Brute FactsElly Vintiadis, Constantinos Mekios Brute facts are facts that don't have explanations. Such facts appear in our explanations, inform many people's views about the structure of the world, and are part of philosophical interpretations in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Yet, despite the considerable literature on explanation, the question of bruteness has been left largely unexamined. The chapters in Brute Facts address this gap in academic thought by exploring the central considerations which surround this topic. How can we draw a distinction between facts that can reasonably be thought of as brute and facts for which further explanation is possible? Can we explain something and gain understanding by appealing to brute facts? Is naturalism inconsistent with the existence of (non-physical) brute facts? Can modal facts be brute facts? Are emergent facts brute? This volume brings together contributions by authors who offer different answers to these questions. In presenting a range of different viewpoints on these matters, Brute Facts engages with major debates in contemporary philosophy concerning modality, naturalism, consciousness, reduction and explanation. |
Contents
Must There be Brute Facts? | |
How to Make the Case for Brute Facts | |
Mind vs Morality | |
Brute Necessity and the MindBody Problem | |
Are Modal Facts Brute Facts? | |
Truthmaking and the Mysteries of Emergence | |
Are There Brute Facts about Consciousness? | |
The Provenance of Consciousness | |
Brute Facts about Emergence | |
There is Nothing Really Wrong with Emergent Brute Facts | |
Inexplicable but Explanatory | |
Naturalism Emergence and Brute Facts | |
Emergence Downward Causation and No Brute Facts in Biological | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept argue Barnes basic Bickhard brute connections brute necessity brute phenomenal facts Cameron causal closure causal powers Chalmers claim conception contingent determined discussion distinct emergence base emergent properties emergentism emergentists empirical entities epistemic epistemic gap ethical example explanatory gap Goff Goswick grounds higher-level Humean idea identity inference instantiated irreducible kind knowledge argument laws Levine logical mental mereological metaphysical Mind modal objects modal properties natural piety necessary truths nonmodal objects nonmodally appropriate nonphenomenal normative notion ontological dependence ontological emergence ontologically brute facts organization Oxford University Press panpsychism panpsychist particles Philosophical Studies philosophy of mind Philosophy of Science physicalist plausible possible worlds premise principle priori entailed problem protophenomenal Qualia question reality reason relation relevant Russellian monism Russellian panprotopsychism Schaffer sense sort property Strawson strong emergence strong supervenience structural-and-dynamic supervenience theory things true truthmaking understanding unexplained virtue Weak Emergence