An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 16
... benefits.15 Since every man enjoys the benefits of every government act , no matter who pays for it , each man is motivated to evade paying himself . However , he will be willing to pay his share of the cost - since he does receive benefits ...
... benefits.15 Since every man enjoys the benefits of every government act , no matter who pays for it , each man is motivated to evade paying himself . However , he will be willing to pay his share of the cost - since he does receive benefits ...
Page 37
... benefits from gov- ernment activities . Their streets are policed , water purified , roads repaired , shores defended , garbage removed , weather forecast , etc. These benefits are exactly like the benefits they receive from private ...
... benefits from gov- ernment activities . Their streets are policed , water purified , roads repaired , shores defended , garbage removed , weather forecast , etc. These benefits are exactly like the benefits they receive from private ...
Page 197
... benefit income cannot be measured and compared with the benefit incomes of others for cost - allocation purposes . Nor can government find out how much each citizen benefits from its actions by asking him , “ How much would you pay ...
... benefit income cannot be measured and compared with the benefit incomes of others for cost - allocation purposes . Nor can government find out how much each citizen benefits from its actions by asking him , “ How much would you pay ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero