state lasers that offers the promise of smaller, operational size at appropriate power levels. Based on the continuing development in COIL technology and the strong investment in solid-state lasers by the Army, the Air Force, and the High Energy Laser Joint Technology Office, the risk associated with getting to an operationalsized tactical laser that would be compatible with future AC-130s capabilities is assessed as moderate.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Question. The military campaign in Afghanistan began with the clandestine insertion of Special Operations Forces into the country to marshal indigenous forces to conduct what we all now know as "unconventional warfare". Combined with the ability of U. S. forces to target the enemy from the ground and to destroy them with precision guided munitions it took 49 days from the first insertion of SOF_teams to the fall of Kandahar, the pivotal strategic point in the war. How many SOF operators took part in this phase of the war?

Answer. The numbers that were tracked at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan were not very accurate for "special operations forces (SOF) operators" and included support troops and sometimes, conventional forces supporting SOF, as well as some Coalition SOF. From these numbers the average number of "SOF" personnel deployed to Afghanistan during the months of October-November 2001 was 2,743 with a peak of 3,256. If you count just the Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA)'s, SOCCE's, and Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB)'s personnel, it averaged around 285 during this period.

Question. What was their role in recruiting and paying forces of the Northern Alliance?

Answer.

Question. What was their role in equipping and training forces of the Northern Alliance?

Answer.

Question. The Committee is aware that there were at least eight factions of the Northern Alliance that worked with SOF forces. Were there occasions when those forces attempted to engage each other as opposed to al Qaeda and Taliban forces? Answer. There were limited incidents in the North only after the whole of the North had been freed from the Taliban.

Question. SOF forces also worked with forces in the south, many aligned with the present ruler Hamid Karzai. How are all of the various factions of indigenous forces working together today?

Answer. Although various factions can improve methods of interaction, we are not aware of any serious incidents in the South.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES LOSSES

Question. It is an unfortunate fact of war that forces are killed and wounded and equipment is destroyed either in combat or as a result of accidents. To date how many SOF forces have lost their lives in direct support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM?

Answer. Thirty-nine special operations forces (SOF) have lost their lives. This includes 19 killed in action (KIA), 1 died of wounds received in action (DWRIA), and 19 non-hostile casualties-death (NHCAS-D).

Question. To date how many SOF forces have lost their lives in direct support of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM?

Answer. Five were killed in action (KIA).

Question. How many of those forces lost their lives due to friendly fire? What lessons from those experiences can we take into future conflicts?

Answer.

• OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF): Four of the 19 killed in action (KIA) or died of wounds received in action (DWRIA) were lost due to friendly fire3 due to close air support (CAS) ordnance explosion and 1 during Operation Anaconda.

• OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): One of five KIAS was due to friendly fire.

Lessons learned are still being worked at this time and are not yet available. Question. How many SOF forces have lost their lives in direct combat with the enemy?

Answer.

• OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF): Fifteen were lost in direct combat with the enemy, total 19: 18 killed in action (KIA) and 1 died of wounds received in action (DWRIA).

• OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): Four were lost in direct combat with the enemy, total five KIA.

Question. Were any of those losses avoidable through better training, equipment, or communications?

Answer. Until accident investigations, after action reports, and lessons learned are completed or compiled, it is not possible to determine if better training, additional equipment or communications improvements could have prevented forces or equipment from damage.

Question. How many aircraft have been a total loss?

Answer. The following aircraft have been destroyed during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): 1 MC-130H, 1 MC-130P, 2 MH-53Ms, and 2 MH-47Es.

Question. How many aircraft have been lost and are either back in service or in the process of being returned to a usable service?

Answer. In addition to the aircraft destroyed as mentioned above the following aircraft have been damaged during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): 2 MC-130Hs, 1 MC-130P, 2 MH-53Mx, 2 MH-47Ds. 7 MH-47Es, 2 MH-60Ks, and 2 MH-6Js. All damaged aircraft have been repaired or are in the process of being repaired.

OPERATION ANACONDA/TAKUS GHAR

Question. The final major combat operation in Afghanistan was an effort to kill or capture those al Qaeda and Taliban forces remaining in country after the fall of Kandahar, which were regrouping in the mountains along the Pakistani border. This operation code named OPERATION ANACONDA included a battle to occupy a 10,000 foot peak called Takur Ghar where 7 Special Operations Forces lost their lives, the most SF lives lost in direct combat in one day since Mogadishu in 1993. What began as an insertion of Special Operations forces into a strategic observation point turned into a rescue mission to recover Petty Officer First Class Neil Roberts, a Navy SEAL who fell out of his helicopter and tragically lost his life along with the other Special Operations forces? How important was the occupation of this strategic objective in the prosecution of OPERATION ANACONDA?

