CHAPTER VII. OF ESTATES FOR LIFE. SECT. 1.- LIABILITY OF TENANT FOR LIFE TO THE DIS CHARGE OF INCUMBRANCES. SECT. 2.-WASTE. SECT. 3.-APPORTIONMENT. SECT. 4.-EMBLEMENTS. SECT. 5.-RIGHT OF TENANT FOR LIFE TO THE POSSESSION OF TITLE DEEDS. SECT. 6.-LEASING POWERS OF TENANT FOR LIFE. SECT. 7.-LEASING POWERS OF ECCLESIASTICAL AND COL LEGIATE CORPORATIONS. SECT. 8.-RENEWAL OF LEASES. ALTHOUGH an estate for life confers only a right to the partial ownership of the land, it constitutes a more varied and interesting head of law than that which grows out of the consideration of estates of inheritance. A short general sketch, therefore, of the legal incidents of an estate for life will form a convenient introduction to that more detailed examination of them, which it is designed to give in the sequel of this chapter, as well for the reader's general guidance in respect to what he may find here, as for the purpose of tracing the general principles of connexion, which bind together the several topics intended to be treated of in this chapter. Estates for life are either created by act of law, as estates by curtesy and dower, which, in their main circumstances, have been treated of as incidental to estates of inheritance; or originate under our ecclesiastical and eleemosynary establishments, as bishoprics, deaneries, &c.; or, finally, are created directly by settlement under Dighton v. Greenvill, 2 Vent. 326. deed, will, or other tantamount assurance. An estate for life may be either for the life of the person to whom it is granted, in which case it is said to be an estate pur sa vie; or, for the life of some other person, and then it is said to be an estate pur autre vie. The person, for whose life the estate is held, is called the cestui que vie; if there be more than one person, they are called cestuis que vie. An estate pur autre vie is, in estimation of law, less than an estate pur sa vie; and though it is an estate of freehold, it is the lowest 1 estate of this description. An estate pur autre vie does not in general differ in the rights which it confers, or the disabilities which it imposes, from an estate pur sa vie: the principal feature of distinction grows out of the circumstance, that though in point of law the former is an estate of less quantity than the latter, it may in point of fact continue longer; and hence has arisen a series of questions peculiar to it, having reference to the disposition of it after the death of the tenant in the event of its not being then expired. These questions will be treated of under the head of wills and devises. Estates for the lives of others are usually granted, either under the statutory powers of leasing conferred by the legislature upon the crown and the various ecclesiastical corporations; or arise in particular districts, chiefly in the west of England, where this mode of farming out lands prevails more or less; or, in copyhold estates, by the special custom of certain manors. A tenant for life is entitled during his life to the possession of the land, and the receipt of the rents and profits. In common with the owner of the inheritance, he is said to be seised of the lands, in opposition to a termor, who is said to be possessed only. Notwithstanding the limited nature of his estate, he, for some purposes, may be considered as representing the inheritance. On the other hand, while he is freed from many of the burdens incident to the ownership of the inheritance, as, for instance, the liability to pay off incumbrances in solido, so he is deprived of many of its privileges, as for example, the right to cut down timber, open new mines, or do other acts which the law designates waste. Ecclesiastical persons, also, as bishops, rectors, &c., being considered in most respects as tenants for life of the lands which they hold jure ecclesiæ, are also subject to a similar restriction as to the exercise of the rights of ownership; and, therefore, if 1 Knight v. 175, 2nd edit.; Moseley, Amb. but see Rutland's Ca., 1 Lev. 107. Francis, 2 Atk. 217. $ Acland v. Atwell, 2 Roll. Jefferson v. 105. they open mines1, or cut down trees, unless for repairs, they will be restrained by the court of Chancery 2, and are punishable in the ecclesiastical courts, and also by writ of prohibition3. Being entitled to the rents and profits during his life, it is only reasonable that he should have not only the rents and profitsStrachey v. which had actually become payable previous to his death, but also, that his personal representatives after his death should have such portion of the rents and profits as had accrued in his lifetime, although not actually payable at the period of his death. At common law, however, his personal representatives could not enforce this reasonable right. Thus, for example, if the lands were out on lease, and the tenant for life died before the rent became actually payable, his personal representatives could not recover the proportion of the rent, which had accrued up to the period of his death; neither could the persons entitled in remainder or reversion, unless the lease had been created under a power, and consequently, as to so much rent as had accrued in the interval between the last preceding day of payment and the death of the tenant for life, there was no remedy against the lessee, if he did not choose voluntarily to pay his rent. This has been remedied by the legislature, and now, in almost every case, the tenant for life is entitled to a proportional part of the rent, or other profits, which may have accrued in his lifetime. This will lead us to the subject of apportionment. When he had sown the lands, and been at all the trouble and outlay incident to the due cultivation and preparation of the soil for the production of the following crop, and died before he had reaped and gathered it, the crop was generally secured to his personal representatives by the common law; and this will lead us to the subject of emblements. Tenant for life in possession being the immediate freeholder, it was his duty, in conformity with the obligations imposed upon him by the feudal contract, to defend the title to the inheritance against all strangers. For this purpose it became necessary for him to be in possession of the evidences of the title; and on this ground, therefore, he is, in general, entitled to the possession of the title deeds. When an estate for life meets with the inheritance in the same right, it merges in the latter; and even if they meet in different rights, provided this concurrence be effected by the act of the party himself. With this observation I shall for the present dismiss the subject of merger, as affecting estates for life; and refer the reader to the next chapter, where the subject will be considered more at large. Having only a partial estate in the land, he can rightfully convey only an estate for his own life. If he convey the entire inheritance, or any larger estate than his own, by a tortious assurance, this will be a forfeiture of his life estate, and the remainder-man or reversioner expectant upon it may immediately enter. If he attempt by a rightful assurance to convey an estate for a period which may continue beyond the period of his own life, as for example, an estate of inheritance, such a conveyance would be, on his death, not Ante, p. 198. merely voidable, as in the case of a tenant in tail1, but would be actually void and could not be set up by any mere acts of confirmation. Although the tenant for life cannot, by force of his own estate, convey a larger interest than for his own life, yet by several modern acts of parliament he is, for certain special purposes, and under the direction of the court of Chancery, enabled to make a valid conveyance of the fee-simple. Thus, he is enabled to convey the inheritance for the purpose of giving effect to the decree of a court of equity for sale of a deceased person's estate, for payment * 1 W. 4, c. 47, of the debts to which it is liable2; and to give effect to a decree ss. 11, 12. for the specific performance of a contract made by a testator in s. 17. 1 W. 4, c. 60, his lifetime for sale of his estate3. The observations, which have been made, as to the effect of a conveyance, by tenant for life, of the inheritance, would apply with equal force to the grant of any minor estate, as a lease for years, which might extend beyond the period of his own life. Upon his death, such a lease would be void, or the residue of the term, and could not, therefore, be confirmed by the acceptance of rent, or other acts of a like nature, as may be done in the case of a lease which is merely voidable. As, however, it is in general much for the benefit both of the tenant for life and those who take in remainder or reversion after him, that the former should be enabled to grant leases, which shall be binding on the remainder-man and reversioner, powers for this purpose are usually conferred upon the tenant for life where his estate is created by settlement; and in the case of ecclesiastical persons or corporations, who for the purposes of alienation are considered as tenants for life only, such powers have been extensively conferred by statute. According to this general view, therefore, of the legal incidents of the estate of tenant for life, we may consider them conveniently in the following order :-h's liability in respect to the discharge of incumbrances;-his rights in respect to the commission. of waste,-apportionment,-emblements, the possession of title deeds. We shall then be naturally led to consider his power of leasing beyond the term of his own life, and this will lead to the case, first, of such leases taking effect under powers conferred by the settlement, under which the life estate was created; and, secondly, to the case of such leases taking effect by force of the statute law, as happens in leases granted by ecclesiastical or collegiate corporations And this brings us to the subject of the renewal of leases, to the examination of what is commonly called the tenant right of renewal, and to the consideration of the doctrines of courts of equity in regard to the apportionment and payment of the fines and other charges incidental to the renewal, and to the trusts which these courts are in the habit of impressing upon renewed leases. SECT. 1.-LIABILITY OF THE TENANT FOR LIFE TO THE DISCHARGE OF INCUMBRANCES. Tenant for life, being entitled only to the rents and profits of the land, is liable only to keep down the interest of any incumbrances or charges upon the estate, and not to pay off the principal. When, therefore, he pays off an incumbrance upon the estate, the presumption is, that he meant to lay out this sum as an investment, and he becomes a creditor upon the estate for the sum so paid. This presumption, like every other, may be rebutted; and his own acts or other circumstances may be adduced to shew that he meant to pay off the charge for the benefit of the inheritNot only is the tenant for life bound to keep down the interest of all incumbrances during the continuance of his estate, but it has been determined that the rents and profits must be applied, not only in payment of all interest accruing due during his possession, but also of all interest due before the commencement of his estate1. The decisions on this subject have turned, ance. |