land, by Riles; and Holland, by way of security for the premium and a further sum advanced at the same time, deposited the original assignment of the policy and the policy itself. Cullington and Riles claimed to have the amount of premiums advanced by them repaid out of the policy-monies, and the latter also claimed to have a charge for the further amount, in respect of which the deposit was made. The Master of the Rolls, in giving judgment, thus delivered himself: "Riles advanced the money without making any inquiry about Hawker, whether he was alive or dead, or what interest he had, although he must have had an interest either beneficial or onerous; and simply on Holland's representation that he (Holland) was solely interested. I think that Riles was bound to inquire, and that the case comes within Jones v. Smith. If he had inquired and received a satisfactory explanation, the case would have been different but I am quite satisfied that he entered upon the affair, knowing well that he was embarking in an affair of great risk."

We think also that this case comes within Jones v. Smith, not only, we mean, within the rules for determining the fact of notice there defined by Sir J. Wigram, but within the case itself. In Jones v. Smith, the party sought to be charged with notice was told that there was a marriage settlement, but that it did not affect the mortgagor's wife's property; and it was not considered crassa negligentia that he inquired no further, though it turned out that the wife's property was affected by the settlement. In Clack v. Holland, the circumstances are not very different. The depositor of the policy represented that he was solely interested: the depositee did not disbelieve the statement, and, relying upon it, advanced the money. Yet one case is held to be within the rule of constructive notice, and the other not. Well might Sir J. Wigram remark :1 "It is indeed scarcely possible to declare à priori what shall be deemed constructive notice, because, unquestionably, that which would not affect one man may be abundantly sufficient to affect another."

In conclusion, to revert to our starting-point, is Clack v. Holland a case of actual or of constructive notice, according to the test laid down by the Lord Chancellor in Ware v. Lord Egmont? The depositee had actual notice that another person, besides the depositor, had had an interest in the policy, and "he was held bound by all the consequences of what he knew to exist." Might not a similar description be given of every case of constructive notice, even of Jones v. Smith, in which Sir J. Wigram observed, that if "Smith was affected with notice of the settlement, it was with constructive notice only"?

1 1 Hare, 55.

POLICY OF ASSURANCE.-NATURE OF THE CONTRACT.—
INDEMNITY.-14 GEO. 3, c. 48.

Law v. The London Indisputable Life Policy Company and another.1

The case of Godsall v. Boldero (9 East, 72), which decided that a contract by a creditor to insure the life of his debtor was substantially a contract of indemnity against the loss of the debt, has received another shake, if it has not been completely demolished, by the case of Law v. The London Indisputable Society. The latter case, together with the decision in Dalby v. The India and London Life Assurance Company, may be considered as a complete overruling of Godsall v. Boldero, and therefore is entitled to take its rank as a leading case, from the great importance of the case which it overrules.

In Law v. The London Indisputable Company, the plaintiff being entitled by purchase from his son to a contingent legacy of 3,000l., which had been bequeathed to the son on his attaining the age of thirty, effected a policy for 2,9997. with the defendants' company when the son wanted twenty months of that age, to assure the event of his attaining the age of thirty years. Previously to effecting the policy, he informed the secretary of the company of the nature of the risk against which he wished to be assured, and was informed that the practice of the company was to make such assurances for one or more complete years, and that therefore he ought to assure for two years. The policy was accordingly effected, and the premiums were calculated upon the ordinary terms of a life for two years, without any regard being had to the particular character of the risk to be covered. The plaintiff paid two premiums; and after the payment of the second his son attained the age of thirty years, and the plaintiff received the legacy of 3,000l. Subsequently, but before the expiration of the two years for which his life was assured, the son died; and then the company refused to pay the amount of the policy; whereupon the plaintiff filed his bill.

On behalf of the plaintiff it was argued that the contract in no respect depended upon the payment of the legacy, but was absolute. The case was not within the statute 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, which, as the preamble showed, was passed to prevent "a mischievous kind of gaming," by persons assuring lives in which they had no interest at the time of effecting the assurance. The defendants contended that it was only a contract of indemnity; and that after the legacy was paid, the policy was a mere gaming 11 Kay & Johns, 223.

VOL. LIV, NO. CVIII.

2 B

transaction, which was void under the statute. It would be a complete evasion of the Act, they said, if, from having an interest in the life of another, for however short a period, a person were allowed to assure the whole life, or any period longer than that over which such interest extended; and this case was distinguishable from Dalby v. The India and London Life Assurance Company, inasmuch as in the latter case the policy was for the whole term of life.

The Vice-Chancellor Wood agreed with the judges of the Exchequer Chamber, that Godsall v. Boldero had not met with universal approval in the profession, though it was considered to be law. "The decision in the Exchequer Chamber," said his Honour, "independently of the high authority of that Court, appears to me to rest upon a right footing as to policies of this description. Policies of insurance against fire or marine risks are contracts to recompense the loss which parties may sustain from particular causes. When such loss is made good aliunde, the companies are not liable for a loss which has not occurred; but in a life policy there is no such provision. The policy never refers to the reason for effecting it. It is simply a contract that, in consideration of a certain annual payment, the company will pay at a future time a fixed sum, calculated by them with reference to the value of the premiums which are to be paid in order to purchase the postponed payment. Whatever event may happen meanwhile is a matter of indifference to the company. They do not found their calculations upon that, but simply upon the probabilities of human life, and they get paid the full value of that calculation. On what principle can it be said, that if some one else satisfies the risk on account of which the policy may have been effected, the company should be released from the contract? The company would be in the same position whether the object of the insured were accomplished or not; whether he were in a better or worse position, that could have no effect upon the contract with the company, which was simply calculated upon the value of life which they had to insure. The Exchequer Chamber came to this conclusion in the case of an insurance upon the whole term of a life, when the person insured had received the amount, to provide against the loss of which his insurance was effected. Then," continued his Honour, "I have first to consider the particular contract in this case. It was distinctly, that if the person whose life was insured should die within two years from the date of the policy, in consideration of the payment meanwhile of two premiums, the company would pay to the person insuring a fixed sum of money. I cannot import into that contract any other consideration than

what would be the value of insuring the life against the contingency there mentioned. If there had been evidence of any mistake in the terms, there might have been a case for reforming the contract; but the statement is, that the plaintiff represented that he wished to insure against the risk of his son dying within twenty months, and that the answer was, that the company made their policies annual in point of form, and therefore in this case proposed to insure against the risk of the son dying within two years. If they had said they would charge only such premiums as an actuary should calculate for the risk of his dying with twenty months, then the policy ought to be reformed. **The company, therefore, got the full value in premiums for that insurance for two years; and, accordingly, I cannot be in the least doubt what should be the result."

There is really no distinction in principle between this case and Dalby v. The India and London Life Assurance Company. Both take the same view of the nature of the contract of life assurance; viz. that it is a contract to pay a stipulated sum of money upon the death of the assured, or upon his attaining a certain age; of which it is an obvious corollary that it cannot be considered as a contract of indemnity.

Short Notes of Cases.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.-FRAUD.

Holman v. Loynes, 4 De G. Mac. & G. 270.

The relation of attorney and client was held in this case to subsist, although the attorney had not acted in his professional capacity for his client for sixteen months previously to the transaction which was sought to be set aside. In 1846 there had been an attempted sale by auction of the whole of the client's property, when only a small portion was sold. In July, 1848, Holman the client sold to Loynes the defendant, who was his solicitor, a portion of the same, the consideration being expressed to be 6007., though only 2601. was paid, and an annuity of 401. for Holman's life. In 1852, Loynes purchased the remainder for an annuity of 261. to Holman. The bill was filed by the heir-at-law of Holman, to set aside the transaction, on the ground that the relation of attorney and client subsisted at the time of the sale; and that Loynes might have made a better bargain for his client. The defence was, first, that the relation of attorney and client did not subsist; and secondly, that if it did, the defendant had acted properly. It appeared that he had acted for Holman in 1836, and that in 1838 an arrangement was made in reference to the costs then incurred. His next employment was the preparation of a lease for Holman, in 1843, from which time, until the sale by auction in 1846, he was not further engaged for Holman. From the latter period until April, 1847, he continued to act as attorney for the vendor, and was the agent for getting the estate sold; and there was an entry in his own book, in 1848, charging Holman for drawing the agreement for the sale of the premises to himself. It was held that the relation of solicitor and client subsisted when the defendant made his purchase from Holman in 1848. That being so, the Lord Chancellor held that he was bound to show that by no industry could he have got a better bargain for his client; and that the defendant not having proved that,-though no moral fraud was imputed to him, the sale to him should be set aside. "It may be admitted," observed the Lord Justice Turner," that if these transactions had taken place between Holman and any person not standing in a confidential relation