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1827.

Cook against

PALMER.

sale of the whole of the goods, were bound to take care that the officer received no more of the purchase-money than would satisfy the levy. If they allowed him to receive the residue, it made him their agent.

BAYLEY J. The sheriff was not a party to the agreement for the sale of the whole of the bankrupt's stock, and, therefore, it seems to me that the plaintiffs cannot recover in this action. It appears that Theobald had issued two executions, that part of the money had been raised, and certain goods, more than sufficient to satisfy the residue, were in the officer's possession. The duty of the officer was to raise the residue, and then stop the sale; but an arrangement was made by the plaintiffs and Theobald, authorizing the officer to sell the whole of the goods for a certain sum. Upon that sale the officer was identified with the sheriff, to the extent of the sum to be levied, but no further, his authority to sell to a greater extent not being derived from the sheriff, but from the plaintiffs and Theobald, who thereby made him their agent as to that part of the transaction. The sheriff never had any right to call upon the officer to pay over the surplus to him, nor was it the officer's duty to do so; and as the sureties are only responsible for the due performance of the officer's duty to the sheriff, the plaintiffs cannot be entitled to recover, even treating the sureties as the real defendants in this action. I therefore think that a nonsuit must be entered.

HOLROYD and LITTLEDALE Js. concurred.

Judgment of nonsuit

END OF EASTER TERM.

AN

INDEX

TO THE

PRINCIPAL MATTERS.

ACT OF PARLIAMENT.

See MANDAMUS, 1.

ACTION.

See ASSUMPSIT, BANKRUPT, 8.

FERRY.

1. By an act of parliament, a canal
company were bound to repair
the banks of the canal. In an
action brought by the company
against the owner of adjoining
land for digging clay-pits upon his
own land, and causing the plain-
tiffs' banks to give way, there was
some evidence to show that the
bank was not in good repair; but
the learned judge directed the
jury to find for the plaintiffs, if
they thought that the falling in of
the bank was caused by the de-
fendant's having dug clay-pits:
Held, that the plaintiffs were not
entitled to recover, unless, at the
time when the bank gave way,
it was in good repair; and that
question, not having been sub-
mitted to the jury, a new trial
was granted. Staffordshire Canal
Company v. Hallen, H. 7 & 8 G.4.
Page 317
2. In an action against excise offi-
cers for the detention and neg-

ligent custody of certain malt,
&c., taken under a distress upon
a conviction under the malt act
(statute 43 G. 3. c. 74.) it ap-
peared that the plaintiff, having
been convicted in a penalty, a
warrant issued, directing the de-
fendants to levy the same, and
that they seized and removed the
plaintiff's goods from his pre-
mises, and that afterwards he
paid the penalty. The defend-
ants, ten days after this payment,
brought the goods back to the
plaintiff's premises, but in a da-
maged state: Held, that in order
to make the detention unlawful,
the plaintiff ought to have de-
manded the goods, and that there
having been no demand, the de-
tention was not unlawful. Hutch-
ings v. Morris and others, E.
8 G.4.
Page 464
3. Where certain goods upon a
farm were seized by virtue of a
writ of pone per vadios against
the occupier, issued out of the
Court of Pleas at Durham, and
were afterwards, upon his default,
forfeited to the bishop, who, by
writ to the sheriff, ordered them
to be assigned to the party at
whose suit the pone issued, in

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ARBITRAMENT.

1. The defendant was arrested for 179%. At the trial a verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the award of an arbitrator, to whom the cause, and all matters in difference between the parties, were referred, and the costs of the cause were to abide the event of the award. The arbitrator by his award found, that at the commencement of the suit there was due from the defendant to the plaintiff the sum of 451. 10s., and that the defendant had no reasonable or probable cause for arresting the defendant for 179%, and that the defendant, by reason thereof, was entitled to compensation or damages to the amount of 201. The arbitrator then ordered the verdict to be finally entered for the plaintiff for 257. 18s., the balance due to him after deducting therefrom the damages awarded to the defendant. The Court refused to allow the defendant costs, under the statute 43 G. 3. c. 46., inasmuch as by the terms of the reference the costs were to abide the event of the award, and that was in favour of the plaintiff. Thompson and another v. Atkinson, H. 7 & 8 G. 4. Page 193 2. Declaration stated, that before the making of the promise therein mentioned, certain differences had arisen, and a certain suit was depending in Chancery between M. D. and divers infants, plaintiffs, and P. K., T. B., since deceased, and J. R., defendants; and it was ordered, with the consent of the attornies of the parties in the said suit, that the several matters in question in the said suit, and all disputes and differences then subsisting between the said plaintiff, M. D., and the in

fants, and P. K. and T. B. since deceased, should be referred to the arbitrament of C., who was to make one or more awards, and in case either of the parties died, the death was not to abate the reference; that T. B. afterwards died, before the making of the award; that the arbitrator awarded that the defendants, as executor and executrix of T. B., should pay to the said plaintiff 2251. out of T. B.'s assets, and that being so liable as aforesaid, the defendants executor and executrix, as aforesaid, promised to pay: Held, upon error, that no sufficient authority to refer on behalf of the infant plaintiffs was shown, the attornies in the suit having no such authority, and that therefore the submission was not mutual, and, consequently, the award was bad. Biddell v. Dowse, H. 7 & 8 G. 4. Page 255 3. Where a cause and all matters in

difference were referred to arbitration, and a motion was made to set aside the award, on the ground that the arbitrator had not decided upon certain matters in difference: Held, that it was not necessary to state these matters in the rule, inasmuch as they were specified in the affidavit, which the rule was obtained. Where a cause is referred by order of Nisi Prius, a motion to set aside the award must be made within the time allowed for moving for a new trial, unless a sufficient reason for delay be shown. Ramshaw v. Arnold, E. 8 G. 4.

upon

ARREST.

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2. The same person being agent for the grantor of an annuity for the purpose of procuring the money, and also for the grantee for the purpose of paying over the consideration money to the grantor, at the time of executing the deeds for securing the annuity, paid over to the grantor the whole consideration money, but in pursuance of a previous agreement between the agent and the grantor, part of the consideration money, amounting to 15l. per cent upon the whole money, was returned by the latter to the agent for law expences and for brokerage; it was held that this was a return of part of the consideration money to the party advancing the same, within the meaning of the 53 G. 3. c. 141. s. 6., and the annuities were set aside upon the grantor's paying the principal and interest, together with reasonable costs and brokerage. Finley v. Gardner, H. 7 & 8 G. 4. Page 165 3. Where an annuity was granted by an indenture, which also contained a release of a former annuity: Held, that it was sufficient to describe the annuity deed in the memorial as a grant of an annuity. Crowther v. Wentworth, H. 7 & 8 G. 4. 366 4. Where A. purchased an annuity for his life, which was regularly paid up to the time of his death, but no memorial of the grant of annuity was enrolled: Held, that A.'s executrix could not on that ground insist that the contract was void, and recover back the consideration money paid for the annuity. Davis, executrix of Griffiths, v. Bryan, E. 8 G. 4. 651 5. Where an annuity-deed contained, besides covenants to pay the annuity, an assignment of stock, for better securing the an

nuity: Held, that it was well described in the memorial as a "grant of annuity."

One of three co-sureties for the payment of this annuity, paid money on account of the annuity after the bankruptcy of a cosurety: Held, that the latter was liable to an action for contribution, although he had obtained his certificate, inasmuch as one surety could not prove the value of the annuity under the commission against his co-surety; but that he could not at law be compelled to repay more than one third of the sum paid on account of the annuity, although the third surety had become insolvent at the time of such payment.

'The grantor of an annuity assigned it, together with all securities, for a valuable consideration to A., but part of the consideration-money belonged to B., one of the co-sureties for payment of the annuity, and it was agreed by deed between A. and B. that the former should retain, out of the annual payments, sufficient to pay him the principal sum advanced, and interest; and that, when he should have been paid principal and interest, the annuity should be for the benefit of B.: Held, that the annuity was not thereby extinguished, but that it continued a subsisting annuity between the several cosureties, and that B. having paid money to A. on account of it, the other sureties were liable to contribution.

Held, also, that although the stock assigned for further securing the annuity would ultimately revest in B., by the deed made between him and A., that did not discharge the other sureties. Browne v. Lee, E. 8 G. 4.

Page 689

ARBITRAMENT.

ARBITRAMENT.

1. The defendant was arrested for 1791. At the trial a verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the award of an arbitrator, to whom the cause, and all matters in difference between the parties, were referred, and the costs of the cause were to abide the event of the award. The arbitrator by his award found, that at the commencement of the suit there was due from the defendant to the plaintiff the sum of 451. 10s., and that the defendant had no reasonable or probable cause for arresting the defendant for 179%, and that the defendant, by reason thereof, was entitled to compensation or damages to the amount of 201. The arbitrator then ordered the verdict to be finally entered for the plaintiff for 251. 18s., the balance due to him after deducting therefrom the damages awarded to the defendant. The Court refused to allow the defendant costs, under the statute 43 G. 3. c. 46., inasmuch as by the terms of the reference the costs were to abide the event of the award, and that was in favour of the plaintiff. Thompson and another v. Atkinson, H. 7 & 8 G. 4. Page 193 2. Declaration stated, that before the making of the promise therein mentioned, certain differences had arisen, and a certain suit was depending in Chancery between M. D. and divers infants, plaintiffs, and P. K., T. B., since deceased, and J. R., defendants; and it was ordered, with the consent of the attornies of the parties in the said suit, that the several matters in question in the said suit, and all disputes and differences then subsisting between the said plaintiff, M. D., and the in

fants, and P. K. and T. B. since deceased, should be referred to the arbitrament of C., who was to make one or more awards, and in case either of the parties died, the death was not to abate the reference; that T. B. afterwards died, before the making of the award; that the arbitrator awarded that the defendants, as executor and executrix of T. B., should pay to the said plaintiff 2251. out of T. B.'s assets, and that being so liable as aforesaid, the defendants executor and executrix, as aforesaid, promised to pay: Held, upon error, that no sufficient authority to refer on behalf of the infant plaintiffs was shown, the attornies in the suit having no such authority, and that therefore the submission was not mutual, and, consequently, the award was bad. Biddell v.

Dowse, H. 7 & 8 G. 4. Page 255 3. Where a cause and all matters in difference were referred to arbitration, and a motion was made to set aside the award, on the ground that the arbitrator had not decided upon certain matters in difference: Held, that it was not necessary to state these matters in the rule, inasmuch as they were specified in the affidavit,

upon which the rule was obtained. Where a cause is referred by order of Nisi Prius, a motion to set

aside the award must be made within the time allowed for moving for a new trial, unless a sufficient reason for delay be shown. Ramshaw v. Arnold, É. 8 G. 4.

ARREST.

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1. Where a party is arrested for a debt from which he has been discharged under the Insolvent act, and gives bail, the Court will order the bail-bond to be delivered

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