Elly Vintiadis, Constantinos Mekios
Oxford University Press, Oct 18, 2018 - Philosophy - 288 pages
Brute facts are facts that don't have explanations. Such facts appear in our explanations, inform many people's views about the structure of the world, and are part of philosophical interpretations in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Yet, despite the considerable literature on explanation, the question of bruteness has been left largely unexamined. The chapters in Brute Facts address this gap in academic thought by exploring the central considerations which surround this topic. How can we draw a distinction between facts that can reasonably be thought of as brute and facts for which further explanation is possible? Can we explain something and gain understanding by appealing to brute facts? Is naturalism inconsistent with the existence of (non-physical) brute facts? Can modal facts be brute facts? Are emergent facts brute? This volume brings together contributions by authors who offer different answers to these questions. In presenting a range of different viewpoints on these matters, Brute Facts engages with major debates in contemporary philosophy concerning modality, naturalism, consciousness, reduction and explanation.
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accept Alexander argue Barnes basic Bickhard brute connections brute necessity brute phenomenal facts C. D. Broad Cameron causal closure causal powers Chalmers claim conception contingent discussion distinct emergence base emergent properties emergentism emergentists empirical entail entities epistemic epistemic gap ethical example explanation explanatory gap fundamental Goff Goswick grounds higher-level Humean idea identity infer instantiated irreducible kind knowledge argument laws Leibniz logical mental mereological metaphysical modal objects modal properties natural piety necessary truths nonmodal objects nonmodally appropriate nonphenomenal normative notion ontological dependence ontological emergence ontologically brute facts organization Oxford University Press panpsychism panpsychist particles philosophy of mind physicalist plausible possible worlds premise principle priori problem protophenomenal Qualia question reality reason relation Russellian monism Russellian panprotopsychism Schaffer scientific sense sort property Strawson strong emergence strong supervenience structural-and-dynamic supervenience theory things true truthmaking unexplained virtue weak emergence weakly emergent