Answer. Extremely important. The operation that Petty Officer First Class Neil Roberts and his SEAL team were planning to occupy (later named Roberts Ridge) dominated the entire Shahi Kot valley. Its occupation was an essential part of the overall Combined Joint Task Force (ČJTF) Mountain mission to block the enemy's rat lines, find, fix, and destroy the enemy attempting to flee into the mountains, and to deny him further sanctuary there. The location immediately around Roberts Ridge was also an area of interest for high value targets among the al Qaeda fight

ers.

If Roberts's fire team had successfully occupied Takur Ghar's summit, it would have gained immediate_tactical advantage, providing overwatch from the western slopes above objective Remington, overwatch along the enemy's primary rat line through the draw below the southern slope of Takur Ghar into the mountains of Eastern Afghanistan, and the ability to effectively utilize close air support.

Question. In hindsight, how could this operation have been conducted to minimize the risks to SOF forces?

Answer. There are several key factors which increased the already inherent risks to special operations forces (SOF) supporting OPERATION ANACONDA. Most notably the enemy chose to stay and defend this area rather than flee. SOF team's like Roberts's once compromised were fighting from a significant numerical disadvantage.

Additionally, the infiltration was not a deliberate one. In the interest of time, Roberts and his team decided to infiltrate directly onto the operation rather than move from the originally planned helicopter landing zone (HLZ) to the operation site. Once the first MH-47 descended onto the summit of Takur Ghar, tactical surprise was lost.

As the first crew and fire team came under fire, the ability to communicate over Satellite Communications (SATCOM) to higher headquarters was ineffectual. This served to degrade the effectiveness of close air support (CAS), the Quick Reaction Force (QRF), and the supporting crews as the situation unfolded. Finally, the lack of sufficient qualified SOF liaisons embedded with Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain reduced interoperability and diminished situational awareness for all of the conventional and SOF units entering the battle space.

Question. What lessons have been learned from this operation about the capabilities of our forces and the equipment we provide them?

Answer. Lessons Learned on this operation are still being compiled and are not available at this time.

Question. In addition to the loss of lives several MH-47 helicopters were lost. What other helicopters in the inventory can operate at the altitudes required to perform this particular mission?

Answer. The MH-53E (3 engine USMC version) and the Army's CH-47 can also fly the high/heavy lift mission.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOPS)

Question. An important tool in modern warfare is the use of Psychological Operations. How were PSYOPS used during the Afghan phase of ENDURING FREEDOM?

Answer. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) was employed tactically and operationally through the use of leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, handbills, and ground/ air based radio (eventually host nation stations). Most importantly face-to-face interaction between PSYOP soldiers and local populace was used.

Question. What forces were used and what platforms were employed in the PSYOPS campaign?

Answer. Elements of 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) (8th Psychological Operations Battalion (POB), 3rd POB, 9th POB) with Reserve tactical forces from the 2nd POG and 7th POG. Platforms include: EC-130E (Commando Solobroadcast); MC-130E (leaflet drops- 79); B-52, F-16, F-18 (leaflet drops- 1305). Ground based: SOMS-B for broadcast.

Question. How many leaflets, handbills and posters were disseminated during the conflict?

Answer. A total of 87,223,648 were disseminated.

Question. How many hours of broadcasts were employed?

Answer. 10,331:39 hours (SOMS-B, Commando Solo, host nation, and Maritime). Question. What is the status of integrating EC-130J aircraft into the Special Operations inventory?

Answer. 2 EC-130Es are currently being demodified and the Special Mission Equipment (some of which is being upgraded) is being cross-decked to the EC-130J. The first EC-130J (Commando Solo) is slipping and should arrive in May 2004.

SOF POST-AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT

Question. From acting as personal bodyguards for Afghanistan's present ruler Hamid Karzai, to training a new Afghan national army to support the country's central government, Special Operations Forces have played a significant role in Afghanistan following the war. How many Special Operations forces remain in Afghanistan?

Answer. As of April 18, 2003, there were 1,817 special operations forces (SOF) personnel in Afghanistan. For Fiscal Year 2003 (as of April 18, 2003), the maximum SOF deployed was 2,636 and the average was 2,158.

Question. What functions are they performing?

Answer. Special operations forces (SOF) forces are performing Tactical Reconnaissance (TA), Counter-Guerrilla Operations (CGO), Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (Afghanistan National Army Training), and Internal Defense and Development (IDAD).

Question. Are any of these missions more suited for regular DoD forces?

Answer. Afghanistan National Army Training (ANA): The Afghanistan National Army training mission can be accomplished by conventional forces and the Army is to relieve the special operations forces (SOF) forces of this particular mission in June 2003. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) Combat Controller (CCT) for Department of State Personal Security Detail (PSD) (President Karzai): The CCT assigned to the PSD is_currently being used as a line Radio Telephone Operator (RTO)/Communications Security (COMSEC) custodian with various other non-SOF related tasks, such as paying the contracted security forces. These duties can be filled by any line RTO, rather than an high density/low demand (HD/LD) asset. This is in line with the Secretary of Defense's guidance to relinquish non-SOF tasks to other forces capable of performing that mission. CCT's are trained to provide terminal guidance of aircraft in the objective area as well as Air Traffic Controller/Close Air Support (ATC/CAS) functions. Specific missions are: establish (to include placement of navigational aids such as Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN)s and Multi Mode Landing Systems (MMLS) and portable airfield lighting) and provide air traffic control at austere airfields; controls full spectrum of fires (Terminal Guidance Operations (TGO), helicopter calls for fire, AC-130 calls for fire, fighter CAS in support of SOF operations (Direct Action/Special Reconnaissance (DA/SR),

etc); conducts assault zone surveys and assessments to determine feasibility for use as landing zones, drop zones etc.; works as part of a Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) team as the ground command and control (C2) and fire support asset; overall air-ground interface integrating SOF ground troops with the full spectrum of air power. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) will maintain this tasking until July 10, 2003. Department of State (DOS) is making arrangements to replace the individual with a contract person or a conventional force replacement. Question. Are any of these missions more suited for U.S. Civilian agencies or NonGovernmental Agencies Answer. No.

SOF/FT. BRAGG SUICIDES

Question. On March 23rd of this year, an Army Special Forces soldier charged with killing his wife after returning from Afghanistan nine months prior hanged himself in a jail cell. He was the fourth soldier at Ft. Bragg suspected of killing their spouses during a six-week stretch last summer, three of whom were in Special Operations units. What can you tell us about the circumstances which might have caused these tragic events?

Answer. Prior to these tragic events, there were no indicators that would have alerted commanders to problems within the families. During the Serious Incident Review Board process it was ascertained that each of the families had marital problems.

Question. To what extent do you believe the Afghan conflict was a contributor? Answer. United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has soldiers deployed daily from throughout the command. Special Forces (SF) Groups at locations other than Fort Bragg, North Carolina had larger numbers of soldiers deployed. If the Afghan conflict were a contributor, one could extrapolate that the murders/suicides would not have been restricted to Fort Bragg. The report rendered by the 19-member Epidemiological Consultation Team (EPICON) stated there was no clear evidence that deployment, Operational Tempo (OPTEMP), or drugs caused the violence. The one commonality was marital discord.

Question. How many other soldiers have committed suicide following their service in Afghanistan?

Answer. We are thankful there were no others than the aforementioned four. Question. What lessons have we learned to better prepare SOF forces and their families so that similar events will not occur after the Iraq conflict?

Answer. Top down emphasis and resourcing for staff will have an overall positive effect on the services and programs offered to our families. Both pre and post deployment training will be provided for all soldiers. Training and outreach for family members prior to, during, and after the deployment will also be provided. Leadership will ensure any and all red flags are identified and swiftly followed up on. Training will emphasize and ensure that all comments are taken seriously. Chaplains will be appropriately brought into the process depending on given situations. Leadership will ensure contact between families and rear detachment commanders is on-going and will ensure early returns are treated the same as full unit returns. Leadership seminars were conducted to emphasize the commander's role in preventing and resolving domestic violence, and counseling programs were instituted for soldiers returning from a foward-deployed location. Additionally, the DoD sponsored Lifeworks system was implemented to assist families with myriad issues, to include domestic violence.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Question. The military goals of operation IRAQI FREEDOM were declared largely met 25 days after U.S. and British Forces entered Iraq. Special Operations Forces played a pivotal role in this operation. What proportion of the Special Operations Operators were deployed in and around Iraq to participate in Iraqi Freedom?

