An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 87
Page 7
... assume , is to select a government . Therefore rational be- havior in connection with elections is behavior oriented toward this end and no other . Let us assume a certain man prefers party A for political reasons , but his wife has a ...
... assume , is to select a government . Therefore rational be- havior in connection with elections is behavior oriented toward this end and no other . Let us assume a certain man prefers party A for political reasons , but his wife has a ...
Page 26
... assume complete agreement on goals among the members of an office - seeking coalition . By thus narrowing our definition , we escape the dilemma posed in Chapter 1 and yet construct a model in which the government is a decision - making ...
... assume complete agreement on goals among the members of an office - seeking coalition . By thus narrowing our definition , we escape the dilemma posed in Chapter 1 and yet construct a model in which the government is a decision - making ...
Page 116
... assume that the left end of the scale represents full government control , and the right end means a completely free market , we can rank parties by their views on this issue in a way that might be nearly universally recognized as ...
... assume that the left end of the scale represents full government control , and the right end means a completely free market , we can rank parties by their views on this issue in a way that might be nearly universally recognized as ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
14 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero