Planning-programming-budgeting, Interim Observations: A Study Submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations ....1968 - 7 pages |
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1st sess 2d sess 90th Cong advantages affairs program budget alternative policies August budgetary Bureau Chairman CHARLES H Chief Connecticut costs and benefits country decisionmaker decisions Department of Defense departments and agencies duce effort Executive Branch fense foreign affairs program foreign policy Gaud goals Hearings hobby horses improve initial interagency INTERIM OBSERVATIONS INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS intro JACKSON JACOB K JAVITS July 26 KARL E key element Maine ABRAHAM RIBICOFF major federal depart matters Memorandum by Dr ments ming-Budgeting Mosher MUNDT MUSKIE national policy process national security officials Oklahoma LEE METCALF Peace Corps Planning-Program PLANNING-PROGRAMMING-BUDGETING plication of PPB policy analysis policy issues policy-maker PPB approach PPBS and Foreign President Johnson Professional Staff program memoranda Programming-Budgeting System provide quantitative require responsible Schlesinger Secretary of Defense SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL South Dakota Staff Director State's SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL System PPBS systems analysis techniques Thomas Schelling tions tool Top management USIA York CHARLES Zwick
Popular passages
Page 3 - But fourth and finally, to end on an encouraging note, although these techniques are mutually supporting, we are not dealing here with a matter of either/or. There is an infinity of degrees. Not only may one introduce a program budget without systems analysis or vice versa, but each may be used in limited areas or ways, and sometimes quite productively. For example, in foreign affairs, where quantification of objectives and therefore full systems analysis is so difficult, one can, I think, organize...
Page 5 - ... will become passive, and let analysis (implicitly) make the decisions. This is possible; it is also improper. But whether the decisionmaker will control the tool rather than letting it run away with him strikes me as a less important question than whether he will employ it properly in another sense. Will the decisionmaker tolerate analysis — even when it is his own hobby horses which are under scrutiny? How many hobby horses are there? Are they off limits to the analysts? Dr. Enthoven has quite...
Page 3 - ... arguments and evidence on which to base a decision; but the crucial element in the proceedings is the judge himself. Systems analysis and other modern techniques of evaluation require a consumer, some responsible person or body that wants an orderly technique for bringing judgment to bear on a decision. PPBS works best for an aggressive master; and where there is no master, or where the master wants the machinery to produce his decisions without his own participation, the value of PPBS is likely...
Page 4 - A major issue today as in the past is how best to generate more coherence in the planning and operations of the several departments and agencies in the field of foreign affairs. Would the installation of an interagency foreign affairs program budget be a promising way to extend and strengthen the authority of the Secretary of State over the conduct of foreign affairs? Is this what a President and his Secretary of State want ? And is this what Congress wants? Would the expected advantages of central...
Page 3 - Government-wide adoption of the PPB system, the directive came to AID not as a shock, but as a fillip. In fact it was a confirmation of what we were already doing. Top management in some other agencies, however, was not persuaded that PPB was well suited for their tasks. Yet for PPBS to work there must be a responsible person or body that wants this tool to help provide the organized data and arguments on which to base a decision. Thomas...
Page 3 - ... cited above, the Defense Department had a further asset : the capability gained through about a decade of study and experience (mainly at the RAND Corporation) prior to the formal beginning of PPBS. Most Federal agencies had no such background nor the technicians which this experience could produce. Clearly, in most areas of Federal activity, the Defense model of PPBS could be helpful only in peripheral ways. Most would have to develop their own blueprints, adapted to their own subject matter,...