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"each state, to the public acts, records and judicial pro- HEPBURN & "ceedings of every other state." If the district of Columbia is not to be considered as a state for this purpose, there is no obligation upon the states, to give faith or credit to the records or judicial proceedings of this district. But congress, in carrying into effect, this provision of the constitution, by the act of March 27th 1804, (vol. 7. p. 152) has expressly declared that it "shall apply as well "to the public acts," &c. "of the respective territories of "the United States and countries subject to the jurisdic"tion of the United States, as to the public acts," &c. "of "the several states," thereby giving another clear legislative construction to the word states, conformable to that for which we contend.

Again, by the 9th sec. of the 1st art. of the constitution of the United States, "No tax or duty shall be laid on "articles exported from any state." Can congress lay a tax or duty on articles exported from the district of Columbia, without a violation of the constitution?

By the same sec. "no preference shall be given by any "regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one "state over those of another." Can congress constitutionally give a preference to the ports of the district of Columbia over those of any of the states?

The same section says, "Nor shall vessels bound to or "from one state be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in "another." Can vessels sailing to or from the district of Columbia be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in Maryland or Virginia? Yet all this may be done if the rigi. construction contended for be given to the word state.

It is true that the citizens of Columbia are not entitled to the elective franchise in as full a manner as the citizens of states. They have no vote in the choice of president, vice-president, senators and representatives in congress. But in this they are not singular. More than seven -eighths of the free white inhabitants of Virginia are in the same situation. Of the white population of Virginia one half are females-half of the males probably are under age-and not more than one half of the residue are freeholders and entitled to vote at elections. The same case happens in some degree in all the states. A great majori

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HEPBURN & ty are not entitled to vote. But in every other respect the citizens of Columbia are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.

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ELLZEY.

Marshall, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court.

The question in this case is whether the plaintiffs, as residents of the district of Columbia, can maintain an action in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Virginia.

This depends on the act of congress describing the jurisdiction of that court. That act gives jurisdiction to the circuit courts in cases between a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state. Το support the jurisdiction in this case therefore it must appear that Columbia is a state.

On the part of the plaintiffs it has been urged that Columbia is a distinct political society; and is therefore "a "state" according to the definitions of writers on general law.

This is true. But as the act of congress obviously uses the word "state" in reference to that term as used in the constitution, it becomes necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a state in the sense of that instrument. The result of that examination is a conviction that the members of the American confederacy only are the states contemplated in the constitution.

The hause of representatives is to be composed of members chosen by the people of the several states; and each state shall have at least one representative.

The senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state.

Each state shall appoint, for the election of the executive, a number of electors equal to its whole number of senators and representatives.

These clauses show that the word state is used in the constitution as designating a member of the union, and ex

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cludes from the term the signification attached to it by HEPBURN & writers on the law of nations. When the same term which has been used plainly in this limited sense in the articles respecting the legislative and executive departments, is also employed in that which respects the judicial department, it must be understood as retaining the sense originally giv

en to it.

Other passages from the constitution have been cited by the plaintiffs to show that the term state is sometimes used in its more enlarged sense. But on examining the passages quoted, they do not prove what was to be shown by

them.

It is true that as citizens of the United states, and of that particular district which is subject to the jurisdiction of congress, it is extraordinary that the courts of the United States, which are open to aliens, and to the citizens of every state in the union, should be closed upon them.But this is a subject for legislative not for judicial consideration.

The opinion to be certified to the circuit court is that that court has no jurisdiction in the case.

ELLZEY.

END OF VOL. II.