The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional DemocracyA scientific study of the political and economic factors influencing democratic decision making |
Contents
Introduction | 3 |
The Individualistic Postulate | 11 |
Politics and the Economic Nexus | 17 |
Individual Rationality in Social Choice | 31 |
The Realm of Social Choice | 41 |
The Organization of Human Activity | 43 |
A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions | 63 |
The Rule of Unanimity | 85 |
Pareto Optimality External Costs and Income Redistribution | 189 |
The Range and Extent of Collective Action | 201 |
Qualified Majority Voting Rules Representation and the Interdependence of Constitutional Variables | 211 |
The Bicameral Legislature | 233 |
The Orthodox Model of Majority Rule | 249 |
The Economics and the Ethics of Democracy | 263 |
Democratic Ethics and Economic Efficiency | 265 |
Pressure Groups Special Interests and the Constitution | 283 |
The Costs of DecisionMaking | 97 |
Analyses of DecisionMaking Rules | 117 |
The Structure of the Models | 119 |
Simple Majority Voting | 131 |
Simple Majority Voting and the Theory of Games | 147 |
Majority Rule Game Theory and Pareto Optimality | 171 |
The Politics of the Good Society | 297 |
Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy | 307 |
Theoretical Forerunners | 323 |
Notes | 341 |
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Common terms and phrases
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