just claim that he had made, universities would not hear "how should they understand him, he could explain himself the value of his medicines?" to the world by his pen. In he asked indignantly. "Their method is to vilify the physician. Should a sick man be healed, they must needs tell him not to pay for his cure, so that the sick and the law judged of healing as though it were shoe-making." His sound reasoning was declared a libel, and Paracelsus escaped imprisonment only by flight. So he shook the dust of Basel from his feet, and set out once more on his travels. It was in a spirit of injured pride that he went forth. "You scoundrels " thus he denounced his assailants "you have sought to drag me under the harrow, but for the harrow your own backs shall be bared." Not for a moment did he admit his inferiority. "I tell you," he cried with superb arrogance, "the down on my chin knows more than you and all your writers, my shoe- buckles are more learned than Galen and Avicenna, and my beard has more experience than all your universities." If the his 'Volumen Paramirum', and THE TURCO-ITALIAN WAR. IF it were not that the situation in the Tripolitaine is pregnant with lessons to those responsible for the military shortcomings. of the British Empire, the TurcoItalian War would practically have ceased to be of interest. Italy at this moment finds herself much in the same position as this country well might be, if she succeeded in clearing the seas of the ships of some European military power. Italy Italy has the command of the sea, but has no means available to impress her will upon Turkey. Her very inadequate and ponderous successes on the fringe of the Libyan desert, Turkey apparently can ignore: her not altogether meritorious depredations on the Arabian coast are of no relative importance: to throw an army either into Macedonia or Anatolia Italy does not dare. A period of stalemate, therefore, has been reached, in which Italy is unable to reap the full benefits from her sea-supremacy, since Turkey has little sea-borne commerce to be dislocated by an active blockade, and has nothing vital that her enemy dare touch. To a great extent this very parlous state of affairs has been created by the peculiar geographical circumstances of the Turkish Empire. The fact remains, however, that sea power accounts for little in the final arbitrament of war unless it be backed by a land force to carry the conviction of hostile superiority into the heart of the enemy's country. In war, sea power and land power are equally the complement of each other. Let us see what the Italians have done with the sea superiority that they established in the Mediterranean three months ago. They have established an advanced naval base at Marsa Tobruk, and they have mobilised five Infantry Divisions. As a result of their initiative against Turkey in Africa, they have occupied the three main seaport towns of the Tripolitaine, and a few subsidiary seaside settlements. They have established themselves upon the fringe of the Libyan desert at an enormous sacrifice in treasure, and in the circumstances of their marked superiority to their enemy, at a great sacrifice of human tissue. What material damage have they effected against Turkey? As far as can be judged it has been infinitesimal. little prestige the Turks may have lost by their unpreparedness for war has been re-established by the extraordinarily persistent opposition that the marooned handful of Turkish soldiery have made against the invasion,-an opposition that in many cases has been heroic. The loss of a few small warships and the wreckage of native shipping in the Red Sea amounts to little while the What power suspension of trade between companies of Bersaglieri on his Italy and Turkey only means left front in the Tripoli oasis, that Austrian and Russian General Caneva withdrew his houses are stealing one of line on that flank so far that Italy's particular markets. Sea it became possible for the cannot prevent this. Turkish artillery to shell the There is no great call upon town with their field-pieces. Turkey's Treasury to feed the Except a very small portion at spasmodic resistance that her the Tripoli end, the whole oasis garrison in the Tripolitaine has was abandoned to the enemy. so strenuously conducted. The This was exactly what Colonel situation has, it is true, neces- Neshet Bey wished. As long sitated the mobilisation of the as his force was concentrated at Redif units of the European Ainzara the Italian aeroplanes Urdus of the Turkish army. from above, and their cavalry, But Turkish mobilisations are if they shared initiative, from inexpensive measures when below, could ascertain his judged by European standards, numerical weakness. Italy's adventure, therefore, is likely to be a costly affair, so barren of the usual fruits of victory that it looks as if eventually Italy will have to buy that which it has cost millions to steal. Of this kind is the value of sea power, when it has no adequate complement in land force,-for the unprejudiced observer must reckon Italy's timidity with regard to Turkey in Europe and Asia Minor as a confession of military weakness. The so-called restriction of the area of operations out of consideration to Europe is, of course, only plausible eye-wash to comfort the proud Latins themselves in their national pride. The naïveté of the suggestion is, however, refreshing. After this preamble let us see what the army in Tripoli has done with itself since we left it last month calling for reinforcement from Italy as a result of the mismanagement of the local native question in October. After he lost his two Masked in the cover of the fig- and date-palm groves, however, his force must appear much greater than it really was to the Italians. A further advantage lay in the fact that there were many anchorages along the northern front of the oasis, where boats running the blockade could bring him valuable cargoes. Also the dates were ripening, and it was an easy matter to feed his desert allies. It is impossible for any one that was with the Italians to say how many allies the Turks succeeded in inducing to join their standard. The published casualty lists on both sides are very misleading; but if one can estimate the strength of the Turks in the desert round Tripoli itself by their official returns, it will be found that the estimate given in 'Maga' in December is practically accurate. The Turkish returns for the fighting round Henna, Mesri, and Hamidieh from 22nd October to the end of the month are given as 5000. It is explained that these are mostly Arabs, and the number is intended to include those that fell as a result of the internal conspiracy, and to implicate the Italians by the suggestion of cold blooded slaughter that accompanied the repression of the conspiracy. In the smaller operations early in November the Turkish losses were returned as 40 killed and 80 wounded. In the larger operations towards the end of the month, on the Hamidieh and Ainzara fronts, the Turkish losses were 90 killed and 230 wounded. In the great Italian advance by which the Turks and Arabs were finally driven clear of the oasis, the Turkish commander acknowledges to about 200 killed. In all this fighting, since September 26, it is doubtful if either Turks or Arabs have suffered heavier casualties than ten per cent of their entire force during any decisive period of the fighting. Let us take the last two periods mentioned and strike an average at this computation. This will give us a mean between 3200 and 9000 rifles. Let us say 7000 rifles. We know that the Turkish regulars marched out of Tripoli on 2nd October between 3000 and 4000 strong. They must have lost by the wastage of three months' war at least 1000. Therefore it seems rational to surmise that when the Italians finally drove the Turks and their allies out of the oasis, Neshet Bey disposed of about 2500 Turks and just under 5000 Arabs. Perhaps even less. The Italians were nearly 50,000 strong. It has been necessary to go into all this detail because there is a feeling in certain quarters that we in this country have been unjust to the Italians. We have not been unjust: we may have forgotten, perhaps, that they have had to learn many things about war that we ourselves have learned by just as bitter an experience as the Italian troops have had in the Tripoli oasis. There is no intention with us to be hypercritical; but the game game modern war is so serious a science that it is impossible to see it inexpertly applied without striving to profit by the lessons that a comparison suggests. of The Italian General Staff had calculated that they could effect the conquest and subjugation of Tripolitania with the mobilisation of three Divisions. That is, two Divisions for the actual theatre of war, and a Division in reserve at home. General Caneva's experience in the Tripoli oasis necessitated the immediate dispatch of the 3rd Infantry Division 1 to the : 1 The 3rd Infantry Division: Commander, General de Chaurand :— 1st Infantry Brigade (51st and 52nd Regiments) from Perosa. 2nd Infantry Brigade (93rd and 94th Regiments) from Ancona. A battalion of Alpini. Over and above this brigade the corps troops were augmented by the addition of the 15th Regiment and other detached units. seat of war, and the mobilisa- Italians withstood all these tion of a 4th Division.1 These attacks, and, the the weather reinforcements raised the troops having mended, the invaders disembarked in the Tripoli town were able to change to the area to the strength of an offensive on the 26th of Novarmy corps, and a corps com- ember. The plan of campaign mander was appointed in the which Generals Caneva and person of General Fragoni, Fragoni jointly decided upon who, though junior to General was not of a very complex Caneva, who retained his character. The plan disposed appointment as commander- one brigade along the line of in-chief, was senior to the sand dunes which lie just outdivisional commanders. side the southern border of the oasis, so as to command any movement from the Turkish advanced base at Ainzara, while with four regiments of infantry in operation between the sea and the cavalry barracks, a general sweeping of the oasis was set in motion. Information that has been received from Turkish sources suggests that the combined artillery practice of fleet and field artillery was too much for the nerves of the Arab allies of the Turks. The shell, fired at short range, tore great lanes through the palm groves, and ringed the defenders in with a thick pall of smoke and dust from the demolished buildings. The Bersaglieri of the waving plumes and the Italian Grenadiers pressed forward with levelled bayonets, and in the first day's struggle re-established a portion of their old line. On the following day the battle still waged among the fig and cactus groves, and by that evening Caneva was able to report that he had re-established the whole line that had With this overpowering force it was a physical impossibility for the Italians not to push back the resistance which the Turks had marshalled against them. Offensive operations, however, were delayed for nearly a fortnight by a tropical rainfall, which for North Africa even was torrential. This downpour turned all the roads radiating from Tripoli town into mountain torrents. The beat of these torrents undermined the loose sand of the field - works, and the water turned each trench and casemate into a boggy quicksand. The Italian field-batteries and the commissariat depots had, for the most part, been erected in low-lying places. The rain flooded them all out, and a heavy wind rising with the storms, all shipping in the harbour had to weigh anchor and seek safety elsewhere. To add to the general disorder, the Turks and Arabs, now established on the line HamidiehMesri, pushed in under cover of the heaviest downpours. The 1 The 4th Infantry Division: 26th, 37th, 50th, and 57th Regiments, with the usual Divisional Light Infantry Battalion. This division has reinforced Cyrenaica, and a 5th Infantry Division has now been mobilised in reserve. VOL. CXCI. -NO. MCLV. I |