An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 54
Page 8
... group sociology . However , nearly all primary groups are strongly influenced by general economic and political conditions ; hence we may pro- visionally regard the peculiarities of each such group as counterbal- anced by opposite ...
... group sociology . However , nearly all primary groups are strongly influenced by general economic and political conditions ; hence we may pro- visionally regard the peculiarities of each such group as counterbal- anced by opposite ...
Page 101
Anthony Downs. Thus each party can ideologically woo only a limited number of social groups , since its appeal to one implicitly antagonizes others . But because of uncertainty , it is not obvious which combi- nation of groups yields the ...
Anthony Downs. Thus each party can ideologically woo only a limited number of social groups , since its appeal to one implicitly antagonizes others . But because of uncertainty , it is not obvious which combi- nation of groups yields the ...
Page 273
... groups would vote even if voting costs were equally difficult for everyone to bear . Because citizens who abstain exercise less influence than those who vote , low - income groups in society are likely to have less political power than ...
... groups would vote even if voting costs were equally difficult for everyone to bear . Because citizens who abstain exercise less influence than those who vote , low - income groups in society are likely to have less political power than ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
14 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero