cepta sententia," "receptum jus," "receptus mos," etc.;* though they had legal force only by courtesy before the empire.t This is in singular contrast with the abject humility which they would, if necessary, assume, to secure a vote or a favor from the people. The co-existence, in Rome, of a people continually winning new rights from the vast domain of ancient conservatism, and an aristocracy, too proud, almost, to breathe the same atmosphere, accounts for it. A privileged class universally become mean as they become weak; but the peculiarity of the law aristocracy at Rome was, that all legislation had, either naturally or artificially, so crystallized around them, that they became not only distinguished for the ordinary vices of an over-indulged class, but they furnished from their ranks almost all the scholars, and statesmen, and orators, and generals of that very remarkable era. Indeed, whoever pauses to contemplate that brilliant period of world history, is almost immediately impressed with the conviction, that the Roman bar, before the empire, with all its vices and weaknesses duly considered, was one of the most elegant and accomplished bodies of men which has ever existed.

ART. V.- Communication of the Secretary of the Navy, June, 1841. Congressional Documents. Twenty-seventh Congress, Extra Session.

"THE navy, not inappropriately termed the right arm of the public defence, which has spread a light of glory over the American standard in all the waters of the earth, should be rendered replete with efficiency." This sentiment, so well expressed by President Tyler in his inaugural address, cannot but find a response in every American bosom. is, indeed, but the solemn expression of the general conviction and almost universal wish of the country. The popular will is said to be the law of our land. Whence comes it,

* Hein. Ant. Rom. lib. i. tit. ii. 35.

It

"Jurisconsultorum responsa et decreta sæpe ab oratoribus dicendo everti." Cic. pro Muræna, xiii. Ib. pro Cæcina, xxiv.

Dr. Taylor's Elements of Civil Law, i. sec. 42, 43, 44.

then, that with this will, so unanimous in favor of the creation of a navy proportioned to the extent of our commerce, and our great exposure to maritime attacks, it has never been created? One of the reasons which may be assigned for this anomaly is, that the navy for some years has been much less favorably regarded by the government than by the country. The impression has been entertained by the government, that the navy was not favorably inclined towards it, because it did not throw its influence into the scale of the ascendant party. The great merit to which the navy may justly lay claim, of abstaining from all connection with parties, and all interference with political strife, has been construed into enmity, on the principle that those who are not for us are against us. The navy has been for the country which created and sustained it, and not for any particular party. Confining itself to the duty of yielding obedience to the existing government, it has considered it no part of its province to decide of what individuals that government should consist. The number of naval officers who vote at all is very small; of those who take any active part in influencing the opinions of others, it is still smaller. Though the constitution imposes no disability upon them, this forbearance should be a merit with all parties, instead of being a motive of dissatisfaction with any. The attempt to introduce politics into navy yards, and to make political orthodoxy a substitute for skill and faithful industry among workmen, is a most expensive experiment. It may swell the votes of a dominant party, but it adds immeasurably to the cost of constructing and equipping our ships. The workman who sits on a log reading the orthodox paper of the day, or who pauses, axe in hand, to harangue his nearest companion as to the merits of a presidential candidate, may render an acceptable service to individuals, but does not forward the interest of the nation that employs and pays him.

Another efficient cause for the want of energetic action in placing our navy on a formidable footing, commensurate with the adequate protection of our commerce and the defence of our extensive coasts, is doubtless to be found in the want of information on a subject involving, perhaps, a little mystery. It is not, however, very difficult to understand and appreciate a few essential facts, which we will proceed to In the first place, then, England has a commerce of which the aggregate value is about four hundred and forty

state.

millions of dollars, without counting her rich returns of bullion which the balance of trade, usually in her favor, enables her to draw from all quarters of the globe. France has a commerce worth rather more than two hundred and seventy millions of dollars, and we a commerce which, even in these years of depression, is still worth nearly two hundred and sixty-six millions of dollars. The tonnage of England engaged in the transportation of this valuable commerce amounts to about two millions eight hundred thousand tons, worth probably one hundred and forty millions of dollars; that of France to seven hundred and sixty-seven thousand four hundred and thirty-nine tons, worth about thirty-nine millions of dollars; and that of the United States to two millions ninety-six thousand four hundred and ninety tons, worth nearly one hundred and five millions of dollars. The seamen of England amount to one hundred and seventy-five thousand men; those of France to about seventy thousand; and of our own, as ascertained from the entries and clearances of our custom-house in 1839, which necessarily omitted a large number employed in whaling and other remote voyages, neither beginning nor terminating within the year, to seventy-one thousand five hundred and thirty-six, of whom sixty-eight thousand nine hundred and twenty-two were men, and two thousand six hundred and fourteen boys. Making the reasonable allowance of one man for every twenty-five tons of shipping, - England has one man for every sixteen tons, and France one nearly for every twelve tons it would give us about eighty-four thousand seamen employed in our commercial marine, which, added to eight thousand seamen employed in the navy, would make an aggregate of about ninety thousand. The real number would not doubtless fall short of one hundred thousand. Such being the value of our commerce, amount of our tonnage, and number of our seamen, as compared with those of England and France, what ratio do we find between our relative preparation for maritime defence? Why, England has an available force of one hundred and four line of battle ships, eighty-six frigates, and more than two hundred smaller cruisers, including fifty-one steamers; and in actual commission, twenty-nine line of battle ships, twenty-nine frigates, thirty-five sloops, and one hundred and forty-five vessels of inferior force, of which forty-six are steamers. This fleet in commission is manned by twenty-one thousand seamen, four thousand boys,

and nine thousand marines, making an aggregate of thirtyfour thousand, exclusive of officers. France has an available force of forty-nine line of battle ships, fifty-seven frigates, twenty-five corvettes of the first class, and two hundred and six vessels of inferior force, among which are thirty-six steamers. Of this fleet, eight ships of the line are in actual commission abroad, nine equipped ready for immediate service on the completion of their crews; also twelve frigates, thirtynine sloops, seventeen brigs, thirty-six smaller vessels, twentyseven transports, which are armed, and occasionally act as cruisers; and twenty-one steamers. These ships in commission are manned by a force of twenty-four thousand men, exclusive of officers.

Turning from the condition of the English and French navies, and the formidable aspect in which they present themselves, what do we find to be the condition of our own? The last Navy Register shows it to consist of eleven ships of the line, sixteen frigates, twenty-one sloops, four brigs, nine schooners, four steamers, and a store ship. Some of these ships are unseaworthy, and many others require extensive repairs. Of this force there are only the following in actual commission: four ships of the line-three of these being receiving ships, which never quit their moorings - five frigates, thirteen sloops, three brigs, eight schooners, two steamers, and the store ship, manned with a force in all of nine thousand one hundred and twenty-five men.

A consideration of the facts thus briefly stated with regard to the relative value of our commerce, as compared with that of England and France, and the extreme disproportion which our means of defending it bear to those of the powers in question, plainly shows that our navy is wholly inadequate to make head against the powers with which we are liable to be brought into collision. If any other argument were necessary to prove the importance of our possessing a navy commensurate with the exposure of our wide-spread and valuable commerce, and proportioned in some measure to the navies of other maritime powers, it might be found in the fact which our past history conclusively exhibits, that all our difficulties with foreign powers have sprung immediately from the want of a powerful navy. It was this deficiency which, soon after the establishment of our independence, invited the spoliations of the Barbary powers, and led to the Tripolitan war. The same want of naval preparations soon

after invited those predatory attacks on our rich and tempting commerce by France and England, which were carried to such a ruinous extent. In 1800, a season of almost universal war in Europe, we had nearly a million of tons of shipping, exposed without the slightest show of protection, on the high seas. And in 1805 our exports had reached the value of one hundred and eight millions of dollars. An annual expenditure of six or seven millions in the support of fleets and convoys would have secured the safe transit of the valuable products which we exported, and of the enhanced returns by which they should have been repaid, and protected our peaceful citizens, engaged in carrying on their lawful pursuits, from molestation, seizure, and restraint. It was not for want of patriotic warning, even at that early day, that we fell into the error of trusting to the generosity of powerful belligerents, and failed to provide the only means of causing our neutrality to be respected, in the creation of a powerful navy. In 1798, a distinguished statesman, foreseeing the evils that awaited us from a weak reliance upon the justice and generosity of other nations, expressed his perfect conviction that "twelve ships of seventy-four guns, as many frigates, and twenty or thirty smaller vessels, would probably be found, our geographical situation and our means of annoying the trade of the maritime powers considered, a force sufficient to secure our future peace with the nations of Europe."

There can be little doubt that had this opinion been acted upon by our government from that time forward, we should have escaped from those ruinous spoliations carried on in rivalry by France and her allies on the one hand, and England on the other, amounting to an aggregate of seventy millions of dollars, without counting the loss incurred by the consequent check given to our commerce throughout the world. Nor can there be any more doubt that the maintenance of a respectable navy would have prevented those aggressions and insults of every sort, which provoked our late war with England, in which we expended in the armaments which it rendered necessary, one hundred and twenty-eight millions, lost by labor diverted from productive occupations the sum of fifteen millions, and were cut off almost entirely from the lucrative profits on the exports of our productions; and by which we were subjected to the invasion and desolation of our coasts, the slaughter of our citizens, the temporary