Answer. Effective April 18, 2003, there were 9,014 special operations forces (SOF) personnel supporting OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

Question. What role did Special Operations forces play in the pre conflict phase? Answer. Special operations forces (SOF) conducted pre D-Day activities with interdicting Visual Observers (VISOBs), conducted operations in the West such as Special Reconnaissance (SR), and conducted airfield surveys.

Question. When the northern advance through Turkey into Iraq became unavailable to U.S. conventional forces, special operations forces worked with Kurdish military elements to attack Iraqi forces north of Baghdad. Can you elaborate on that phase of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM?

Answer. In northeastern Iraq, designated Joint Special Operations Area North (JSOA-N) Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force North (CJSOTF-N) conducted Unconventional Warfare, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, and call-forfire missions against thirteen Iraqi divisions arrayed against the Kurds. Its primary mission was to disrupt the Iraqi operational center of gravity in northern Iraq and render the enemy's combat power ineffective.

Denied use of key Turkish bases, CJSOTF-N, also known as Task Force (TF) Viking, had to adjust its campaign plan based on the use of a different forward staging base, much farther from Iraq than the originally planned location in Turkey. This complicated the infiltration of troops and logistics into the JSOA and demanded an abundance of flexibility and creativity to overcome these obstacles.

TF Viking's first order of business was the conduct of Unconventional Warfare (UW). The task force deployed advanced force teams to link up with key Kurdish military and political leaders to assess their capabilities and commitment, and to make accommodations for the arrival of the main body. Working effectively with the Peshmerga (the name for Kurdish guerrillas), would prove to be crucial to the campaign's later successes.

The Iraqis had postured a large conventional force of 13 divisions along the Green Line, a nebulous and historically static boundary separating the Iraqi and Kurdish forces. Before the actual start of the war, Special Operations Forces (SOF) occupied key observation posts along probable Iraqi avenues of advance in order to be in the best positions to call in close air support.

On March 22, 2003, TF Viking commenced infiltration of special operations forces (SOF); MC-130s, Air Force Special Operations fixed-wing aircraft, flew through heavy Iraqi anti-aircraft fire and inserted a contingent of Army Special Forces teams and Air Force Combat Controllers. TF Viking quickly expanded its foot print within JSOA-N to include three Special Forces battalions operating as Forward Operating Bases (FOBS), encompassing a total of 51 Operational Detachment Alpha's (ODA), commonly known as "A-Teams".

In its first offensive action, TF Viking directed a combined force of SOF and 10,000 Peshmerga guerrillas to attack the Ansar al Islam terrorist enclave of 700 entrenched, heavily armed fighters in the Khurma area. The operation commenced on March 28th. Within 30 hours the SOF-Peshmerga force effectively destroyed the opposition.

TF Viking then postured two battalions forward against Iraqi forces along the Green Line. Following a brief defensive phase, during which the observation posts engaged Iraqi positions with close air support, Viking launched an offensive. This consisted of a series of coordinated attacks along the Green Line, which were normally preceded by bombing Iraqi defenses.

As the Iraqis retreated, SOF and Peshmerga troops occupied their positions. At a number of salients along the front the Iraqis counterattacked with armor and artillery, but SOF used Close Air Support (CAS) to blunt the attack and maintain the offensive momentum. The effective integration of air and ground forces destroyed the enemy's will to fight and opened avenues of approach to the two largest northern cities, Kirkuk and Mosul.

Meanwhile, TF Viking assumed tactical control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Assigning a conventional light infantry brigade to a JSOTF had not been done since the Vietnam War. The 173rd jumped into the Kurdish Autonomous Zone on 26 March and began supporting coalition operations. These airborne soldiers conducted an area defense operation to deny Iraqi movement along the major lines of communications between Mosul and Kirkuk. TF Viking would also assume operational control of another conventional unit, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).

SOF and their Peshmerga allies attacked Kirkuk from three sides on 10 April and the city fell by nightfall. More SOF and elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade soon reinforced Kirkuk and secured nearby oil fields. Other TF Viking forces negotiated the orderly capitulation and occupation of Mosul, where widespread violence erupted following the sudden disintegration of the Iraqi 5th Corps. Responding to pleas from factional leaders, SOF worked to reestablish order and civil services to bring stability to the volatile city.

In May, most of CJSOTF-N re-deployed. Some elements of TF Viking remained to serve in support of ongoing peacekeeping operations. Operations in JSÕA-N were deemed to be an overwhelming success and contributed greatly to USCENTCOM's campaign to liberate Iraq. SOF overcame numerical enemy superiority to defeat a large conventional Iraqi army through the effective application of UW doctrine.