An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 45
Page 98
... IDEOLOGIES USEFUL TO VOTERS Uncertainty alters this whole situation by removing the voters ' perfect competence at relating every party decision to their own ideologies . Voters do not know in great detail what the decisions of the ...
... IDEOLOGIES USEFUL TO VOTERS Uncertainty alters this whole situation by removing the voters ' perfect competence at relating every party decision to their own ideologies . Voters do not know in great detail what the decisions of the ...
Page 99
Anthony Downs. ideologies rather than past records . Instead of comparing government behavior with opposition proposals , he compares party ideologies and supports the one most like his own . Thus he votes on ideological competency , not ...
Anthony Downs. ideologies rather than past records . Instead of comparing government behavior with opposition proposals , he compares party ideologies and supports the one most like his own . Thus he votes on ideological competency , not ...
Page 113
... ideologies to cut their information costs . Parties also find ideologies useful in gaining the support of various social groups and in short cutting decisions about which policy will gain the most votes . A diversity of party ideologies ...
... ideologies to cut their information costs . Parties also find ideologies useful in gaining the support of various social groups and in short cutting decisions about which policy will gain the most votes . A diversity of party ideologies ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
14 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero