Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Hobson. Mr. Dicks.

RECONSTRUCTION

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I had the good fortune to accompany Mr. Lewis and other members of the subcommittee on this trip. And I think we are doing some things very, very effectively. I would say to my colleagues, I came away convinced that we have to have the reconstruction money because that is going to help on security as well. I mean, when these people feel like we are doing something to help them, it makes a big difference.

I was up in Mosul with members of the subcommittee, and General Patraeus is doing an outstanding job. That should be the model for the rest of the country, Mr. Secretary. I was so impressed with the level of detail and involvement and interaction that the 101st is having with all these people in those provinces. I think that should be the model. If we follow that and give those generals the resources necessary to keep up their effort, I think we can do this.

Security is still an issue, by the way. I mean, don't kid yourself. You were just there and we were there. We have a lot of work to do. And it was mentioned that you need these trucks that can prevent these improvised explosive devices from exploding and other equipment like that.

RECAPITALIZATION AND PROCUREMENT

The one thing I am worried about, and I think we are going to do this and do it successfully-General Myers always testifies every year in his statement that-and I told this to the President and the White House staff on this issue that we are well below where we have to be on procurement. We are at like $71 to $72 billion and CBO and everybody else says we should be at $100 to $110 billion. What I worry about is we are wearing out this equipment at a record rate and I don't think we are putting enough money away. The Army said that it needed something like $17.5 billion to repair and replace equipment used in Iraq and Afghanistan. And as I understand it, the Department is only requesting $5.6 billion. And of that, $3.7 billion is for classified programs. So we are going to make a bad situation worse.

I had the opportunity, I should put it, to fly on probably five or six different C-130s and most of them were 1962-64 vintage. I mean, these Guard and Reserve people do an amazing job keeping that old stuff going. At some point we have to start replacing this equipment or somewhere down the line, when you and I are beyond the scene, some future President, some future Secretary of Defense, isn't going to have the equipment needed for some future contingency.

So I hope you will consider that. I really think we have got to come to grips with this. This has been pushed to the right for too long and we now need to do something about it or we are going to have real problems out in the future. Operation and maintenance is going to go right through the roof with the cost of maintaining and repairing all this equipment.

I would ask for your comment and General Myers' comment on that issue on the recapitalization and procurement.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I understand we have funds for about $2.8 billion for depot maintenance. And you are right; tracks and various aspects of the equipment are getting used at a rate that in some cases it is 2 or 3 times the normal usage.

I would also add, however, that we found after the Afghan campaign that requirements were adjusted and things were not replaced on a one-for-one basis; that the services made a judgment that they wanted to purchase something else. And so the total inventory is migrating over, understandably, as a result of the lessons being learned.

General MYERS. The only thing I want to add there is a pretty large chunk in the supplemental to help the depot maintenance piece, as I said, and I think that is really, really critical. On the procurement piece we are going to have to see how we come out of this period, and we are using the equipment very, very hard. And you saw that and we know that. And the usage is much higher than is predicted in a peacetime environment.

Mr. DICKS. What happened-go ahead.

General MYERS. I would just say that the fiscal year 2004 budget that was put together and the defense planning budget got us better in procurement throughout that time frame. And I think it was, for the most part, a very realistic expectation where we can be in procurement. We couldn't make it all up in fiscal year 2004, as you know. But we are chopping away at it in fiscal years 2005, 2006 and 2007. And I think the Department has done a pretty good job of that.

Mr. DICKS. I hope we don't keep pushing it to the right, which is a tendency. You have to pay more for health care and other things and you keep pushing procurement and new equipment to the right.

General MYERS. That is the danger. As more entitlements come on the books, then something has to give. You have a lot of must pays there. What usually gives, the account that always gives-and you are right-procurement always gives it up. That is where it has to give up.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Bonilla.

NEWS COVERAGE IN IRAQ

Mr. BONILLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of the great frustrations is getting the truth out there. It is not a secret, but some of the information we are talking about in this room, and some of us that were in Iraq got to see firsthand the reality, which is that the glass is really more than half full and not half empty and how the projects that are being undertaken there, whether they are border security projects, education or hospitals, or trying to build a police force or a good military, they are not just ideas that are abstract. There are good forms of measurement that are being taken on a regular basis that show if you charted them on a graph, these are real projects that are being successfully undertaken in partnership, walking hand in hand with the Iraqi people.

Talking just recently to a member of the media, it was astounding; we were having an off-the-record conversation. Even this person's impression of what's happening in Iraq, they thought it was chaotic and we didn't have a grip of what is going on there. If people at that level, who are supposed to be informed, don't know what is going on there, imagine how difficult it is for the average person wandering the malls out there trying to understand what we are trying to do. And it is so frustrating because, again, when we were on the ground in Iraq and talking to folks at the State Department and part of Bremer's team, the news conference is-the information flow is out there every day, but somehow it seems like nobody wants to take up the cause and just tell the truth. And unfortunately the portrayal of what is happening there is just told in a few minutes each night, sometimes on the evening news, about the casualties, and that is not reflective of the big picture. Obviously that is a very serious issue when you lose anyone or anyone is wounded, so that is not the big picture.

In contrast to the war itself, where we got good coverage and the message was out there very clear with the embedded reporters, is it possible to have some kind of embedded project as well to have folks spend time with General Patraeus? I couldn't agree more with my colleague, Mr. Dicks, about the great impression that is made just by spending a little time with him to see how he is managing this entire part of the country.

There has to be some way to get this message out there, because otherwise it seems like the cynics and the agitators are the ones in my view, that claim to be loyal Americans, really want us to fail and they stir this up all the time and, unfortunately, they are succeeding. How can we get this message out there better?

