lands, of which the legal estate is in some other person, who is called the trustee; and to compel him to execute such conveyances as the person entitled to the profits, who is called the cestui que trust, shall direct; and in the mean time, cestui que trust, when in possession, is, in the estimation of a court of law, tenant at will to the trustee. Copyholds, as have been already stated, are not within the Statute of Uses; but when a surrender is made by A. to the lord, to the use of B., in trust for C., C. has no right but in equity, the legal estate being in B. Although no trust be declared in the surrender, yet the copyholder, as between himself and any other person, except the lord, may, by a separate instrument, model the beneficial interest in any manner he pleases, provided the equitable interest be consistent with the established customs of the manor; and, with this qualification, all the rules of courts of equity, for enforcing moral obligations in respect to freehold lands, are equally applicable to copyholds. Trusts, in respect to the mode of their creation, arise either by the express declaration of the grantor, or by implication and operation of law. The former may be called express, the latter implied trusts. In respect to their character, the trust may either be fully and completely declared in the first instance, and then the trust is said to be executed; or it may be only partially and imperfectly declared, and then it is said to be executory. Finally, the trust may be general, as where the conveyance is to A. and his heirs, in trust for B. and his heirs-here A. has nothing to do but to permit B. to use his name; or, the trust may be created for a particular purpose, as on a conveyance to A. upon trust to sell and apply the purchase monies, and this may be called a special trust. Special trusts of the most frequent occurrence are trusts for sale, for the separate use of married women, for accumulation, to attend the inheritance, to preserve contingent remainders, &c. In following out this subject, it will be convenient to treat of it in the following order,-trusts express and implied,-trusts executed and executory; incidental to which is the equitable doctrine of performance and satisfaction,-the general qualities and incidents of trust estates,-the declaration of trusts,-and the more important of the principal special trusts. Express and implied trusts.]-Trusts are either express or implied. The former arise from the declaration of the party creating the trust, the latter upon the construction of a court of equity, and grow out of the manifest intention of the parties and the nature of the transaction. Implied trusts are either constructive or resulting. The following are the principal instances of constructive and resulting trusts. It is a principle of the Court of Chancery, that what is agreed to be done for valuable consideration shall be considered as being done. Hence, after a valid contract has been entered into for the purchase of real estate, and till a conveyance has been made, and the purchase money paid, the vendor is considered a trustee of the land for the purchaser, and the purchaser a trustee of the purchase money for the vendor. The interest of the vendor becomes mere personalty, and goes to his executors or administrators; that of the purchaser becomes realty, and goes to his heir at law or devisee1. The trust in this case is said to be constructive. Where an estate is purchased by one person, and the purchasemoney is paid by another, there is a resulting trust in favour of the latter. "I am bound," says Lord Hardwicke 2, ." by the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries to construe nothing as resulting trusts but what are there called trusts by operation of law. And what are those? Why, first, when an estate is purchased in the name of one person, but the money or consideration is given by another; or, secondly, where a trust is declared only as to part, and nothing said as to the rest, what remains undisposed of results to the heir at law. I do not know any other instance besides these two, where this court has declared resulting trusts by operation of law, unless in cases of fraud, and where transactions have been carried on malâ fide." If this fact, as to the payment of the purchase-money, appear on the face of the conveyance, then, of course, there is a clear case of resulting trust without any further evidence; but if it does not appear on the face of the deed, then, to raise a resulting trust, there must be plain proof of the payment of the money 3. The evidence may be either direct or founded on collateral circumstances; and, in the latter case, the pecuniary means of the grantee of the estate being such as to render it impossible that he could have advanced the money, would be material4. 4 Willis v. Atcherley v. 1 Finch v. Finch, 15 Ves. 43; Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, On the same principle, in the case of copyholds, equity will decree the person to whom the legal estate is surrendered or granted to be a trustee for him who advances the purchase money, or pays the fine of admission1. So where copyholds are granted for two, three, or more lives in succession, if one of the cestuis que vie pays the fine, the other two are trustees for him 2. It seems, that there being an express trust declared, though Howe, 1 Vern. but by parol, there can be no resulting trust, for resulting trusts are left by the Statute of Frauds as they were before the act; and a bare declaration by parol, before the act, would prevent any resulting trust3. 92. • Howev. 415. 3 Bellasis v. Compton, 2 Vern. 294. 4 Murless v. Sim. & Stu. 1. * Redington v. Redington, 3 Ridg. P. C. 178. 6 Kingdon v. Bridges, 2 Vern. 67. "Davidson v. Foley, 2 Bro. C. v. Shelley, 19 Hill v. Bishop of London, 1 Atk. 618. Though, in general, if A. purchase with his own money, and the conveyance is taken in the name of B., an implied trust in favour of A. arises from the payment of the purchase-money; yet that doctrine has exceptions. One exception is, that if a man purchase in the name of a son, and no act is done to manifest an intention that the son shall take as a trustee, that intention will not be implied from the payment of the purchase-money by the father, but the purchase is primâ facie an advancement, and the onus probandi does not rest with the child5. The other exception to the general rule is, where the conveyance is taken in the name of a wife; for she cannot be a trustee for her husband, and therefore, primâ facie, the purchase is presumed to be an advancement and provision for her. Where the lands are conveyed to a trustee, and a trust is declared as to part only, what remains undisposed of results to the original owner7. So, where the whole of an estate is conveyed or devised for particular purposes, or on particular trusts, which wholly or partially fail, there is, in generals, a resulting trust to the grantor or the heir at law. If a trustee or executor purchase land with his trust-money or assets, and take the conveyance in his own name, without the trust appearing on the face of the deed, the estate will not be liable to the trust, even if he die insolvent, unless the application of the trust-money can be clearly proved. The same principle applies to purchases by a husband with trust-money be• Cator v. The longing to his wife, or by an agent with the money of his principal9. On sufficient proof, however, of the trust-money having been laid out in the purchase of the estate, a trust would result and be Earl of Pem broke, 2 Bro. C. C. 287. decreed accordingly 1; for although doubts were formerly entertained upon this subject, it is now settled, that money may, in this manner, be followed into the land in which it is invested; that a claim of this sort may be supported by parol evidence 2, and that such evidence is admissible either before or after the death of the trustee. In Ryal v. Ryal3, Lord Hardwicke says, "the court has been very cautious in following money into land; but it has done it in some cases. No one will say but the court would, if it was actually proved that the money was laid out in land. The doubt with the court in these cases has been on the proof. There is difficulty in admitting proof: parol proof might let in perjury. But it has always been done* when the fact has been admitted in the answer of the person laying it out. If the executor of John Ryal had been a party, and admitted it, there would have been no doubt; but the admission is by his representative, which, though it does not bind the heir, is ground for an inquiry. The way of charging the heir is by considering him a trustee, as when lands are purchased by one in the name of another, it is a resulting trust by law, and out of the statute; and, upon inquiry, a little matter will do to make it a charge pro tanto." Lechmere, 3 P. W. 228. Where the trust is that money shall be laid out in land, and it is laid out, though not modo et formâ, it will be presumed to have been done in execution of the trust4. In Snowden v. Snow-Lechmere v. den3, A. B., by marriage settlement, reciting that he had, in consideration of the marriage, actually paid to the trustees a sum of 15007., and had also agreed to pay them a further sum of 500l. 582. at the least upon the trusts after mentioned, he the said A. B. covenanted with the trustees that he would, within six months, pay the said sum of 500l. at the least, which said sums of 15007. and 5001. were to be applied in manner thereinafter mentioned. And it was declared that the said sums of money were so paid, and to be paid, upon trust that the said trustees should, as soon as conveniently might be, with the consent of the said A. B., lay out and invest the same in the purchase of freehold lands in the county of Devon; and that such lands, when purchased, should be conveyed to the trustees to the uses of the marriage as therein "If it were res integra, I should think the evidence not admissible within the statute. But I must not be wiser than my predecessors."—(Per mentioned. Notwithstanding the recital in the settlement, A. B. had not paid the 15007., which, with the 500l., remained unpaid at his death. Soon after the marriage, he purchased an estate in the county of Devon for 21807., which was conveyed to him in fee, but he never made any settlement of it, and died intestate. There was no evidence in the cause upon which the court thought any reliance could be placed; but it was argued that this case might be distinguished from the others, inasmuch as in this case the husband covenanted to pay the money to the trustees, of which covenant he scarcely could mean a performance when he made a purchase himself. Kenyon, M. R., in delivering judgment, said, "I feel myself in the same situation in which Lord Hardwicke expressed himself to be,—not inclined to carry these cases farther than they have been carried; but at the same time I must not make nice and technical distinctions, where the cases are in substance the same as those which have been decided. As to all hardship in this case, I lay all consideration of it totally aside. I must decide this case by the cases before decided, and not depart from the established rules of property. Now, in this case it was, beyond all doubt, incumbent on the husband to lay out the money on real estate; but the distinction which has been taken is, that the husband covenanted to pay the money to trustees to be laid out, and therefore his laying out money himself in the purchase of the estate, could not be meant as complying with that covenant; and I think the distinction a very important one, and would deserve great consideration if it were res integra. But the main case on which I choose to rely is Lechmere v. Lechmere; this case having decided that if a man covenant to purchase land modo et formâ, and if he so purchase at all, whether modo et formâ or otherwise, it shall be the same thing. This gets rid of a great part of the argument. The principle is, that where a man covenants to do an act, and he does an act which may be converted to a completion of this covenant, it shall be supposed that he meant to complete it'. Here the land was in the particular county specified. The case of Lechmere v. Lechmere seems to be exactly in point; and upon that case (the principles of which I coincide in) I shall declare the estate to be subject to the trusts of the settlement" *. As to the effect of a covenant in marriage articles, to convey or assure all or part of the personal estate, of which the husband should become |