An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 124
... proportional representation exists , a party which wins only a small percentage of the total vote may place some of its members in the government , since coalition governments often rule . " Thus the minimum amount of support necessary ...
... proportional representation exists , a party which wins only a small percentage of the total vote may place some of its members in the government , since coalition governments often rule . " Thus the minimum amount of support necessary ...
Page 125
... proportional repre- sentation structure . From this analysis it is clear ... proportional repre- sentation system is established in a society where ... representation model in which such small but powerful parties can exist . 10 ...
... proportional repre- sentation structure . From this analysis it is clear ... proportional repre- sentation system is established in a society where ... representation model in which such small but powerful parties can exist . 10 ...
Page 162
... proportional representation and the legis- lature then selects a government by majority vote . Under these conditions , each voter's ballot does not support the policies of any one party . Instead it supports the whole coalition that ...
... proportional representation and the legis- lature then selects a government by majority vote . Under these conditions , each voter's ballot does not support the policies of any one party . Instead it supports the whole coalition that ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero