rich and copious style of the "divine Plato," might drink in its beauties for themselves, from the pure and uncorrupted fountain; but a regard for those whose want of classical attainments would exclude them from a knowledge of its valuable truths, has induced us to give a literal translation, preserving the spirit, and, as far as possible, the idiom of the original.

The manuscript represents Socrates as having gone down to the Piraeus, as was his custom-professedly to see the games and races observed there annually in honor of the Goddess Athene, but in reality to study human nature, as it exhibited itself in the free and untrammeled movements of the pleasure-loving Greeks and strangers, with whom the port of Athens was, upon this occasion, crowded to seek an opportunity to benefit them by lessons drawn from his stores of wisdom, and true practical philosophy. The sage is sitting on the marble steps of a fountain, beneath the friendly shade of whose portico he has passed the night, making his morning repast of a meagre crust, the gift of some passing stranger, and quenching his thirst with the crystal stream that bubbles up from the fountain below. Polus, on the lookout for some one on whom to demonstrate the powers of his darling art, espies Socrates, and with the air of a man conscious of his own powers, and sure of an easy victory, approaches the sage, and with an ill-concealed sneer, after the ordinary salutations, begins to commiserate him upon his misfortunes, and dwells upon the unhappiness of his lot, compelled as he was by poverty to trust to the shelter of the public buildings for a lodging-place, to the gushing fountain for his drink, and to the meagre crust of passing charity for the means of appeasing his hunger. Socrates, however, denies that his is an unhappy condition, and on the contrary asserts, that it is far happier than that of other men, inasmuch as he is satisfied with this supply of his simple wants, while others, whose wants exceeded their means of supplying them, are the truly miserable. Polus denies the truth of this assertion, and challenges him to an argument. In accordance with his invariable custom, Socrates requests the Sophist to begin the discussion, by defining what he considers to be true happiness. From this point let the disputants speak for themselves.

Polus. Happiness is that state or condition in which a man gratifies all his desires, those both of the body and the mind. This is perfect happiness. But the man who gratifies the greatest number of his desires is happier than he who gratifies but few of them. And he who is dependent upon chance for the gratification of his desires, is, as you seem to me to be, O Socrates, of all men the most miserable.

Socrates. Does it then seem to you that happiness depends both upon the number of desires a man has, and the number of these he can gratify?

Pol. Nai.

Soc. Does it not then seem to you, that he who gratifies the greatest number of his desires, in proportion to the whole number of them, is happier than he who gratifies the fewest?

Ροί. Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Soc. Come, then, let us reason with regard to the civilized man and the savage, and do you answer while I ask, and either refute or be refuted. Has not the civilized man then, more desires than the savage?

Ρol. Πῶς γάρ ;

Soc. Does he not desire to eat, and drink, and sleep, and gratify his passions, equally with the savage?

Ροί. Πάνυγε.

Soc. And has he not besides these desires of the body, others which the savage has not? for does he not wish to gratify his taste for luxuries, his pride in style, dress, and equipage, and such like things, of which the savage knowing nothing, desires them not? Moreover, does he not covet money, and houses, and such things, for which the savage has no desire? And does he not desire to become distinguished among the citizens as a Poet, or a Philosopher, or even as a Sophist? Pol. Φαίνεται.

Soc. Does it not then seem to you, on the one hand, that the civilized man has the most desires? since he desires the gratification of the body, just as the savage does, and desires moreover these other gratications, those of the soul.

Pol. Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Soc. And, on the other hand, that the savage has the fewest desires, since he only wishes those things that pertain to the body?

Pol. Αλλά μοι δοκεῖ ὦ Σώκρατες.

Soc. Then the civilized man excels the savage in the number of desires, by the desires of the soul.

Pol. 'Aváyxn.

Soc. This then is agreed upon by us: On the one hand, that the civilized man excels the savage in the number of his desires, and on the other hand, that he excels them by the desires of the soul.

Ροί. Ωμολόγηται γάρ.

Soc. Come then let us also examine in this way: Does the civilized man excel the savage in respect to the gratification of his desires? Ροί. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ὦ νεότερες

Soc. Thus; does he sleep more soundly? or eat more heartily? or more abundantly gratify his desires?

Ροί. Ναι μα Δια.

Soc. How so, my good fellow? does he not require a soft couch to sleep upon, and dainty meats to feed upon, and when by chance deprived of these, does he sleep as does the savage upon the earth, or satisfy his hunger with uncooked meats or roots ?

Ροί. Οοκ εμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Soc. Does he then, if in sleeping and eating, he desires such a gratification of his desires to sleep and eat as he does not possess, gratify those desires?

Ροί. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Soc. And does not, on the other hand, the savage gratify his desires to eat and drink, whether he sleep upon the ground or on a soft couch? and whether he eat roots or dainty meats? And when any eater eats eatables, is not eating eating, and does not the eater derive the same

pleasure from eating, whatsoever eatables any eater eats? Answer me, my good fellow, it won't hurt

Ροί. Εοικεν.

you.

Soc. Is not the civilized man, then, inferior to the savage in respect to these gratifications, since, if deprived by Fortune of soft couches and dainty meats, he cannot gratify his desires for sleep and food? How does it seem to you?

Ρολ. Δήλον δή.

Soc. Then with respect to the desires of the body, the savage excels the civilized man in gratifications.

Ρol. Πάνυγε.

Soc. Is not then the savage more happy in respect to the body, since he excels in gratification of the desires of the body? Answer me, my pretty fellow, don't be afraid.

Ρο. Ναὶ τουτόγε.

