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PENNING designates the time of payment. Between the distillation and removal, the duty remains outstanding. Laws of U. S. Vol. 1, p. 301, 310, § 14 & 17. The inspector is to estimate the gross quantity, by which he is to regulate the penalty of the bond, but the condition is to pay in nine months, the dutfes upon such part, as shall be removed in three months, from the date of the bond. Had not the duties accrued when the bond was given? And yet does not the payment in fact, and in amount, depend on the removal within three months?

In the case of sales at auction, Laws U. S. Vol. 3, p. 122, the duty accrues at the time of sale, to be paid at the end of the quarter. So in the instance of the carriage tax, Vol. 3, p. 327. Why then should it not attach on the sugar as soon as refined, when in all other cases, it attaches at a period antecedent to the time of payment.

In the act laying duties upon goods imported, Vol. 1, p. 248, 253, § 6, the duties are said to accrue, from the time specified for their commencement, not from the time when they were to be paid or secured.

Again in the case of snuff, the terms and conditions are the same as in the case of sugar. By the first section the duty is laid on snuff manufactured for sale, not on snuff sold; and by the 4th section the account of the whole quantity manufactured is to be exhibited. By a subsequent act (vol. 3, p. 195,) the duty is transferred from the snuff to the mill. A license is to be granted, and a bond given for payment of the annual rate of the tax, in three instalments. This act shows that the employment of the mill, and not the sale of the snuff was the object of the tax. The first section says that the former duty shall cease on the last day of March, and shall not thenceforth be collected, and the 16th section provides for the recovery of such duties as shall then have accrued. Yet the snuff then manufactured, although not sent out, in fact, paid the duty; and in law, what could be referred to but snuff manufactured and not removed? There could be no idea that the repeal of the duty applied to a bond given which had extinguished the duty.

Upon the whole, then, we find the repealing act perfectly correspondent to the words and spirit of the imposing act, and to analagous provisions in pari materia.

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The refiner was bound to pay, or secure, before remo- PENNINGval. But a bond was tantamount to a payment of the duty; it was a matter of option with the refiner. It released the sugar from a specific lien, or liability to forfeiture; and it changed the nature of the debt, and the remedy. A discontinuance of the duty could not cancel the bond, nor render a provision to recover it necessary. The proviso, therefore, was not more calculated for a bond payment, than for à cash payment. But it is consistent, operative, and necessary, if we suppose the legislature contemplated the recovery and receipt of duties which had accrued when the sugar was refined, but which according to pre-existing arrangements, must remain outstanding as duties, and which were not to be paid or secured until removal of the sugar.

The duty to be paid, was upon all sugar refined. But the duty on refined sugar was not discontinued until after the 30th of June. The sugar in question was refined sugar before the 30th of June. To exempt it from duty, therefore, is to discontinue the duty before the day of the repeal.

There can be no question as to the remedy; for if the duty had accrued, all the pre-existing remedies were continued.

If then we consider the words and spirit of the imposing act, the general nature and operation of a revenue system, the analogy of provisions in pari materia, and the words and spirit of the repealing act, little doubt can remain that the legislature meant to impose the duty on the act of refining, and not the act of removing the sugar, and therefore that the duties upon the sugar in question had accrued and remained outstanding on the 30th of June, 1802,

Harper and Martin, in reply.

The question has been truly stated to be, at what time did the duties upon refined sugar accrue? To ascertain this, all the provisions of the imposing act are to be considered in one view. This is the general rule of construction of all written instruments, and results from the principle that such instruments are only the evidence of the will of the maker.

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General expressions may be restricted by other parts of the instrument, or by its general import.

It is true that the 2d section lays a duty upon all sugar which shall be refined within the United States, to be levied, collected and paid after the 30th of September, 1794. If no time is fixed for the commencement of an act, it operates from the time of passing. By the strict construction of this section it applies as well to those sugars refined after the passing of the act and before the 30th of September, as to those refined after that day. But it is evident from the subsequent provisions of the act, that such was not the intention of the legislature. The act therefore cannot be construed strictly; and resort must be had to the other parts to ascertain its meaning.

If the duty was to be levied upon all sugar refined, the legislature would have directed a bond to be given for the duties on all such. Why should an account be rendered, to the officer, of all the sugar sent out, and not of all refined?

The general system of the excise laws was to tax, not the means of living, but the consumption of the article.

In respect to the impost, the duties are not due while the goods are in the ship on the passage. The analogy is between goods landed, and refined sugar sent out. This is the decisive act which evidences that the sugar is for consumption.

The expressions "recovery and receipt," in the repealing law, are not applicable to an unascertained duty; the term in such a case would have been collection. In the revenue system this difference is taken.

There is no analogy to the other cases mentioned, because the legislature have used different expressions, and therefore it is reasonable to infer that they meant to enact different provisions.

Wherever they meant that the duty should be laid at the time of the manufacture, they have so expressly declared.

In the case from Anstruther, the duty was laid upon wash, totidem verbis, and therefore, although the wash

was destroyed before the process of distillation was com- PENNING. plete, yet the court decided that the duty had attached.

But here we contend that no duty is laid upon refined sugar not sent out. The only inference from the case is that the court judged from the general purview of the act; and that is what we contend ought to be done in our case.

It is an important consideration that the penalties and forfeitures apply only to sugar sent out. Hence it may be strongly inferred that the duty was laid only on such.

The entry and report of the house, the number and capacity of the pans, boilers, &c. and the daily account of sugar refined, were only provisions enabling the officer to check the account of the quantity sent out,

It is said that every revenue system consists of three parts; the subject of the tax, the time of payment, and the mode of collection.

All these parts would be included in the 5th section, if the words "two cents per pound" had been introduced. It contains the subject of the tax, and provisions for the collection and payment.

As to the title, it is no part of the law, and is not to be considered in construing the act. But if it was, it is so general and indefinite, no argument can be derived from it.

The act ought to be construed favourably for the manufacturer.

Penal laws, and laws giving costs, are to be construed strictly.

Multitudes of cases are to be found where general words shall be construed, in favour of him on whom a penalty is imposed, but never against him.

No argument can be drawn from the 14th section, because the drawback is allowed only upon sugars which have paid the duty, and no duty is to be paid but upon sugars

sent out.

So in the 10th section the forfeiture is only of sugars on

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which the duty has not been duly paid; but no duty is payable but upon sugar removed.

But it is said that the contrary construction harmonizes the system. If the duties are payable upon sugars refined but not removed, why not render an account of those refined, as well as of those sent out? Why do none of the penalties apply to the former, but all to the latter?

As to the idea of debitum in presenti, solvendum in futuro; if the sending out is a condition precedent, no debt accrues until the sugar has been sent out.

If I am bound to A to pay a sum when A shall return from Rome, it is not a debt until he has returned; and if he never returns it is no debt.

In the case of impost, the duties accrue at the moment when they become payable. They must be paid or secured when application is made for a permit to land them. If they are destroyed before landing, or application for the permit, no duties have accrued and none are to be paid.

With regard to distilled spirits, the bond is to pay the duty upon all such spirits as shall be removed during the next three months. If no spirits are removed during that time, nothing is due upon the bond.

The duty upon sales at auction, does not accrue until the purchase money is paid. It is a part of the price.

The carriage tax accrues at the time of payment; and if not duly entered and the duty paid, a penalty is incurred.

As to snuff, the construction of the 4th section of the act of June 6, 1794, ought to be the same as that of the 5th section respecting sugar. There has been no legislative construction, or judicial decision, that the duties upon snuff manufactured after the 3d of March, 1795, (the date of the repealing law as to snuff) and before the 30th of March (when the duty was to cease) and not sent out until after the 30th of March, were payable. The gentlemen have said that those duties have been paid; the fact may be so, but that cannot alter the law.