An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 124
... V. O. Key Jr. , Politics , Parties , and Pressure Groups ( New York : Thomas Y. Crowell Company , 1953 ) , Pp . 224-231 . " A detailed analysis of the problems raised by coalition governments is pre- sented in the next chapter . 8 ...
... V. O. Key Jr. , Politics , Parties , and Pressure Groups ( New York : Thomas Y. Crowell Company , 1953 ) , Pp . 224-231 . " A detailed analysis of the problems raised by coalition governments is pre- sented in the next chapter . 8 ...
Page 137
... V. O. Key Jr. , op . cit . , pp . 231-232 . follows from our axiom that each man seeks his own THE STATICS AND DYNAMICS OF PARTY IDEOLOGIES 137.
... V. O. Key Jr. , op . cit . , pp . 231-232 . follows from our axiom that each man seeks his own THE STATICS AND DYNAMICS OF PARTY IDEOLOGIES 137.
Page 305
... Key , V. O. , Jr. , 124 n . , 137 n . , 271 n . Keynes , John Maynard , 13 , 150 Lazarsfeld , Paul F. , 8 n . , 222 n . , 229 n . , 243 n . , 298 n . , 299 n . Lerner , Abba P. , 13 n . , 115 n . , 280–281 Lindahl , Erik , 282 Lindblom ...
... Key , V. O. , Jr. , 124 n . , 137 n . , 271 n . Keynes , John Maynard , 13 , 150 Lazarsfeld , Paul F. , 8 n . , 222 n . , 229 n . , 243 n . , 298 n . , 299 n . Lerner , Abba P. , 13 n . , 115 n . , 280–281 Lindahl , Erik , 282 Lindblom ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero