An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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... assumption , in fact , that gives his theory its explanatory power . Most of us are such uncritical children of Freud that to say , " He did that because he decided it was the best way to get what he wanted , ” is apt to strike us as ...
... assumption , in fact , that gives his theory its explanatory power . Most of us are such uncritical children of Freud that to say , " He did that because he decided it was the best way to get what he wanted , ” is apt to strike us as ...
Page 4
... assumption.1 As a result , the traditional methods of prediction and analysis are applicable in our model . If a theorist knows the ends of some de- cision - maker , he can predict what actions will be taken to achieve them as follows ...
... assumption.1 As a result , the traditional methods of prediction and analysis are applicable in our model . If a theorist knows the ends of some de- cision - maker , he can predict what actions will be taken to achieve them as follows ...
Page 182
... assumption of superperfect certainty neces- sary to overcome these technical difficulties , society will not al- ways reach a Paretian optimum . a . It will do so only by chance in a two - party system if the op- position party can wait ...
... assumption of superperfect certainty neces- sary to overcome these technical difficulties , society will not al- ways reach a Paretian optimum . a . It will do so only by chance in a two - party system if the op- position party can wait ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero