What Is This Thing Called Science?Co-published with the University of Queensland Press. HPC holds rights in North America and U. S. Dependencies. Since its first publication in 1976, Alan Chalmers's highly regarded and widely read work--translated into eighteen languages--has become a classic introduction to the scientific method, known for its accessibility to beginners and its value as a resource for advanced students and scholars. In addition to overall improvements and updates inspired by Chalmers's experience as a teacher, comments from his readers, and recent developments in the field, this fourth edition features an extensive chapter-long postscript that draws on his research into the history of atomism to illustrate important themes in the philosophy of science. Identifying the qualitative difference between knowledge of atoms as it figures in contemporary science and metaphysical speculations about atoms common in philosophy since the time of Democritus offers a revealing and instructive way to address the question at the heart of this groundbreaking work: What is this thing called science? |
Contents
| 1 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 9 | |
| 12 | |
The fallibility of observation statements | 14 |
Further reading | 17 |
2 Observation as practical intervention | 18 |
Testing the methodology against history | 131 |
Problems with Lakatoss methodology | 134 |
Further reading | 137 |
Feyerabends anarchistic theoryof science | 138 |
Feyerabends case against method | 139 |
Feyerabends advocacy of freedom | 144 |
Critique of Feyerabends individualism | 145 |
Further reading | 147 |
Galileo and the moons of Jupiter | 20 |
Observable facts objective but fallible | 23 |
Further reading | 24 |
3 Experiment | 25 |
The production and updating of experimental results | 26 |
historical examples | 29 |
Experiment as an adequate basis for science | 34 |
Further reading | 37 |
Deriving theories from the facts induction | 38 |
Baby logic | 39 |
Can scientific laws be derived from the facts? | 40 |
What constitutes a good inductive argument? | 42 |
Further problems with inductivism | 45 |
The appeal of inductivism | 49 |
Further reading | 54 |
Introducing falsificationism | 55 |
A logical point in favour of falsificationism | 56 |
Falsifiability as a criterion for theories | 57 |
Degree of falsifiability clarity and precision | 60 |
Falsificationism and progress | 64 |
Further reading | 68 |
Sophisticated falsificationism novel predictions and the growth of science | 69 |
Increasing falsifiability and ad hoc modifications | 70 |
Confirmation in the falsificationist account of science | 73 |
Boldness novelty and background knowledge | 75 |
Comparison of the inductivist and falsificationist view of confirmation | 77 |
Advantages of falsificationism over inductivism | 78 |
Further reading | 80 |
The limitations of falsificationism | 81 |
Falsificationism inadequate on historical grounds | 84 |
The Copernican Revolution | 86 |
Inadequacies of the falsificationist demarcation criterion and Poppers response | 94 |
Further reading | 96 |
Theories as structures I Kuhns paradigms | 97 |
Introducing Thomas Kuhn | 100 |
Paradigms and normal science | 101 |
Crisis and revolution | 104 |
The function of normal science and revolutions | 109 |
The merits of Kuhns account of science | 111 |
Kuhns ambivalence on progress through revolutions | 113 |
Objective knowledge | 115 |
Further reading | 119 |
Theories as structures IIresearch programs | 121 |
Lakatoss research programs | 122 |
Methodology within a program and the comparisonof programs | 126 |
Novel predictions | 128 |
Methodical changes in method | 149 |
a change in standards | 151 |
Piecemeal change of theory method and standards | 155 |
A lighthearted interlude | 158 |
Further reading | 160 |
The Bayesian approach | 161 |
Bayes theorem | 162 |
Subjective Bayesianism | 164 |
Applications of the Bayesian formula | 167 |
Critique of subjective Bayesianism | 173 |
Further reading | 177 |
The new experimentalism | 179 |
Experiment with life of its own | 180 |
Deborah Mayo on severe experimental testing | 184 |
Learning from error and triggering revolutions | 187 |
The new experimentalism in perspective | 190 |
happy meetings of theory and experiment | 194 |
Further reading | 196 |
Why should the world obey laws? | 197 |
Laws as regularities | 198 |
Laws as characterisations of powers or dispositions | 201 |
Thermodynamic and conservation laws | 204 |
Further reading | 208 |
Realism and antirealism | 209 |
language truth and reality | 210 |
Antirealism | 214 |
Some standard objections and the antirealist response | 216 |
Scientific realism and conjectural realism | 219 |
Idealisation | 222 |
Unrepresentative realism or structural realism | 224 |
Further reading | 226 |
Epilogue to the third edition | 227 |
Further reading | 232 |
Postscript | 233 |
Confirmation by arguments from coincidence | 235 |
Philosophical versus scientific knowledge of atoms | 239 |
Perrins experiments on Brownian motion | 244 |
atomism in nineteenthcenturychemistry | 251 |
Realism versus antirealism again | 257 |
Further reading | 266 |
Notes | 267 |
| 269 | |
| 278 | |
Back Cover | 283 |
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Common terms and phrases
able account of science anti-realist appeal argued argument Aristotelian assumption astronomy atomic weight atoms attempt Bayesian Brownian motion Brownian particles century chapter characterisation claim confirmed conjectures Consequently constitute Copernican theory Copernicus degrees of belief derived detailed earth electromagnetic electron ether evidence example experiment experimental results explain extent fallible false falsifiable falsificationism falsificationist Feyerabend Fresnel’s Galileo gestalt switches Hertz historical history of science Howson and Urbach hypothesis idea induction inductivist insofar involved kind kinetic energy kinetic theory Kuhn Kuhn’s Lakatos light logical measure mechanical mechanical philosophy method molecules moon motion nature Newton’s theory Newtonian novel predictions objective observable facts observation statements orbit paradigm Perrin phenomena philosophers philosophy of science physics planet Popper position precise prior probabilities probability problem progress question realism rejected research programs revolution scientific knowledge scientific realism scientific theories scientists sense significant straightforward telescope theoretical theory-dependent tion true truth velocity Venus waves