tention for a jury; for the gist of the action is, the husband's loss of the comfort and society of his wife, and this comfort 'must be in proportion to their mutual cordiality and attachment. Indeed, where this affection appears by the evidence to have amounted to that engrossing and subjugating sentiment called love, the keenness of the wound is infinitely augmented, and the amount of the compensation should be proportionably increased. We have already seen that where a husband connives at the infidelity of his wife, the effect shall be, not only to diminish his compensation, but to destroy his right of action altogether, and disentitle him to any verdict whatsoever; and this on one or both of the following grounds: First, that volenti non fit injuria; secondly, that a profligate accomplice in his wife's dishonour forfeits his rights to the protection of the court. But there may be a levity in the husband's behaviour, and a culpable inattention to the conduct of his wife, which, not amounting to a consent to her infamy, shall not, indeed, disentitle him to a verdict, but which, having probably contributed to her seduction, shall mitigate the damages which are awarded to him. It has been argued in the present case, that if any such negligence existed, it arose (to adopt the language of one of the witnesses)" not from the fault of the heart, but of the head." The excuse is founded in misapprehension. If the inattention arose from the fault of the heart, it would amount to connivance; and destroy the plaintiff's right of action altogether. When the neglect arises only from an error of the head, it leaves him a right of action; but is evidence admissible in mitigation of damages. Otherwise a snare would be laid for the defendant; who, judging of the plaintiff's motive by his conduct, might suppose that he intended to connive, and was an accommodating husband, not from inadvertence, but design. At the same time, towards entitling a plaintiff to recover largely, we must not require that he should have been a Spanish or an Oriental husband. We must recollect the freedom which our customs allow to females; and not lay down a rule so rigorous as this: that the rights of every married man may be invaded, whose conduct is not a system of suspicion and control; exposing the jealous spy to public derision; and degrading the woman who is the object of his distrust; offending her pride, and alienating her affections.. It should suffice, that he does not negligently overlook behaviour which ought to excite the vigilance of a man duly attentive to his wife's honour. The law invests every husband with certain privileges and authorities; and if he will not use them for his own protection, he must forfeit a part of his claim to damages, as the reasonable consequence of his default. It is the vigilant, not the indolent, whom the law assists. There are but two observations more which I have to make. First, that if, in measuring the damages, public morals and example should be at all taken into the question, we must re member, that plaintiffs as well as defendants are subject to the infirmities and depravities of our imperfect nature. We must, therefore, take care how, by awarding damages to an enormous amount, we hold out a temptation to the unprincipled husband, dissembling his own connivance, to wink, however, at his wife's dishonour, when he finds that her infamy will bring so high a price. The second and last remark which I have to trouble you with, is this, that you will be the more scrupulous in measuring the compensation which you award-because, if you grant too much, it is improbable that your error can ever be corrected; it being the established practice, if it be not the undoubted law, that in actions of this nature, however high the damages which are found may be, the verdict cannot be set aside on the mere ground of their being excessive. Baron Smith then proceeded to recapitulate the evidence, as it appeared upon his notes; and having done so, closed his charge, without any farther observations on the law. The trial lasted twelve hours; verdict for the plaintiff, 10,000l. at 12 o'clock at night, with costs.* COUNSEL for the plaintiff: Messrs. Curran, Hoare, Grady, Casey, White, Hawkesworth, O'Regan, Lloyd, M'Mahon and Bennet. Agent, Mr. A. Hogan. COUNSEL for the defendant: Messrs. Ponsonby, Quin, Goold, Franks, Burton and Penefather. Agent, Mr. J. Sims, * Dr. Franklin somewhere tells a good story of a certain young man who, having got some money into his possession, bought a whistle with which he disturbed the neighbourhood My Lord Headfort, considering his age and gray hairs, certainly gave too much for his whistle; ten thousand pounds damages, and costs of suit, with jewels and presents to the lady; he also settled upon her 1,000l. per ann. In return for all which, when the lady had been about six weeks in London, she forsook her old lover, and went off with a young officer of the guards!—“ Quantum est in rebus inane.” SPEECH OF MR. CURRAN, ON THE RIGHT OF ELECTION OF LORD MAYOR OF DUBLIN, DELIVERED BEFORE THE LORD LIEUTENANT AND PRIVY COUNCIL OF IRELAND, 1790. cuss. MY LORDS, I HAVE the honour to appear before you as counsel for the commons of the corporation of the metropolis of Ireland, and also for Mr. Alderman Howison, who hath petitioned for your approbation of him as a fit person to serve as lord mayor, in virtue of his election by the commons to that high office; and in that capacity I rise to address you on the most important subject that you have ever been called upon to disHighly interesting and momentous indeed, my lords, must every question be, that, even remotely and eventually, may affect the well being of societies, or the freedom, or the repose of nations; but that question, the result of which by an immediate and direct necessity, must decide, either fatally, or fortunately, the life or the death of that well being, of that freedom and that repose, is surely the most important subject on which human wisdom can be employed, if any subject on this side the grave can be entitled to that appellation. You cannot, therefore, my lords, be surprised to see this place crowded by such numbers of our fellow citizens; hereVOL. II. G g ་ tofore they were attracted hither by a strong sense of the value of their rights, and of the injustice of the attack upon them; they felt all the magnitude of the contest; but they were not disturbed by any fear for the event; they relied securely on the justice of their cause, and the integrity of those who were to decide upon it. But the public mind is now filled with a fear of danger, the more painful and alarming, because hitherto unforeseen; the public are now taught to fear that their cause may be of doubtful merits, and disastrous issue; that rights which they considered as defined by the wisdom, and confirmed by the authority, of written law, may now turn out to be no more than ideal claims, without either precision or security; that acts of parliament themselves are no more than embryos of legislation, or at best but infants, whose first labours must be, not to teach, but to learn; and which even after thirty years of pupilage, may have thirty more to pass under that guardianship, which the wisdom of our policy has provided for the protection of minors. Sorry am I, my lords, that I can offer no consolation to my clients on this head; and that I can only join them in bewailing that the question, whose result must decide upon their freedom or servitude, is perplexed with difficulties of which we never dreamed before, and which we are now unable to comprehend, Yet surely, my lords, that question must be difficult, upon which the wisdom of the representative of our dread sovereign, aided by the learning of his chancellor and his judges, assisted also by the talents of the most conspicuous of the nobles and the gentry of the nation, has been twice already employed, and employed in vain. We know, my lords, that guilt and oppression may stand irresolute for a moment ere they strike, appalled by the prospect of danger, or struck with the sentiment of remorse; but to you, my lords, it were presumption to impute injustice: we must therefore suppose that you have delayed your determination, not because it was dangerous, but because it was difficult, to decide; and indeed, my lords, a firm belief of this difficulty, however undiscoverable by or |