I have here is a kind of interesting device. Two of the things we want to demonstrate in the test program are, for instance, can you stop a vehicle in a convoy? You pick out a single vehicle, the fourth vehicle or the sixth vehicle. Can you just stop that vehicle? And so we did a test up at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio, with a laser that simulated what we were going to be doing and shot a hole through the hood of this little truck right into the manifold. This is the manifold, and of course it blew, of course it went through the hood of the truck in about two seconds, went through that manifold in about another two seconds. It spews gas all over. You have got an engine fire. Whoever is in that truck is getting out of that truck. He is not going to be there very long. And that truck stops in about another

Mr. Lewis. That is a pretty good answer. We have less than two minutes to go back upstairs and it is very interesting. Since you didn't read your entire statement, General Holland, we are going to put your bio in the record anyway. We will be back in approximately 20 to 25 minutes for a members only session, so the room will be cleared.

The Subcommittee adjourned and proceeded in an Executive session.

[clerk's Note.—Questions submitted by Mr. Lewis and the answers thereto follow:]

Special Operations Budget Process

Question. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOMi is the only operational Combatant Command within the Department of Defense directly responsible for determining its own force structure and related material and funding requirements, procuring Special operations unique equipment, and training and deploying units. In other words, it is the only Combatant Command with its own budget.

The Secretary of Defense has assigned new responsibilities for the Command including an expanded role in the war on Terrorism, placing it more in line with the other Combatant Commanders who do not have their own budget responsibilities. Is this a reason to change the role the Special Operations Command has in determining its own budgetary requirements?

Answer. No, the United States Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) budgeting authority has been the key to our success. The command's acquisition and budgeting authority is vital to our effectiveness. We have built an award winning acquisition system that has consistently accelerated emerging technologies into usable systems. Shifting that authority back to the services would most likely result in the reemergence of the same difficulties that led Congress to give USSOCOM these authorities in the first place.

Question. Military personnel resources are planned and programmed by USSOCOM, but budgeted and executed by the individual services. With a significant increase in personnel being requested for the Command this year due to its expanded responsibilities and with no additional personnel being provided to the Services, how have the services reacted to the requirement to provide USSOCOM additional personnel?

Answer. This was an unforeseen situation for both the services and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and required an immediate shift in the normal programming cycle. Having to crosswalk spaces with the dollars created stress on each of the services, which is going to be difficult to absorb in the near future.

Question. How is the total amount of Budget Authority provided to the Command for Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, and Research and Development established?

Answer. In accordance with Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) Atwood's December 1, 1989 memorandum, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) establishes budgets using the same procedures as the military services under Major Force Program (MFP)-11. We actively participate in all aspects of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process just like a military department. Internally, we use a capabilities-based Strategic Planning Process to rank and resource validated Special Operations-unique requirements across various appropriations. USSOCOM works with the Services to garner financial support for service-common items required by special operations forces (SOF). Military personnel resources are planned and programmed by USSOCOM, but budgeted and executed by the individual Services.

Question. If the method for establishing these amounts differs for Supplemental requests what are the differences?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) develops Supplemental requests in line with Department guidance. In all cases, that guidance has been focused specifically on the operational shortfalls at the time. It is considered vital that integrity is not sacrificed at any time during this process.

Question. Describe the level of detailed guidance provided to the USSOCOM by the DoD Comptroller and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) receives very detailed guidance from the Department during the development of budget requests. These include the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the DoD Financial Management Regulations, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A11. There are also a number of reviews performed on all the budget requests received from the Services and Agencies to ensure that the intent of the guidance is being met prior to submission.

Question. Does guidance that flows to the USSOCOM go to the project, activity, and program level? In what ways?

Answer. The Department issues it's guidance in specific terms that focuses on the intent of the Administration's objectives. During the reviews that are performed by the Department and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) the discussions invariably focus on the requirements down to the project, activity, and program levels to ensure that they are compliant with the Administration's objectives.

FISCAL YEAR 2002 DEFENSE EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (DERF) AND SUPPLEMENTAL

FUNDING

Question. Special Operations Forces were the first DoD personnel on the ground in Afghanistan and they played a major role in the early defeat of the Taliban and the killing and capture of thousands of al Qaeda operators. The Special Operations Command received $751.7 million from the DERF and $773.8 million in Supplemental funding for fiscal year 2002. How were the requirements for those funding requests developed?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) used a very deliberate process based on requirements submitted by the Component Commanders and the Commanders on the ground, while focusing on paying for the deployment costs and purchasing the items that ensured the success of special operations forces (SOF). The headquarters reviewed the requirements for appropriateness and then integrated into a prioritized list of known shortfalls and additional requirements needed by the troops on the ground.

Question. When were those requests presented to the DoD?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) submitted its Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) requirements to the Department on September, 21 2001. The FY2002 submission was given to the Department on January, 24 2002.

Question. How long did it take for funding to flow to the Special Operations Command?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) received its first increment of Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) funding on September, 26 2001, and its first increment of FY2002 Supplemental funding on September, 17 2002.

Question. How much of that funding was reimbursement of operational expenditures?

Answer. $339 million of the $751.7 million DERF and $450 million of the $771 million of FY2002 Supplemental.

Question. What portion of those funds was used for the unconventional warfare phase of the war?

Answer. Funds used in support of unconventional warfare through December 2002 totaled approximately $289 million.

Question. How much of that funding went to training and equipping anti-Taliban opposition groups?

Answer. Equipping of anti-Taliban opposition groups was funded by Other Government Agencies, not by United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Due to the operational immediacy of the situation, there was no formal training for the training of anti-Taliban opposition groups. Rather, special operations forces (SOF) engaged in "advise and assist" activities with opposition groups in the field in direct preparation for or as part of military operations. These activities fall within the spectrum of combat operations, and associated costs are not separable from the actual combat operations themselves.

Question. What portion of the funds received was used to purchase equipment?

Answer. $413 million of the $751.7 million DERF funding and $321 million of the $771 million of FY02 Supplemental.

Question. What types of equipment were fielded that were not a part of the normal acquisition process?

Answer. We define "types of equipment fielded that were not part of the normal acquisition process" as requirements that meet the criteria for USSOCOMs Combat Mission Need Statement (CMNS) process. CMNS is defined as an expedited process for documenting and staffing urgent, time-sensitive requirements. It is the method used to satisfy deficiencies that arise during combat or crisis operations or when it is believed that urgent and compelling acquisition procedures are necessary. Below is a listing of all CMNS actions as of 31 March 2003 to include source of funding:

Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS)

IComponent: USSOCOM]
UDA Progmm Funding mourn

Blue Force Tracking Devices DERF.

Small UAV DERF.

AC-130U All Light Level TV DERF.

Specific Emitter ID Detection DERF

Remote Sensing 02 SUP

Non-Standard Commercial Vehicles DERF.

Remote Camera Controller DERF.

Laser Targeting Device DERF.

All Terrain Vehicles DERF.

Video Teleconferencing Capability DERF.

Standoff Explosive Detection System DERF.

Hardened Sport Utility Vehicles DERF.

Special Purpose Receiver DERF.

Leaflet Delivery DERF.

Remote Weather Capability DERF.

Thermal Identification Device DERF. Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS)—Continued

(Component: USSOCOM]
UDA Program Funding source

Man-Portable Decontamination DERF.

Remote Observation Post DERF.

MH^17D HAVE CSAR DERF.

VHF Repeater DERF.

Fiscal Year 2003 Supplemental Requirements

Question. The Global War on Terrorism operations, ranging from Afghanistan, and operations in Yemen, the Philippines, the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, and now in and around Iraq have placed enormous strains on your operating accounts. The Congress provided $531 million to the Special Operations Command for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM as a subset of the $10 billion it provided in the Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003. The Congress provided $1.2 billion in the fiscal year 2003 Supplemental. What is the estimated total requirement for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM for the rest of fiscal year 2003?

Answer. Our FY2003 Supplemental requirement of $1.2 billion fully addresses our known requirements for both Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).

Question. How much of that requirement is for Deployment costs?

Answer. $750 million.

Question. How much for Flying Hours?

Answer. $126 million.

Question: How much for equipment?

Answer. $405 million.

Question. In addition to ongoing OEF costs, there will be costs associated with our operations in and around Iraq. How much do you anticipate those costs will be?

Answer. $1.2 billion in FY2003 Supplemental funding supports both Operation ntAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) anticipated requirements. However, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has very little funding flexibility to meet unforeseen requirements. While the Services are able to absorb their OIF/OEF requirements within their baselines, USSOCOM doesn't own any Base Operating Support (BOS) funds from which to draw.

