An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 103
... reliability , integrity , and responsibility as applied to political parties . Though we believe our examination of these concepts is interesting per se , its main purpose is to establish certain traits of party behavior relevant to our ...
... reliability , integrity , and responsibility as applied to political parties . Though we believe our examination of these concepts is interesting per se , its main purpose is to establish certain traits of party behavior relevant to our ...
Page 105
... RELIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN POLITICS Though reliability and responsibility are useful in our model , per- haps either or both can be eliminated without destroying political rationality . To examine this possibility , let us ...
... RELIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN POLITICS Though reliability and responsibility are useful in our model , per- haps either or both can be eliminated without destroying political rationality . To examine this possibility , let us ...
Page 106
... reliability nor responsibility exists , no political predictions can be made . But rational behavior is impos- sible without at least some way of forecasting future events . Ipso facto , a democracy in which parties lack both reliability ...
... reliability nor responsibility exists , no political predictions can be made . But rational behavior is impos- sible without at least some way of forecasting future events . Ipso facto , a democracy in which parties lack both reliability ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero