pletion of the overall CV-22 Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in the Spring of CY06.

Question. The CV-22 will have a suite of Defensive measures and Countermeasures that the MV-22 will not have. What are those systems and when do you anticipate the testing will be complete for them?

Answer. The heart of the CV-22 Defensive Avionics suite is the ALQ-211 Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures (SIRFC) electronic warfare (EW) system with the capability to detect (and if necessary, jam) enemy threat radars. This system is complemented with the AAQ-24 Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) system (which includes the AAR-54 Missile Warning Sensor) to actively defeat heat-seeking threats. In addition to these active systems, the CV22 carries a full load of passive EW chaff and flare countermeasures. In addition to the two aft sponson-mounted ALE 47 dispensers common with the MV-22, the CV-22 also has two forward-firing dispensers. (The forward-firing chaff and flares assist in protecting the aircraft from "nose-on" engagements, and two dispensers are required to provide an adequate quantity of consumables for the long-duration, high threat missions that the CV-22 is designed to perform). Development of these systems is complete, and developmental testing aboard the CV-22 will conclude in conjunction with overall CV-22 Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in the Spring of CY06.

Question. What other systems and capabilities does the CV-22 have that the MV22 does not have?

Answer. In addition to the major sub-systems previously described, the CV-22 also incorporates numerous other modifications to enhance its ability to perform the special operations forces (SOF) mission. Most notable of these are:

• Integral wing fuel tanks to provide 600 additional gallons of fuel for the longer range SOF missions

•The addition of a Flight Engineer as a third cockpit crewmember to assist with the intense cockpit workload associated with low-level, night TF/TA flight • An upgraded communications system to enhance command and control (4 satellite communication (SATCOM) capable radios vs. 2 for the MV-22)

Upgraded mission computer and moving map display

A situational awareness station for the embarked SOF troop commander, enabling him to maintain communications with his command and control element, as well as access updated intelligence, threat and position information. Question. What is the status of the development of each of those systems? Answer. Initial development of all of these systems is complete and they are currently undergoing developmental testing as part of the overall CV-22 Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) program going on now at Edwards Air Force Base, California. The one exception to this is the Crash-worthy Flight Engineers Seat. The initial design for this seat did not provide the Flight Engineer with the cockpit access and mobility required to adequately perform his tasks. As a result, we are redesigning the seat, and the new seat will not be available for testing until late in CY2006.

Question. When do you expect the CV-22 to complete Initial Operational Test and Evaluation testing?

Answer. The Program Manager's current estimate for completion of CV-22 initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) is September 2006.

Question. Is the CV-22 a replacement for existing Special Operations platforms, or does it fulfill a requirement that is not currently being met?

Answer. The CV-22 Osprey is not a direct replacement for any single special operations forces (SOF) weapon system since it fulfills a long-standing shortfall in longrange, high-speed, vertical lift missions that today cannot be accomplished.

Question. Are there aircraft, which will be eliminated from the inventory when the CV-22 becomes available?

Answer. Although it is not a direct replacement, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) will draw-down and retire the MH-53J/M Pave Low fleet in conjunction with the fielding of the CV-22.

Question. What would USSOCOM do to replace those aircraft if the MV-22/CV22 program were cancelled?

Answer. In the near term, we would need to immediately institute a costly Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) on our remaining MH-53's in order to address critical structural and power plant issues. In the mid and long term, we would need to begin another development program aimed at meeting the long-range, high speed, vertical lift mission capability deficiency that the CV-22 is planned to solve. The special operations forces (SOF) have had a validated need to perform these longrange, vertical lift missions within a single period of darkness for over 20 years. The need will not go away should the V-22 program be cancelled. Although we are

aware of several interesting technologies currently in the laboratory, nothing apart from the tilt-rotor technology at the core of the CV-22 is available, today or on the drawing boards in the next 10 years, that can fill this long-standing SOF operational need. If we must begin a new development program today, we estimate it will be another 20+ years before the newly developed system could be fielded in sufficient quantities to fulfill our national tasking.

Question. The V-22 program has experienced delays and several catastrophic crashes. Does the USSOCOM expect those events to change its requirement for the CV-22?

Answer. No. Our requirements are based on the need to perform certain assigned missions, in this case, the long-range infiltration, exfiltration and resupply of special operations forces (SOF) teams, within a single period of darkness. Our requirements are not based on any specific weapon system or technology.

ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM (ASDS) INCREASED CAPABILITY

Question. The Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) is a mini submarine which will serve as an improved combatant delivery system for clandestine insertion and extraction of Special Operations Forces. It will deliver its compliment of Special Operations Forces in a "dry" delivery vehicle and will replace the existing "wet" SEAL Delivery (SDS) system. What other differences, capabilities and advantages does the ASDS have over the current SDS?

Answer. The ASDS has many advantages over the SDV aside from the dry vs. wet environment. These include increased range (ASDS range is over twice current SDV range), endurance (ASDS endurance is over 4 times longer than SDV), and payload (ASDS can carry twice the number of personnel compared to the SDV, and has the ability to carry larger, more flexible payloads than SDV). ASDS also has a built-in anchor and loiter capability, where it can remain submerged for days as compared to hours with the SDV. The ASDS can also operate in far greater environmental extremes and depth ranges than the SDV. Other advantages include Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM), the ability to detect threats to the ASDS, something the SDV does not have, and an organic communications suite that allows for near real time intelligence data collection and transmission. The ASDS will not replace the SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV).

Question. Will the ASDS be used for any other missions in addition to the delivery and extraction of SEAL teams?

Answer. Yes. The ASDS has already proven itself as an extremely capable Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platform. During Joint Forces Command Exercise Millennium Challenge 02, the ASDS conducted a harbor penetration and surveillance mission, taking high resolution digital images of the target area and transmitting them back to the joint headquarters in near real time. The ASDS also has the ability to perform sensor emplacement missions in a high threat environment, a crucial mission for which current NSW capabilities are limited.

Question. The ASDS will be an integral subsystem of the SSGN, four of which are currently expected to be converted. How many ASDS will be carried on each SSGN? Answer. The SSGN is being designed to carry two ASDS, two Dry Deck Shelters (DDS), or one of each. In order to provide the most flexible special operations force package with SSGN, the more likely configuration will be one ASDS and one DDS per SSGN. This would allow the operational commander the ability to employ ASDS, SDV and/or multiple SEAL platoons all from the same SSGN. Question. What is the USSOCOM requirement for ASDS?

Answer. The USSOCOM requirement is six ASDSS, based on the Operational Requirements Document, Revision 4, updated in June 2001.

Question. How many are included in the POM?

Answer. In fiscal years 2004–2009, there are three ASDSs programmed.

ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM (ASDS) DEVELOPMENTAL PROBLEMS

Question. The first ASDS vehicle was originally scheduled for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 1997 at a cost of $62 million. To date the ASDS has cost $625.431 million and has yet to complete Operational Evaluation which precedes IOC. The ASDS is a battery powered vehicle and was originally designed to be equipped with a Silver-Zinc battery. There have been persistent problems with this battery. What is the current status?

Answer. The silver-zinc propulsion battery does not provide the projected number of re-charge cycles, which limits the number of missions that can be conducted before the battery must be replaced. USSOCOM and NAVSEA are continuing to develop improvements to the existing silver-zinc battery. These improvements have already improved battery performance, however, additional work is continuing. Poor

performance of battery sets 1 through 3 prompted an investigation and subsequent redesign of the battery, which led to limited success with set 4. Battery set 4 performed much better and satisfied the Maximum Combat Range and Endurance KPPs, but did not achieve the desired recharge cycles. This means that increased logistics costs will be incurred with continued use of current silver-zinc batteries. NAVSEA has reinstituted the battery Integrated Process Team (IPT) to investigate further modifications and improvements to the current silver-zinc batteries. Question. At the request of USSOCOM, the Committee provided resources to develop a Lithium-Ion replacement battery. What is the status of this battery development?

Answer. The Program Office has currently awarded three Lithium Ion battery contracts. The first was to Alliant Technologies, Inc (ATK), and the next two were awarded as part of a recent competition to SAFT American and Yardney Technical Products. The recent competition has been protested, and the award is currently under review by the GAO. The Program Office expects a decision from GAO by June 2003. The current program of record for Lithium Ion battery procurement shows a down select in December 2003 and installation in ASDS #1 in August 2004.

Question. When is the Lithium-Ion battery expected to be installed in the ASDS? Answer. If the current protest is resolved quickly, the program office estimates that the first Lithium-Ion battery set could be installed in ASDS #1 by August 2004. Question. When the ASDS underwent sound trials in February 2002, the Vehicle did not meet the operational requirements with regard to noise levels produced. Was the major problem the propeller?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What is the status of the new propeller which is being developed?

Answer. The new composite propeller was delivered to Hawaii in March 2003 and installed in April 2003. Modeling conducted at the Applied Research Lab at Penn State University showed that the new propeller would meet acoustic thresholds. Limited acoustic testing was conducted before and during Operational Evaluation. (OPEVAL), with favorable results that indicate acoustic signature is substantially reduced.

Question. Are there any other major impediments to the first vehicle being acceptable to USSOCOM?

Answer. No. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Navy Special Warfare Command (NÂVSPECWARCOM) remain committed to Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) and the transformational capabilities it will bring to special operations forces (SOF), and feel that the ASDS will prove itself in its first operational deployment, scheduled for early FY 2004.

AC-130 GUNSHIPS

Question. One of the most effective weapons systems in the entire DoD inventory is the AC-130 Gunship. It is also one of the most requested platforms by the combatant commanders. The Committee provided funding for an additional AC-130 Gunship conversion in fiscal year 2003. What was the unit cost of the original 13 AC-130U conversions?

Answer. The first aircraft, which included all development costs, manufacture tooling costs, software development, test and evaluation costs (ranges, telemetry, etc.) as well as modification costs, was $190 million. Aircraft 2-13 were $60.2 million each.

Question. What is the estimated cost of the conversions budgeted in fiscal year 2004?

Answer. The target (negotiations still underway) per unit cost for the four additional gunships is $122.86 million (objective) and $135.15 million (threshold). This unit cost is greater than the original aircraft primarily due to a reduced quantity purchase and the additional modifications that have been added since the initial procurement.

Question. What is the total gunship requirement?

Answer. 25 total gunships, which includes 8 AC-130Hs built in the early 1970s, 13 original AC-130Us, and 4 new U models.

Question. Will that requirement be met with the conversions in fiscal year 2004? Answer. No, delivery of the last AC-130U will be made in CY 2005 using fiscal years 2003-2005 funding.

GREEN TIP AMMO

Question. It is the Committee's understanding that the current Army-common ammunition issued to SOF forces is the 5.56mm M885 or "Green Tip” ammo. This ammunition was developed for use against lightly armored personnel and when fired

at enemy who are not wearing body armor, its penetration capability allows it to pass right through an enemy soldier. Anecdotal evidence provided to the committee during examinations in the field suggests that unless the round directly impacts a vital organ it has very little debilitating effect. How serious a problem is this for the SOF personnel currently deployed?

Answer. The M885 is still a serious problem for special operations forces (SOF) personnel currently deployed. M855 was developed for lightly armored personnel. Soft enemy targets engaged can have the round pass right through them. The goal of the 77 grain ammunition developed to counter this problem is two fold: it increases the accuracy of the round by having a more stabilized flight and has proved more lethal by having a somewhat slower velocity causing better effects upon soft targets. The problem with the M855 was enough of an issue to seek an alternative. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) currently is continuing to procure the 77 grain because it is in use in both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and has become a high use item.

Question. What is the solution to this problem?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is currently using a special operations forces (SOF) unique line of ammunition that has been brought into the SOF inventory. This ammunition is the 5.56mm, 77 grain round. This ammunition has proved to be both more accurate at range as well as more lethal than the standard M885. The 5.56mm, 77 grain round has been used in support of both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Question. Are there forces that are equipped with ammunition which is more lethal than the "green tip" ammo?

Answer. Currently, all special operations forces (SOF) components, to include United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Navy Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), have the 5.56mm, 77 grain ammunition.

Question. What is the plan to equip SOF troops with more lethal ammunition? Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has an ongoing procurement to meet inventory requirements.

ADVANCED LIGHTWEIGHT GRENADE LAUNCHER (ALGL)

Question. The ALGL is an improved 40mm grenade launcher designed to replace the current weapon with a precision fire weapon system. The Committee has added funding to the President's budget for the development and fielding of the ALGL system for a number of years and understands that it is the Number One priority on your unfunded requirements list. What is the inventory objective for this weapons system?

Answer. Total Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) is 548 systems. (63 systems for Navy Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) and 485 systems for United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)).

Question. How many are on hand at present?

Answer. Through fiscal year 2003, 128 systems will have been purchased.

Question. How many are proposed to be procured in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget?

Answer. No systems are programmed for FY2004, however, ALGL is United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)'s number one FY2004 Unfinanced Requirement (UFR). The $88.5 million UFR, if fulfilled, will buy out the remaining Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) and supporting ammunition.

Question. Are there plans to procure any of these systems with funding provided in previous supplemental appropriations?

Answer. There are no plans to procure systems with the previous supplemental funding.

ADVANCED TACTICAL LASER (ATL)

Question. The Special Operations Command proposed a new ACTD RDT&E program to develop a tactical laser to be fielded aboard an AC-130 gunship last year. Usually R&D funds are used to develop Special Operations Command unique items rather than those used throughout the services. What is Special Operations unique about the Advanced Tactical Laser?

Answer. The AC-130 Gunship is a special operations forces (SOF) unique weapon system. The Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) offers unique attributes in accuracy by utilizing a narrow, silent, invisible and high-energy laser beam. This provides the ability to disable/damage/destroy targets that are of particular interest to SOF. The inherent attributes of a high-energy laser also provide the SOF operator with the potential to accomplish the clandestine mission. This, along with a multi-directional

firing capability, enhances the survivability of the Gunship. The ATL ACTD represents a significant step forward by placing this technology into the hands of SOF for evaluation. The ACTD is specifically tailored to demonstrate capabilities relevant to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). USŜOCOM has delegated to the Air Force Special Operations Command the responsibility for conducting the Military Utility Assessment of this system. Laser weapons will not be unique to SOF. As laser technology matures and the size of tactical lasers that can provide operationally useful power is reduced, there will be increased interest in laser weapon systems from the conventional forces.

Question. What targets will it enable the SOCOM to eliminate that it does not currently have the capability to destroy?

Answer. The issue is not the destruction of targets; it is creating battlefield effects that allow our special operations forces (SOF) operators to successfully accomplish their mission. The Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) does not provide United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) the capability to prosecute any additional target sets. The kinetic weapons of today provide only one type of effect, explosive. These kinetic weapons, while effective, also have limitations. In the recent engagement in Iraq, we observed the enemy placing military equipment in civilian and culturally sensitive target areas. This limited the number and frequency of shot opportunities with kinetic weapons. An ATL system, with precision accuracy (4" diameter beam) and the ability to destroy, disrupt, and/or annoy a target, will provide for an expanded number of shot opportunities and create a better battlefield environment for SOF operators. As experience is gained with this new technology during the ongoing ATL ACTD, new SOF missions and better ways to conduct current operational missions may be identified.

Question. What is the total cost of the ACTD?

Answer. The total cost of the Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) ACTD is $217 million (a combination of contractor and government efforts).

Question. What is the level of risk associated with this development?

Answer. All of the technologies contained in the major components of the Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) ACTD system have been successfully demonstrated in a laboratory environment. This has driven the component risk level to Low from Moderate. The key risk in the program is associated with the integration into the aircraft and demonstration of the laser system in an airborne environment. We assess this risk to be Moderate. A tremendous amount of our integration and demonstration risk has been mitigated using lessons learned from other laser development programs, such as AirBorne Laser (ABL) and Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL).

Question. What is the required power level of the laser?

Answer.

Question. What power has been achieved to date?

Answer. Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser energy is very scalable, as demonstrated by ABL program and the experience of Boeing with the Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) ACTD sub-scale demonstration laser. Our demonstration goal for this device was 18 kW. To date, we have demonstrated 22 kW.

Question. The ACTD is currently designed to produce a laser that will take up the entire space of an AC-130 gunship, leaving no room for the weapons currently deployed on the airframe. Is that the desired configuration?

Answer. DoD made a deliberate decision at the start of the Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) ACTD not to spend scarce funding on reducing the size of the laser system. It was deemed more important to concentrate on building the laser, integrating the components, and conducting the live fire demonstrations. One of the key reasons for conducting an ACTD is to provide an environment that allows the operators to use new technology which they are unfamiliar with and determine what military utility this system may have. It is not at all clear, at the early stage of this ACTD, what is the correct mix of laser and conventional weapons. Over the next several years, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) will be reviewing the ATL ACTD performance, the results of the Next Generation Gunship (NGG) Analysis of Alternatives, and current operations of the AC-130 to determine what suite of weapons will provide the most effective battlefield performance.

Question. How would you assess the risk of reducing the size of the tactical laser to allow the gunship to also carry the weapons it does today?

Answer. The specific risk of reducing the laser size will depend upon the operator's system performance requirements (i.e. effective range, magazine depth and/or target effects). There are ongoing research and development programs outside of this ACTD that are addressing technologies that may significantly reduce the size and weight of chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL) components as well as improve the efficiency of the laser. There is also current research and development in solid