Simulation and Knowledge of ActionJérôme Dokic, Joëlle Proust The current debate between theory theory and simulation theory on the nature of mentalisation has reached no consensus yet, although many now think that some hybrid theory is needed. This collection of essays represents an effort at re-evaluating the scope of simulation theory, while also considering areas in which it could be submitted to experimental tests. The volume explores the two main versions of simulation theory, Goldman s introspectionism and Gordon s radical simulationism, and enquires whether they allow a non-circular account of mentalisation. The originality of the volume is to confront conceptual views on simulation with data from pragmatics, developmental psychology and the neurosciences. Individual chapters contain discussions of specific issues such as autism, imitation, motor imagery, conditional reasoning, joint attention and the understanding of demonstratives. It will be of interest primarily to advanced students and researchers in the philosophy of mind, language and action, but also to everyone interested in the nature of interpretation and communication. (Series B) |
Contents
| 1 | |
| 21 | |
| 33 | |
Reply to Paul Bernier | 49 |
Neurophysiological evidence for simulation of action | 53 |
Reply to Jean Decety Perceiving actions and understanding agency | 73 |
The scope and limits of mental simulation | 87 |
Reply to Pierre Jacob | 111 |
Reply to François Recanati | 173 |
Mental simulation dialogical processing and the syndrome of autism | 185 |
Reply to Donald M Peterson | 197 |
Can radical simulation theories explain psychological concept acquisition? | 201 |
Reply to Joëlle Proust | 229 |
Joint attention and simulation | 241 |
Reply to John Campbell | 255 |
Subject index | 261 |
Some reasons to link imitation and imitation recognition to theory of mind | 119 |
Reply to Jacqueline Nadel | 137 |
Varieties of simulation | 151 |
Name index | 265 |
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Simulation and Knowledge of Action Jérôme Dokic,Joëlle Proust,Joelle Proust No preview available - 2002 |
Common terms and phrases
ability action activity Alvin Goldman ascent routine ascribe ascription assumption attribute autism behaviour Brain Cambridge University Press capacity causal role child claim cognitive cognitive science concept of belief concept of desire context cortex counterfactual Decety deficit demonstrative thoughts difficulty entertain experiences expression fact false belief find finding first first-person Folk Psychology function Gallese goal Goldman Gopnik Gordon grasp human idea imagine imitation infants inference intentions involved Jeannerod joint attention kind knowledge Meltzoff mental concepts mental simulation mentalisation meta-representation mindreading mirror neurons motion motor imagery movements Nadel object observation one’s oneself other’s perception performed Perner person perspective predict premotor cortex pretend problem properties propositional attitudes Proust psychological concepts question radical simulationism reasoning Recanati relevant representation requires Rizzolatti schema self-ascription sense simulation heuristic simulation theory simulationist situation social someone else’s specific sufficient suggestion theory of mind Theory Theory tion understanding View visual