An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 5
... goals which either possess are considered deviations that qualify the rational course toward the main goal . In such analysis , the term rațional is never applied to an agent's ends , but only to his means . This follows from the ...
... goals which either possess are considered deviations that qualify the rational course toward the main goal . In such analysis , the term rațional is never applied to an agent's ends , but only to his means . This follows from the ...
Page 161
... goals in the most efficient manner . But men live in society and in a world of scarce resources ; so when each pursues his own goals , his actions affect other men . Furthermore , these other men never have precisely the same goals that ...
... goals in the most efficient manner . But men live in society and in a world of scarce resources ; so when each pursues his own goals , his actions affect other men . Furthermore , these other men never have precisely the same goals that ...
Page 208
... goals requires information , since only his ultimate goal - his picture of the ideal social state- exists independent of his knowledge of the current situation . Most of his other goals are means to this ultimate end ; hence choosing ...
... goals requires information , since only his ultimate goal - his picture of the ideal social state- exists independent of his knowledge of the current situation . Most of his other goals are means to this ultimate end ; hence choosing ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero