An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 27
... AXIOM Just what goals do all the members of each party agree upon ? In order to answer this question , we set forth here an axiom crucial to all the rest of our model . We assume that every individual , though rational , is also selfish ...
... AXIOM Just what goals do all the members of each party agree upon ? In order to answer this question , we set forth here an axiom crucial to all the rest of our model . We assume that every individual , though rational , is also selfish ...
Page 28
... axiom as a cornerstone of our analysis . Precisely what self - interest means will become clear when we describe in detail how the various types of political decision - makers in the model behave . C. THE MOTIVATION OF PARTY ACTION From ...
... axiom as a cornerstone of our analysis . Precisely what self - interest means will become clear when we describe in detail how the various types of political decision - makers in the model behave . C. THE MOTIVATION OF PARTY ACTION From ...
Page 36
... axiom that citizens act rationally in politics . This axiom implies that each citizen casts his vote for the party he be- lieves will provide him with more benefits than any other . Though this definition seems obvious , it is actually ...
... axiom that citizens act rationally in politics . This axiom implies that each citizen casts his vote for the party he be- lieves will provide him with more benefits than any other . Though this definition seems obvious , it is actually ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero