Mr. Bugge next proceeds to fhew that Belidor has entirely miftaken the theory of this machine, and then goes on to lay down and explain the true theory of it; in doing which he delivers the following principles:

ift, If the refiftance of the ground, and the maffes of the piles, be equal, the depths to which they will be driven with a single blow will be as the product of the weight of the Ram into the height through which it falls.

2d, If the maffes of the Ram and heights through which it falls are both equal, the depths to which the piles will be driven will be in the inverfe ratios of the maffes of the piles into the fuperficies of that part of them which is already immersed'in the earth.

3d, If all these things be unequal, the depths will be in a ratio compounded of the direct ratio of the heights through which the Ram falls into its maís, and the inverse ratio of the mafs of the pile into its immerfed fuperficies.

4th, If the weights of the Ram be equal, and also the weights of the piles; the depths to which they will be driven will be as the heights through which the Ram falls directly, and the immerfed fuperficies of the piles inverfely. Or, because the immerfed fuperficies of the piles are as the depths which they are already driven into the earth, the depths they will be driven are fimply as the fquare roots of the heights through which the Ram falls.

From these principles, which are in a manner felf-evident, our ingenious Mechanician determines, that the distance which a pile will be driven by each fucceeding blow will be lefs and lefs, as the fuperficies of that part of the pile which is immersed in the ground increases; contrary to what had been afferted by M. Belidor: and, confequently, that there is a certain depth, beyond which a pile of a given mass and fcantling cannot be driven; the mafs of the Ram and the height through which it falls at firft being affigned. He alfo refutes the notion which had been entertained by fome, that the driving of piles is facilitated by loading them with weights: for the depth to which a pile can be driven by any fingle blow (all other things remaining the fame) being inverfely as its mafs, it is manifeft that thus loading the pile, and thereby increafing its mafs, will be so far from accelerating its defcent, that it will abfolutely retard it. He concludes his paper with fome very useful practical hints, and obfervations, relative to proportioning the several parts of the machine to one another, the number of men which ought to be employed, examining the ground, and the part of it where the first pile ought to be driven, fo that the others may drive with the greateft eafe poffible.

ART. XIII. Dedication to the collective Body of the People of England, in which the Source of our prefent political Diftractions are pointed out, and a Plan propofed for their Remedy and Redrefs. By the Earl of Abingdon. 8vo. 1 s. 6d. Almon, &c. 1780.

IS Lordship opens this Epiftle Dedicatory with an explanation of the reafon why his Thoughts (fee Monthly Rev. vol. lvii. p. 249) are dedicated to the collective body of the people of England at this period of their publication, and not at first.

The public good, fays he, was my object: but whether I had made ufe of the proper means to that end, or no, was not for me to determine. So far indeed as my intentions went, of their rectitude I was confcious: but how far I had fucceeded in ability rested upon the judgment of others.

To the judgment of others I appealed, and I called upon the Public, if I was wrong to fet me right. I declared that Truth being my only object herein, I thould as readily look for it in others as feek it in myself;' and I have waited impatiently for the event: but notwithstanding five editions of thefe Thoughts have been had, and much time has fince elapfed, to this very hour, not the colour of objection, nor the fhadow of argument have been opposed to them.

• These then are the circumftances under which this Dedication now makes its appearance to you. What diffidence had before with-held, acquired confidence hath fince produced; and as, on the one hand, if truth be with me, my reward will be in its ufe to you; fo, on the other, if error, my confolation is, that I have been ever ready to retract it.

But having faid, that not the colour of objection, nor the fhadow of argument have been oppofed to thefe Thoughts; I feel myself obliged to offer a few words in anfwer to one writer, who has been pleafed to honour me with his public correfpondence. This writer is a Mr. Cartwright, and who, in a Letter addreffed to me +, has, fuppofing me wrong in a pofition that I have laid down, called upon me, with great propriety, for my juftification. I rejoice to meet fuch inquiries. They are the avenues to truth. And I am no less pleased with the inquirer. He has written like a gentleman, and what is more than this, like an honeft man: for, unlike those anonymous writers, whofe fears are left the infamy of their names fhould increase the infamy of their writings, he has affixed his name to what he has written. It is therefore matter of concern to me to find myself miftaken by this writer: but my hopes are, that to remove his mistake will be equally fatisfactory to him, as to me.'

His Lordthip then enters upon his vindication, and, as we think, fully proves that the error has arifen merely from a mifconception of his expreffion; and that, in fact, with refpect to

Vid. A Letter to the Earl of Abingdon difcuffing a pofition relative to a fundamental right of the Conflitution, &c. By John Cartwright. See Review, vol. lviii. p. 237. REV. May 1780. Cc

the

the matter in difpute he and Mr. Cartwright are both of the fame opinion. He then proceeds to the difcuffion of another point; namely, the nature of allegiance; on the due folution of which, as his Lordship obferves, the most important conftitutional doctrine hangs. On this fubject his Lordship reasons with fingular acutenefs and ingenuity. In the courfe of his argument he examines the maxim that the King can do no wrong; in illuftration of which doctrine Sir William Blackftone lays it down, that the King is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing: in him is no folly or weakness.

But let us fee, fays this fpirited writer, how this Westminsterhall inference (for it is called a legal maxim) and its comment agree with the Conflitution, with nature, with reafon, with common fenfe, with experience, with fact, with precedent, and with Sir William Blackstone himself; and whether, by the application of these rules of evidence thereto, it will not be found, that (from the want of attention, as I have taken notice of before, to that important line of diftinction which the Conftitution has drawn between the King of England, and the Crown of England) what was attributed to the monarchy has not been given to the monarch, what meant for the kingfhip conveyed to the King, what defigned for the thing transferred to the perfon, what intended for theory applied to practice; and fo in confequence that whilst the premifles (of the perfection of the monarchy) be true, the conclufion (that the King can do no wrong) be not falfe".

And first in reference to the Conftitution: to which if this matter be applied (meaning what it expreffes, and if it do not it is unworthy of notice) it is fubverfive of a principle in the Constitution, upon which the prefervation of the Conftitution depends; I mean the principle of refiftance: a principle which, whilt no man will now venture to gainfay, Sir William Blackflone himself admits, is justifable to the perfon of the Prince when the being of the State is endangered, and the pubiic voice proclaims fuch refiftance neceffary;" and thus, by fuch admillion, both difproves the maxim, and overfets his own comment thereupon: for to fay that the King can do no wrong," and that he is incapable even of thinking wrong," and then to admit that "refiftance to his perfon is juftifiable," are fuch jarring contradictions in themfelves, that until reconciled, the necef, fity of argument is fufpended t.

With refpect then, in the next place, to the agreement of this maxim and its comment with nature, with reafon, and with common fenfe, I should have thought my felf fufficiently juftified in appealing to every man's own reflection for decifion, if I had not been made to understand that nature, reafon, and common fenfe had had nothing to do with either. Sir William Blackstone fays, That though a philofophical mind will confider the royal perfon merely as one man

.6

How eafily does the worship of the divinity degenerate into a worship of the idol?' Vid. Hume's Elfays, p. 46.

+ Vid. Blackstone's Comm. v. I. p. 251.

appointed

appointed by mutual confent to prefide over others, and will pay him that reverence and duty which the principles of fociety demand, yet the mafs of mankind will be apt to grow infolent and refractory if taught to confider their Prince as a man of no greater perfection than themselves; and therefore the law afcribes to the King, in his high political character, certain attributes of a great and tranfcendent nature, by which the people are fed to confider him in the light of a Juperior being, and to pay him that awful refpect which may enable him with greater eafe to carry on the bufinefs of Government." So that, in order to govern with greater ease, (which by the bye is mere affertion without any proof) it is neceffary to deceive the mafs of mankind, by making them believe, not only what a philofophical mind cannot believe, but what it is impotlible for any mind to believe; and therefore in the investigation of this fubject, according to Sir William, neither nature, reafon, nor common fenfe can have any

concern..

· It remains to examine in how much this maxim and its comment agree with experience, with fact, with precedent, and with Sir William Blackitone himself. And here it is matter of most curious fpeculation, to obferve a maxim laid down, and which is intended for a rule of government, not only without a fingle case in support of it, but with a ftring of cafes that may be carried back to Egbert the first monarch of England, in direct oppofition to the doctrine. Who is the man, that reading the past history of this country, will fhew us any King that has done no wrong? Who is the Reader that will not find, that all the wrongs and injuries which the free Conftitution of this country has hitherto fuffered, have been solely derived from the arbitrary measures of our Kings? And yet the mafs of mankind are to look upon the King, as a fuperior being; and the maxim that "the King can do no wrong," is to remain as an article of behef. But without pushing this inquiry any further, let us fee what encouragement Sir William Blackstone himself has given us for our credulity. After ftating the maxim, and prefenting us with a molt lively picture," of our fovereign Lord thus all perfect and immortal,” what does he make this all perfection and immortality in the end to come to His words are thefe: "For when King Charles's deluded brother attempted to enslave the nation," (no wrong this, to be Jure)" he found it was beyond his power: the people both couLD, and did refit him and in confequence of fuch reustance obliged him to quit his enterprize and his throne together +."

that

The fum of all is this: that the Crown of England and the King of England are distinguishable, and not fynonimous terms: allegiance is due to the Crown, and through the Crown to the King: that the attributes of the Crown are fovereignty, perfection, and perpetuity; but that it does not therefore follow, "that the King can do no wrong." It is indeed to be admitted, that in high respect for the Crown, high refpect is alfo due to the wearer of that Crown; that is, to the King: but the Crown is to be preferred to the King,

* Vide Blackftone's Comm. v. 1. p. 250. + Id. v. 4. p. 433.

Cc z

for

for the first veneration is due to the Conftitution. It is likewife to be fuppofed, that the King will do no wrong; and as to prevent this, a Privy Council is appointed by the Conftitution to affist the King in the execution of the government, fo if any wrong be done," thefe men," as Montefquieu expreffes it," may be examined and punished *.”

'But if any future King fhall think to fereen these evil counsellors, from the juft vengeance of the people, by becoming his own Minifter; and, in fo doing, fhall take for his fanction," the attribute of perfection," shall truit to the deception of his being "a fuperior being,' and cloak himself ander the maxim, that "the King can do no wrong;" I fay, in fuch a cafe, let the appeal already made to the Conftitution, to nature, to reafon, to common fenfe, to experience, to fact, to precedent, and to Sir William Blackstone himself fuffice; and preclude the neceflity of any further Remarks from me .'

After enumerating the various diforders under which the Conftitution is fuppofed to labour, this ftate phyfician, whofe abilities, independent of other confiderations, fufficiently fave him from the imputation of being a quack, recommends as a reftorative that an Act fhould be immediately paffed declaratory of the conftitution, for fettling the conftitution, and for obtaining uniformity in the State.' Those who wish to know what is advanced on this fubject must be referred to the book itfelf, in which its noble Author has difplayed great extent of political knowledge. His Lordfhip, though not an elegant, is a

Except the parliament, which is the great council of the nation, the judges, and the peers, who, being the hereditary counsellors of the crown, have not only a right, but are bound in Foro Confcientia to advise the King for the public good; the Constitution knows of no other council than the Privy Council. Any other council, like Clifford, Arlington, Buckingham, Ashley, Lauderdale, and as the initial letters of thefe names exprefs, is a CABAL, and as fuch should be fuppreffed. Nat. Bacon, fpeaking of the lofs of power in the grand council of Lords, fays, The fenfe of State once contracted into a Privy Council, is foon recontracted into a Cabinet Council, and laft of all into a favourite or two; which many times brings damage to the Public, and both themselves and Kings into extreme precipices; partly for want of maturity, but principally through the Providence of God over-ruling irregular courfes to the hurt of fuch as walk in them.' Pol. Difc. part 2. pag. 201.

For experience, fa, and precedent, fee the reigns of King John, Henry III. Edward II. Richard II. Charles I. and James II. See allo Mirror of Juftices, where it is faid, that this grand affembly (meaning the now Parliament or then Wittena-gemotte) is to confer the government of God's people, how they may be kept from fin, live in quiet, and have right done them, according to the cuf toms and laws; and more especially of aurong done by the King, Queen, or their children:" to which Nat. Bacon adds this note, A this time the King might do wrong, &c. and fo fay Bracton and Fleta of Kings in their time.' Difc. part 1. pag. 37. Lond. 1739.

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