On Thermonuclear WarOn Thermonuclear War was controversial when originally published and remains so today. It is iconoclastic, crosses disciplinary boundaries, and finally it is calm and compellingly reasonable. The book was widely read on both sides of the Iron Curtain and the result was serious revision in both Western and Soviet strategy and doctrine. As a result, both sides were better able to avoid disaster during the Cold War. The strategic concepts still apply: defense, local animosities, and the usual balance-of-power issues are still very much with us. Kahn's stated purpose in writing this book was simply: "avoiding disaster and buying time, without specifying the use of this time." By the late 1950s, with both sides H-bomb-armed, reason and time were in short supply. Kahn, a military analyst at Rand since 1948, understood that a defense based only on thermonuclear arnaments was inconceivable, morally questionable, and not credible. The book was the first to make sense of nuclear weapons. Originally created from a series of lectures, it provides insight into how policymakers consider such issues. One may agree with Kahn or disagree with him on specific issues, but he clearly defined the terrain of the argument. He also looks at other weapons of mass destruction such as biological and chemical, and the history of their use. The Cold War is over, but the nuclear genie is out of the bottle, and the lessons and principles developed in On Thermonuclear War apply as much to today's China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as they did to the Soviets. |
Contents
Alternative National Strategies | 3 |
r+ | 13 |
Will the Survivors Envy the Dead? | 40 |
Seven Optimistic Assumptions | 84 |
Neither Oblivion nor Surrender | 96 |
Early Attack | 111 |
Conflicting Objectives IV | 119 |
Group Choices | 120 |
Long War Capabilities | 277 |
Nonmilitary Deterrents | 285 |
Military Deterrents | 287 |
Bargaining Ability | 290 |
Implications for Study and Analysis | 295 |
Other Important Concepts | 305 |
LECTURE III | 306 |
The Role of Analysis | 311 |
Contingency Planning | 123 |
Peacetime Objectives of a Strategic Force | 127 |
Desirable Characteristics of a Deterrent | 146 |
Wartime Objectives | 164 |
Wartime Objectives of Defender | 179 |
Flexible War Plans for Defender | 184 |
Stresses and Strains | 190 |
Could the Missile Gap Have Been Dangerous? | 194 |
Four Typical Caveats | 196 |
U S Must Convince S U That | 218 |
The Arms Controllers View of War | 227 |
Areas for Arms Control | 234 |
Some Problems of Arms Control | 244 |
VI Additional Remarks on the Military Problems | 256 |
Reactions to Warning | 258 |
Problems of Mobile Systems | 265 |
Effectiveness of Aimed and Area Attacks | 268 |
To Protect All Deterrent Forces | 273 |
To Protect the United States | 275 |
On the Analytic Approach to Defense Problems | 326 |
The German Air Defense Analysis | 329 |
Why Dont We Care? | 332 |
19 | 346 |
VIII The Real Past | 350 |
IX The Hypothetical Past | 417 |
Technology 1961 | 453 |
Union | 502 |
Comparison of Select Capital and Consumer Goods | 508 |
PART II | 542 |
Introduction | 578 |
H Proposal for a War Damage Equalization Corporation | 597 |
Comparison of Insurance Rates on Residential Houses | 609 |
Simplified Analysis of the Value of Protective Construction | 623 |
653 | |
654 | |
657 | |
662 | |