An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 18
... social welfare function and dissolved the relationship between individual and social ends which it had tried to establish . Welfare economics was therefore pushed back into the emascu- lated state it had earlier entered by rejecting two ...
... social welfare function and dissolved the relationship between individual and social ends which it had tried to establish . Welfare economics was therefore pushed back into the emascu- lated state it had earlier entered by rejecting two ...
Page 29
... social functions are usually the by - products , and private ambitions the ends , of human action . This situation follows directly from the self - interest axiom . As Joseph Schumpeter cogently stated : It does not follow that the social ...
... social functions are usually the by - products , and private ambitions the ends , of human action . This situation follows directly from the self - interest axiom . As Joseph Schumpeter cogently stated : It does not follow that the social ...
Page 290
... social welfare function , because it provides a rule for transforming individual preferences into social action . Since constitutions vary widely , this rule is not the same in every society . The behavior of government in a democracy ...
... social welfare function , because it provides a rule for transforming individual preferences into social action . Since constitutions vary widely , this rule is not the same in every society . The behavior of government in a democracy ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reëlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero