a literal representation of Plato's language, it has the additional force of presenting us with the convictions of Aristotle, in his paraphrase of the passage. But this was Plato's deliberate and repeated opinion: hence he says, in his Timæus, "It may be truly "asserted, that in those places, where neither intense "cold, nor immoderate heat prevails," (in other words, in those climates most congenial to human beings,) "the race of mankind is always preserved, though "sometimes the number of individuals is increased, "and sometimes suffers considerable diminution 1." That his philosophy or experience led him to anticipate the latter rather than the former circumstance, in his second Republic, is most evident from the far greater care he manifests to force, rather than to repress, population. It is true, that he would have the magistrates to take heed, that the shares of his citizens, namely, 5040, should not be exceeded by the number of claimants, but his principal anxiety is, lest the latter become fewer than the former. Under this apprehension, he proposes to make the duty of marriages, as established by law, more imperative, im-posing great and increasing pecuniary penalties upon those who disobey it, as well as loading them with infamy2. Other regulations are also prescribed; for instance, "If such as are without children, or have "but few, disagree, let them be compelled to marry

1 Plato, Timæus.

2 But he who cannot willingly be persuaded to act in this manner, but lives in the city alienated, without connection, and unmarried, for five and thirty years, such a man shall be fined every year. And if he possesses the largest estate, he shall be fined 100 drachms; if that which is second in order, 70; if that which is third, 60; and if that which is fourth, 30 drachms. Let all these fines be sacred to Juno. And let

him that does not pay his fine every year, be made a debtor of ten times that sum. Let this money, too, be exacted by the dispensator of the goddess, which, unless he exacts, he himself shall be the debtor. He, therefore, who is unwilling to marry, shall be thus punished with respect to fine; but with respect to honour, as follows:-In the first place, let him be deprived, &c.-Plato, De Legibus.

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"again, for the sake of procreating children. If a woman die and have no children, let the husband "be compelled to marry again, till he has procreated "children sufficient both for his family and the city. "If a man dies, and leaves behind a sufficient num"ber of children, let the mother educate them, remaining a widow; if she appears, however, to be "too young to live in a state of health, without a "husband, let her kindred, in conjunction with the "women who take care of marriages, consult what is "fit to be done, both for her and her children. And, "if both are in want of children, let them marry for "the sake of children. But, let an accurate number "of children be male and female 1." This last direction is repeated in his Atlanticus, where he speaks of the "especial care that there might be the same "number of men and women";" an unnecessary anxiety, which shews indeed, his wish, that no impediment, like that which Mr. Malthus attributes to the intentional policy of ancient philosophy, in this respect, should exist; but, at the same time, manifests his ignorance of one of the first and most universal laws of nature, with regard to the very elements of human increase.

(25) Other of the provisions of this philosopher, of the same nature, might be adduced to shew that his authority might be far more justly appealed to in favour of the opinion, that human beings have a natural tendency to diminution, rather than to undue increase; but it is unnecessary. Enough, it is hoped, has been advanced, to rescue my argument from the hostility of Plato, and his character from the foulest aspersion that could be thrown upon it. His opinions,

1 Plato, De Legibus, 1. v. 2 Idem., Atlanticus.

8 Malthus, Essay on Population,

p. 167,

indeed, upon this important branch of political philosophy, do not appear to have been very distinct; but that I have not misrepresented them, I may appeal to an author who was well versed in his writings and in the present subject,-Sir Matthew Hale. "Plato," says that great man, "who seems very uncertain and "unsettled in his philosophy, seems yet to agree "with the partial exhausting of the numbers of man"kind1."

1 Hale, Origination of Mankind, pp. 217, 218.

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CHAPTER XV.

OF THE OPINIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS AND LEGISLATORS OF ANTIQUITY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE

OF POPULATION.-ARISTOTLE.

(1) ARISTOTLE, according to the author of the essay so often quoted, saw the necessity of checking population still more clearly than Plato. I deny, however, that he, any more than the latter, entertained any such views. It is true, that in his imaginary republic (for Aristotle also amused himself with projecting constitutions), he fell into the fundamental and general error of Grecian policy, the injurious tendency of which he had nevertheless previously exposed; I mean that of ordaining that the territory should, with the exception of a reservation for public purposes, be divided into a definite number of shares, and these shares be distributed amongst the citizens, whose number was consequently to be limited'. This regulation, joined with the more unhappy one which prescribed that all the useful and necessary arts, even that of agriculture, should be accounted infamous, and followed by slaves only, closed up against freemen all those sources of subsistence which, in every wellordered community, engage infinitely the greatest and best portion of the people, and certainly rendered it necessary to the scheme, that the privileged few should be preserved stationary in their numbers. Hence, on 1Aristotle, De Repub., 1. iv., c. 10.

VOL. I.

2 Ibid., c. 9.

T

the one hand, an excess of this population was to be guarded against, if it should occur, which Aristotle thought might be done by ecbolic arts, peremptorily interdicting, however, the expedient said to be best "calculated to attain" the end in view,-infanticide, and prescribing that "nothing that has life-shall "be destroyed, excepting it be defective in its mem"bers or grossly deformed in shape;" cases, in such a state of society, it may be presumed almost ideal. But, on the other hand, all he says relating to the duties of marriage, and the virtue of chastity, which is the most effectual promoter of the prevalence and prolificness of that state; and to the careful attention necessary for the preservation and proper education of children, is conclusive as to his views of the duty and necessity, generally speaking, of promoting human fruitfulness, even to continue the numbers of his privileged class 1.

(2) Mr. Malthus, indeed, gives, as his first and main proof that Aristotle saw the necessity of checking population, and provided for it, that he fixed the proper age of marriage at thirty-seven for the men, and eighteen for the women; which must, he adds, "condemn a great number of women to celibacy,

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as there never can be so many men of thirty-seven, "as there are women of eighteen." In thus concluding, however, he is ignorant of one of the most curious of the effects of the principle of which he treats so largely, but of which, as it appears to me, Aristotle was aware. Nature is not thus to be baffled in her designs; the balance of the sexes would, under the circumstance of this habitual postponement on the part of the males, be still preserved at this unequal nubile period. But of this important fact more

1

1 Aristotle, De Repub., 1. iv., c. 16, 17. 2 Malthus, Essay on Population, p. 167.