C.J., and Russell, J.), had rendered their decision, a peculiar question arose, viz., whether the report of the trial Judges should be forwarded to the Speaker of the House of Commons or to the Supreme Court of Canada. Counsel were heard upon the question, and considered opinions given by the Judges: 1 E. L. R. 415. There was no appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from the decision of the Judges avoiding the election, the result of which was that a new election must be held, but the petitioner asserted an appeal to that Court from the finding or determination that the respondent had not personally been guilty of corrupt practices. The Judges, in fact, signed an order, which declared the election void, and also dismissed the personal charges, and the appeal purported to be from the latter part of the order. Weatherbe, C.J., was of opinion that there should be a report to the Speaker that the election was void, and also a report to the Supreme Court of Canada to the effect that the trial Judges were of opinion that the respondent was not personally guilty of corrupt practices. "I am far from saying very confidently," said the Chief Justice," that in the circumstances the more reasonable construction is not that which would confine us to certify and report either to the appellate Court or to the Speaker, but I yield, though with doubt, to the argument that here, where the appeal is upon one matter which is distinct and separate from that which requires a certificate to the Speaker, though we may do what is required to promote an appeal, we are not precluded from certifying to the Speaker our determination-unappealed from-that the election is void." A different view was taken by Russell, J., but he also was of opinion that a report that the election was void could properly be sent to the Speaker. He was of opinion" that if there has been an appeal duly asserted in this case, the election Judges cannot send any certificate or report to the Speaker, and must send it to the Supreme Court of Canada. I think, furthermore, that if the question raised

is open to appeal, the appeal has been duly taken,

and it would have been our duty to take judicial notice of it. But a careful perusal of the statute and examination of authorities have led me to the conclusion that, notwithstanding all that has been said, the conditions have not arisen which oblige us to withhold the certificate and report from the Speaker, or to send them to the Supreme Court of Canada. I think that no appeal has been taken from the judgment or decision on any question of law or of fact of the Judges who have tried the petition. The appeal that has been taken is from a statement which will doubtless appear in the report made by the trial Judges, but, to whomsoever made, constitutes no part of the determination to be certified to the Speaker. The petitioner has embodied this statement in the order taken out. . There is really no provision for such a statement in the order, and I know of no provision in the statute for any such order as has been taken out. The formal expansion of such a statement in the order drawn up cannot make it the decision or judgment of a Court, if it does not in reality and substance partake of that nature. The difference between the certificate and the report is as clearly drawn in the statute as anything could well be."

Payment.]-Moneys paid under protest for pilotage dues were held by the full Court in Cumberland Railway and Coal Co. v. St. John Pilot Commissioners (N.B.), 1 E. L. R. 397, to be recoverable, Barker, J., saying, "If the money was distributed and is not now in hand, the plaintiffs' judgment may not be very valuable, but that fact should not militate against their right to obtain one. Short of the Statute of Limitations and the defendants have had the full benefit of that defence-I can see no reason why the plaintiffs should not be as well able to recover all the payments which have been made, as well as the first one, provided they were all made under the same circumstances, as seems to have been the case. As to the payments being voluntary, I think the evidence shews they were not. The pilots always claimed and exacted their dues, and the customs authorities refused to

clear the barges until the dues were paid. The plaintiffs therefore had no alternative except to pay as they did, unless they ceased doing business altogether or changed the mode of carrying it on so as to satisfy the defendants."

Poor Law.]-In Irvine v. Stanley Overseers (N.B.), 2 E. 1. R. 5, it was held by the full bench of the Supreme Court (Tuck, C.J., dissenting), that the plaintiff, a physician and surgeon, was entitled to recover from the overseers of the poor of the parish of Stanley his fees and charges for medical and surgical attendance and medicines supplied to an indigent person who was injured by an explosion. The two points raised by the defendants were that the injured man was not a "pauper," and that the defendants were not bound as a corporation by the action of one member of their board. The majority of the Court held that it was a question for the jury whether the man was a pauper, that is, whether he was poor and stood in need of relief. They were also against the defendants on the other point. "In the present case," said Barker, J., "if Palmer were in fact poor and in need of relief, and his settlement was, by virtue of his residence, in Stanley, then that parish was liable to aid him, and the overseer necessarily, in the circumstances, had authority to contract for the surgical aid. That was a contract properly made in the discharge of a public duty, upon which an action can be maintained against the overseers in their corporate name."

Savings Bank Deposits.]-The testator whose estate was in question in In re Daly (N.B.), 1 E. L. R. 487, had deposited sums of money in two savings banks to the joint credit of himself and his daughter. The evidence disclosed no circumstances going to shew that the testator intended to make a gift of these sums to his daughter, and the question whether she by right of survivorship became entitled absolutely to the money, was answered in the negative by Trueman, Probate Judge, and the full bench of the Supreme Court on appeal. The Probate Judge said: "I think that the mere fact that the testator joined his daughter's name in the bank accounts

does not create a trust for his daughter. Unless other circumstances are shewn as to the intention of the testator, it will be presumed that the arrangement was for the convenience of the testator in the management of his estate, or in this case it may have been for the convenience of the daughter, she being both executrix and tenant for life: Marshal v. Crutwell, L. R. 20 Eq. 328."

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Ship.]-Section 59 of the Pilotage Act, R. S. C. c. 80, provides that ships "propelled wholly or in part by steam shall be exempted from the compulsory payment of pilotage dues. It was held by the full Court in Cumberland Railway and Coal Co. v. St. John Pilot Commissioners (N.B.), 1 E. L. R. 397, that coal barges, which are usually towed by tugs, but which have also masts and sails chiefly used to steady the barges, are "propelled," if not wholly, at least in part by steam, and so come within the exemption. Tuck, C.J., dissented, being of opinion that a towed vessel could not be said to be propelled by steam-that the propelling power must be within the vessel itself.

Succession Duty.]-An interesting case as to the liability of an estate for succession duty in a province other than that of the deceased's domicile came before the full bench of the Supreme Court of New Brunswick in Rex v. Lovitt (N.B.), 1 E. L. R. 513. The deceased resided and was domiciled in Nova Scotia, but at the time of his death he had on deposit in the Bank of British North America's office at St. John, New Brunswick, a large sum of money. The deceased's will was admitted to probate in Nova Scotia, and ancillary probate was subsequently granted by the Probate Court of St. John, under which the money was paid to the executors. The liability to succession duty depended upon the construction to be placed on s. 5 of the Succession Duty Act, C. S. N. B. 1903 c. 17, which declares that property not specially excepted by the Act situate in the province, and filling the other requisites mentioned in the section, shall be subject to succession duty, whether the owner at the time of his death had a

fixed abode in the province or not. "The real question involved," said Barker, J., "is whether the debt from the bank was property, within the meaning of the Act, situate in St. John at the time the testator died. It is not disputed that it is property, within the meaning assigned to that word by the Act itself. Was it situated in this province? The argument is that the Act has created no situs for a debt of this kind, and, therefore, it must be taken to be the place of the testator's domicile. There is no doubt that the English decisions are to this effect." He goes on to point out the distinction between the English and New Brunswick statutes; and refers to Harding v. Commissioners of Stamps for Queensland, [1898] A. C. 769, as authority for the proposition "that there is nothing unreasonable in legislation by which a duty is fastened on the succession to movable property actually situated within the county foreign to that where the testator had his domicile, and that effect will be given to it where the language of the Act plainly indicates that the liability is to depend upon the actual locality of the property, and not in any way upon any question of domicile." The facts of the case being almost identical with those upon which Attorney-General v. Newman, 31 0. R. 340, 1 O. L. R. 511, was decided, and there being so substantial distinction between the Ontario and New Brunswick statutes, Barker, J., with whom Hanington and McLeod, JJ., agreed, adopted the reasoning of that case, and held that the duty was payable. Tuck, C.J., with whom Landry, J., agreed, arrived at the same destination by a different route, and judgment therefore went for the Crown.

Warranty of Title.]-In Nelson v. Wallace (N.S.), 1 E. L. R. 500, the plaintiff made an agreement with the defendant to purchase all the growing timber upon a certain area of land, to part of which the title was in the Crown, as was known to both parties. The agreement contained a warranty of title; shortly after it was executed the plaintiff applied to the Crown land office and obtained a grant of the portion