Soc. This, then, is agreed upon by us: that the savage excels the civilized man in the gratification of the desires of the body. And it was before agreed, that the civilized man excels in the number of his desires by the desires of the soul.

Ροί. Οὕτως ἔχει.

Soc. Let us then consider these desires of the soul, what kind they are. Are they not such as Pride, Ambition, Avarice, and such like? Pol. Nai.

Soc. And was it not just now admitted, that these are the desires by which the civilized man excels the savage, since many of these the savage does not have at all?

Pol. Ωμολογῆται.

Soc. Let us consider then in this way: Does the civilized man ever obtain the gratification of his desires?

Ροί. Ναὶ μὲ Δία, πῶς γὰρ ὄν ;

Soc. How so, my good fellow? Does he ever gratify his desire to rule ?

Ροί. Πάνυ γε.

Soc. Does he not desire to rule supremely? And are there not always, in every state or city, some who bow not the mind to the ruler ?

Pol. Nai.

Soc. Does he then rule supremely?

Ροί. Πῶς γάρ ου;

Soc. Thus, he who does not submit with his mind, does not submit at all, for, it is the mind that submits, and if the mind do not submit to the ruler, then there is no submission, and he does not rule supremely. Is not this true?

Ροί. Ναὶ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

Soc. Does he then gratify his desire to rule supremely?

Ροί. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Soc. And is it not according to the same reasoning with the other desires of the body? I say something of this kind; is there not always in respect to every desire of the soul, something that is not gratified, in the gratification of that desire?

Ροί. Πῶς λέγεις ;

Soc. Thus; does not the man who is a ruler desire to become a King? and becoming a King, does he not desire to become an Emperor? and becoming an Emperor, does he not desire to become a God, as did Alexander?

Pol. Ναί.

Soc. And does he ever become a God?

Pol. Ov.

Soc. Then he never gratifies his desires with respect to power, does he?

Ροί. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Soc. And is it not the same with regard to Pride, Avarice, and other desires of the soul, that there is always some desire ungratified? Ροί. Φαίνεται.

Soc. Then the civilized man does not gratify at all the desires of the soul, since the highest desires are always ungratified. And it was before agreed with respect to the desires of the body, that the civilized man does not excel the savage in the number of his gratifications. Therefore the civilized man does not excel the savage in the number of the gratifications either of the body or the soul. Is this so? Pol. Φαίνεται.

Soc. But it was at first proposed by you, that happiness is that condition of man in which he gratifies his desires, and that he is the happier man, who succeeds in gratifying the greatest proportion of his desires. Therefore, since the desires of the civilized man exceed those of the savage, by the desires of the soul, and the desires of the soul are not gratified at all, while the savage excels the civilized man in the gratifications of the desires of the body, does not the savage excel the civilized man in happiness?

Ροί. Ναι, κατά γε τοῦτον, τὸν λόγον πάνυ γε, φαίνεται γε, ἀνάγκη, ἀληθη λέγεις, ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔγωγε, πολλη αναγκη, ω Σώκρατες, φημί, μάλιστα, πως γὰρ ου; καὶ μὰ Δία, πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔοικεν, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει, γὰρ φάπερ ἄνδ · ο εντ δοὖν τευ τούν.

THE PROGRESS OF VICE.

WHO has not wandered on the hill of dreams-
Mysterious hill, that runs its shadowy ridge
Between the vale of life and gulf of death-
And from its top gazed both ways, far and near;
Down that dark gulf, and o'er that sullen sea,
Whereon who ships plows no returning course,
But moors for aye upon eternal shores:

Then backward o'er the vale of changeful life,
That like a panorama spreads beneath,

Whose truthful pictures the strained eye doth reap

Amazed? There Horror broods, and lurid Hate;
And pale Despair his quivering substance gnaws;
And Happiness doth like a phantom flit,
While sorrow lurks in every haunt of Joy.

I sat upon that hill, and scenes most strange
Of loveliness and horror filled my view.

I saw a noble boy, upon whose cheeks

The hues of youth beamed beauteous as the morn:
His head was pillowed 'gainst an ancient oak,
Whose dusky umbrage mellowed into dawn
The sultry splendors of the noontide sun,
And, like a stern old castle on the Rhine,
Frowned on a stream that washed his aged foot.
Ambrozial sweetness bloomed along the sward;
A grateful breeze sang anthems through the shades.
As cherub youth, with sheet beyond his size,
Reclines thereon to pore the grateful page;
So on that map of beauty lay the youth,
And drank in nature with a lover's thirst.
Joy filled his heart by fondling of the present:
But to the darksome future flew his mind,
And then he sighed to think how many gins
Lay ready to entrap th' unwary foot.

At length departing, "Noble oak," he cried,

"Sweet stream, ye flowers that deck the year, ye birds,

Nature's pure orchestra, that with me oft

Have hailed the orient morn, and all ye scenes

My boyhood has adored, a long farewell;

The voice of Life calls me to action hence."

The vision changed. That self-same youth I saw ;
But he had grown to manhood, though still young;
Honors had thronged upon him, as the year
With generous bounties crowns the farmer's toil;
And all his character was solid gold.

But, lo! a wizard temptress by him stands,
And with her eloquence his spirit flames.
He sees the sparkling nectar of the vine;
He sees the wealth that skillful ombre heaps,
And all the brilliants on fair Pleasure's vest,
And all the phantasies that Vice displays,
And he bows down in adoration foul.

The vision changed; its tenor too was changed.
Uprose before my sight a gilded "Hell,"
(Oh! how unlike that dread sulphureous sea!)
Blazing with all the eye doth best behold.

All climes were there, all offspring of the earth:
The fragrant shades of Araby and Ind