Question. Was the amount included in the Supplemental passed by the Congress earlier in the month enough to last the entire fiscal year?

Answer. Yes, based on the criteria used to build the FY2003 supplemental request. However, this supplemental doesn't address any United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) platform losses since the commencement of combat operations. These may be addressed through the "ConstitutionTSetting the Force" efforts underway presently, but will certainly require additional Total Obligational Authority (TOA.)

Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request

Question. The President's budget proposes a significant increase for the Special Operations Command of approximately 33 percent as well as an expanded national mission. Heretofore, SOCOM has been a force provider and supporter to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. In addition to its traditional missions the Command's expanded role will include planning direct combat missions against terrorist organizations around the world and executing those missions as a supported Command.

How much of this increase is attributable to the Command's expanded role planning and executing command in the war on terrorism?

How much of the increase is attributable to personnel increases?

How much is attributable to an expanded operational role?

How much is provided to resource equipment?

Answer. (We understand the intent of the above questions, but it's very difficult to answer them separately due to the way the FY04 President's Budget is structured.)

The majority of the 33 percent increase is in the procurement account-about $1.1 billion. About half of the procurement increase is to mitigate the most pressing problems associated with SOF low density/high demand rotary wing and fixed wing assets (MH-47, MH-60, and MC-130). The remaining increase in procurement is attributed to the plus up of four AC-130U gunships, two CV-22 production aircraft, and various types of soldier systems and communication equipment. The budget increase tied to the Command's expanded role as a planning and executing command in the war on terrorism is a relatively small portion of the 33 percent increase— $78 million and 389 additional personnel. Only 118 of the additional personnel are here at United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The remainder are for Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the Theatre Special Operations Commands (TSOC)s. The budget increase requested in FY04 tied to our expanded operational role in the War on Terrorism is also relatively small—$203 million and 357 additional personnel. The majority of the added personnel are at Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) or units with the primary responsibility for Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

End Strength Increases To Support The War On Terrorism At USSOCOM

Headquarters

Question. In October of 2002, the Secretary of Defense directed the United States Special Operations Command to establish plans for and direct the war on terrorist organizations on a global scale. The End Strength for USSOCOM will increase by 3,932 personnel over the FYDP, 2,053 in FY2004 alone. How many additional personnel will be required at the United States Special Operations Command Headquarters?

Answer. 118 personnel.

Question. The Committee is aware that additional personnel have been requested for USSOCOM headquarters to man a 24/7 Joint Operations Center, establish a Campaign Support Group, and create additional Operational Planning Capability. How many personnel will be required for each of these functions?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) plus up is 118 spaces, with the 24/7 Joint Operations Center (JOC) receiving 92 spaces and 26 spaces for Operational Planning Capability. The Campaign Support Group (CSG) has 88 spaces already on the books. This capability is additive to accomplishing current Title 10 missions.

Question. How will these additional personnel enhance existing capabilities?

Answer. Additional personnel will enable USSOCOM headquarters to transform from a resourcing headquarters to a headquarters that will establish plans and direct the war on terrorism against terrorist organizations on a global scale.

Question. Is existing space adequate for these new functions?

Answer. No; however, our top two unfunded Military Construction (MILCON) projects are the Add/Alter Bldg 501A (Warfighting Center) and Information Technology Facility. These projects will greatly enhance our spacing needs to consolidate the strategic planning capability associated with these personnel increases.

Theater Special Operations Commands

Question. The Committee is aware that additional Special Operations personnel are being requested to be deployed at the Theater Special Operations Commands for the Central, European, and Pacific Commands. How many personnel are currently assigned at each Command?

Answer. We currently have 551 military and civilian personnel assigned to our Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC). The breakout for each TSOC is as follows:

SOCCENT 124

SOCSOUTH 125

SOCKOR 45

SOCPAC 92

SOCEUR 85

SOCJFCOM 80

Question. How many additional personnel are being requested for each Command?

Answer. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) 84 positions, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) 79 positions, and a Joint Special Operations Air Component of 10 positions. Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) 79 positions. This provides a forward based Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) in Central Command (CENTCOM) and a 24 hour-per-day/7-dayper-week (24/7) Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) capability in all three theaters.

Question. What missions will they perform that are currently not being performed by others?

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