An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 22
... GOVERNMENT The definition of government used in this study is borrowed from Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom ... government's proper role in the division of labor ? Clearly , these questions are vital in the real world of ...
... GOVERNMENT The definition of government used in this study is borrowed from Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom ... government's proper role in the division of labor ? Clearly , these questions are vital in the real world of ...
Page 145
... government's economic policy . These workers neither believe the Communists will become the govern- ment , nor do they want a Communist government . They treat the election neither as a government - selection device nor as an expres ...
... government's economic policy . These workers neither believe the Communists will become the govern- ment , nor do they want a Communist government . They treat the election neither as a government - selection device nor as an expres ...
Page 287
... government's proper function from its in- stitutional framework means all governments can be looked at from the same point of view , as we mentioned earlier . Since by nature each has general power in its society , its function ...
... government's proper function from its in- stitutional framework means all governments can be looked at from the same point of view , as we mentioned earlier . Since by nature each has general power in its society , its function ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero