An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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... fact that competitive party systems are a conspicuous feature of virtually all those nations the non - Communist world thinks of as democratic . It is an even more important fact that what is involved in governing , and in the ...
... fact that competitive party systems are a conspicuous feature of virtually all those nations the non - Communist world thinks of as democratic . It is an even more important fact that what is involved in governing , and in the ...
Page 67
... fact that each is a citizen is what makes his views significant , not the fact that he is ( or is not ) fervent about them . Hence neither passion nor its absence adds to the political weight of his opinions in a certain world . But if ...
... fact that each is a citizen is what makes his views significant , not the fact that he is ( or is not ) fervent about them . Hence neither passion nor its absence adds to the political weight of his opinions in a certain world . But if ...
Page 265
... fact that poorer citizens cannot afford as much informa- tion as their wealthier neighbors does create a bias . For ... fact , time is the principal cost of voting : time to register , to discover what parties are running , to ...
... fact that poorer citizens cannot afford as much informa- tion as their wealthier neighbors does create a bias . For ... fact , time is the principal cost of voting : time to register , to discover what parties are running , to ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero