that if you were to examine the condition of society with a severe scrutiny; if you were to make yourself practically acquainted with the intellectual state of the mass; if you were to see, as I have seen, that the glare of modern civilization is owing to the superficial illumination which the intelligence of a comparatively few has cast over the many-in thus perceiving how little had actually been done, you would be inclined to grant more time for the evolution of those great and glorious results, which we unite in hailing as the ultimate destiny of the human race." These are unquestionably pleasing visions—and such as may be profitably indulged by men of benevolence, provided they be not altogether the work of an ungoverned fancy-and have their foundation laid in the plan which Divine Providence is observed to be actually carrying on with respect to the human race. But there is always great danger of thus mistaking the mere creations of our own imaginations, for the progressive scheme which Providence is constantly carrying forward-and, therefore, however gratifying and even improving, it may be to philosophic minds occasionally thus to let their minds loose upon the prospect of futurity, and to think of all that may yet be in store for the human family, during the vast and eventful ages of its future history, great care ought to be taken, amidst all such anticipations, to see that we are really keeping the actual course of Providence in view, and are not merely indulging fancies which have their only foundation in the unsubstantial creations of our own wayward imaginations. Many of the speculations of the author from whom we have so liberally quoted, in other portions of this treatise, seem to us to be exceptionable in this respect,-and to proceed rather on bold assumptions of what mankind should be, than on cautious observation of what they actually are, and are fitted to become-although his general style of speculation is of a truly philosophic cast-and, apart from his particular opinions, may be studied with advantage by all who have a kindred taste for freedom of thought and theoretical grandeur of conception. At all events, it must ever be kept in mind, that in speculating on what mankind may become, we are always in great danger of committing the absurdity of supposing that we ourselves have already attained, in idea at least, what is only to be wrought out by mankind, by a gradual and long-continued use of their powers and that as even the most enlightened individual can be but a very little in advance of his age, compared with the attainments of far distant generations, we are not authorized, in any case, to mould our anticipations into too precise a form, lest we should only be falling into the error of believing that our present and very limited acquirements are to be the ultimate inheritance of THE WHOLE HUMAN FAMILY. FORMS OF THOUGHT. It is under this title that Kant and his successors consider Time and Space as properly classed-and perhaps, if a name must be given to the order of ideas to which they belong, that which has been adopted by the great German metaphysician is the best that has yet been selected—because, though they might properly enough be considered as merely abstract notions, yet this title does not sufficiently imply their intimate and indissoluble connection with almost all the aspects which thought assumes, or their position as fundamental conceptions in all the excursions made by the intellect of man. The reader who is in the slightest degree acquainted with the writings of the German school will perceive that the account given of Time and Space in the text, is substantially the same with that so successfully stated and illustrated by Kant, almost in the opening of his great work, and which indeed pervades all his treatise. Yet the reader will also perceive, that the fundamental idea is put in the present work in a simpler and perhaps more easily apprehended aspect than that in which it has been more commonly given— and the author, accordingly, has now the satisfaction of quoting the following passages, which have come under his notice since that portion of the text to which they have a relation was written -which coincide exactly with the ideas he has himself ventured to announce and which, as they are from authors whose powers of thinking are confessedly of the first order, cannot but command the respect, although they should not at first convince the judgment of the reader. Leibnitz, in opposition to Clarke, who held that space and time are both of them infinite, immutable and indestructible, maintains that "space is nothing but the order of things exist ing, and time nothing but the order of things successive." The notion of real absolute space he considers as a mere chimera and superficial imagination; classing it with those prejudices which Bacon called Idola tribus. D'Alembert, to the same purpose, has said, "Y auroit il un espace, s'il n'y avoit point de corps, et une durée s'il n'y avoit rien? Ces questions viennent, ce me semble, de ce qu'on suppose au temps et a l'espace plus de realité qu'ils n'en ont. Les enfants, qui disent que le vuide n'est rien, ont raison parce qu'ils s'en tiennent au simples notions du sens commun: et les philosophes qui veulent realizer le vuide se perdent dans leur speculations: le vuide a été enfanté par les abstractions, et voila l'abus d'une méthode si utile a bien des égards. S'il n'y avoit point de corps et de succession, l'espace et le temps seroient possible, mais ils n'existeroient pas." "La notion du temps et de l'espace," says Bailley, 66 est un des points sur lesquels Leibnitz a combattu contre Clarke: mais il nous semble que l'Anglois n'a rien opposé de satisfaisant aux raisons de Leibnitz." These quotations shew that the dispute is of much older date than the modern philosophy of Germany-and that minds of the highest metaphysical talent have in all times been prone to adopt the same conclusion. No doubt there are also many persons, and some claiming the character of philosophers, who consider the ideas entertained on this subject by the authors mentioned in this note as fantastic and unfounded-and who at the same time are disposed to believe that there is no clearer or better understood idea in their minds than those of time or space. But, perhaps, upon more close consideration, the state of mind, in reference to these topics, of such persons, would be found to be that of Augustine, when he said, Quid sit tempus, si nemo quærat a me, scio; si quis interroget, nescio. That is to say, they would find that the idea is not so well defined or understood by them, as in their more careless and superficial habits of thought they have been inclined to believe. There are many things which men think they know and which influence their conduct as nature intended, but which are yet very different in reality from the first and even from the habitually |