Secretary RUMSFELD. If I knew the answer, we sure would be doing it. You are quite right. Let me first comment about General Patraeus and General Dempsey, the situation in the different parts of the country are very different. What is going on in the north is quite different distinctively from the central and the south. And the techniques that are being used by these innovative, creative_generals and their teams are really fascinating to see. They are doing a wonderful job.

You are right. There are some 6,000 individual reconstruction projects that have been completed. All the schools, universities, and hospitals are functioning. And the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad is working on 5,000 small businesses on its local business council, up from zero May 1st.

I don't know quite why there is so much misinformation around, but the phrase I hear most is "You have no plan," which is utter nonsense. How do you go from zero to 56,000 Iraqis providing security in that country if you don't have a plan? How do you deal with the oil well fires without a plan? How do you deal with the humanitarian crisis? How do you deal with the internally displaced people?

It is utter nonsense that there has been no plan. There has been very good planning here. The bridges, the central bank has been stood up, the schools, the water. The electrical system is being worked on. The judicial system is out and functioning, civil defense people, village clerks. There is something going on that—people

think it is fun to repeat something that isn't the case. And my impression

Mr. BONILLA. What about the idea of trying to have an embedded program to make the opportunities available for some of the people who form opinions.

Secretary RUMSFELD. There is an embedded program and no one wants to embed. In Baghdad, very few people are embedded right now. In Baghdad they have access to telephones, satellites and hotels and all the things they need to do their job. So you have a larger number of them in Baghdad than you do out in the other areas. I must say I think having Members of Congress go there, and other folks have a chance to see it themselves, they do get a very distinctly different impression.

Mr. BONILLA. We certainly had a fabulous trip, because we were able to become more educated about this. And I think in a bipartisan way, those-if you could hear some of the comments that were made in an earlier public event that we had here in the Capitol earlier today, it was well worth it, and I think the message will start getting out there a little more at least through many of us. Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, sir. Mr. Sabo.

COST ESTIMATING

Mr. SABO. I guess I don't have so much a question but just an observation. I am someone who voted against the resolution to go to war. I have no reservations about that vote. If I had to do it again, I would make the same vote with more certainty than I had some months ago. And on the other hand, I understand the reality of where we are today.

And I assume you would like to have some of us who thought you were wrong to go to war vote for what you want to do today. Maybe I am wrong, but I assume that. But you make it very difficult, because we thought then that we were being sold-oversold. And today we are being undersold.

To follow up on Mr. Obey's questions, my assumption is the costs are going to be substantially more than what we are being told today, both in terms of long-term and military obligation and also in terms of reconstruction of Iraq. I think the assumption that billions are going to flow from other countries just doesn't pass the reality test. And I think the American people need to understand this is something that is going to be very expensive for a longer period of time than most of them expect.

We are also in a mess fiscally in this country. It is not your department, but it is reality, and what goes on here complicates that and makes it more difficult to sell.

I find it difficult when I hear that this is an extension on the war on terrorism, because I think it is something fundamentally other than that. We were simply seeking supplemental funds to deal with the war on terrorism. Clearly part of that supplemental would be some significant additional funding for a variety of very crucial programs in our own country to deal with security issues that might relate to terrorism. The administration has not been particularly generous in funding those programs.

So I find you make it very difficult for some of us to vote yes, but we will still seriously consider it, because the truth is the alter

native to proceeding is probably chaos, and chaos in another part of the Middle East would in the long run be incredibly dangerous for this country. So we will keep our options open. But, boy, I wish some of the rhetoric would be a little more accurate to the point. And rather than underestimating our ability to deal with the truth today, where we are, I would like to see us have the American people and the Congress fully understand where we are at and what our responsibility is.

I might say one of my comments early on, before this conflict started, my assumption was that in the end that some of us who voted no would have the responsibility of voting yes for reconstitution on Iraq. Those people who voted yes ran away from the consequences of their vote.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Sabo. Any comments?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I would say this. It would be unwise and unfair for me to think I could speak about the future with precision. It is hard; you can't. There are things that aren't knowable. And I think the way I phrased it is exactly correct, that the our expectation for the military side of the $87 billion is what we believe it will cost for the calendar-correction, fiscal year 2004.

I said earlier and I believe that it is unlikely there would not be a military bill to pay for 2005 and that that would be handled in a supplemental.

Now, that is directly and straightforward as I can be. I can't tell you what that number will be. I don't think anyone could. We are just in the beginning process of developing those budgets, and the Coalition Provisional Authority hasn't even started.

With respect to the Coalition Provisional Authority, I have never believed that it is the job of the United States of America to rebuild Iraq. Iraq is suffering not from the war damage; Iraq is suffering from 30-plus years of Saddam Hussein's Stalinist-like economic policies and denial and starvation of that infrastructure, because he was building palaces and armies and doing other things.

So what we need to do is to, as you correctly said, make sure that you don't end up in chaos. Make sure that they are put on a path, politically, economically, and from a security standpoint, so they can get on a path for the future that is sensible and constructive for that part of the world. And we believe that this proposal, which we do hope you will support, provides the kind of resources that are needed to do that. I take what you have said very seriously.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you. Mr. Nethercutt.

POST-WAR PLANNING

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentle

men.

Mr. Secretary, I think you make a very sound point relative to the issue of whether there is or is not a plan. As one who just came back with the delegation, I think the plan has worked remarkably well, frankly, given where we were 5 months ago and where the people of Iraq were 5 months ago and where they are today.

Now your military personnel are very well positioned I think, as I observed parts of that country along with the rest of the members. I think they are preparing to protect their own security and