ART. VII.-System of National Defence. 1. Report of the Secretary of War, April 7, 1836. Senate Document, No. 293. Twenty-fourth Congress, First Session. Vol. IV. 2. Letter of the Secretary of War, transmitting, in compliance with a Resolution of the House of Representatives, a System of National Defence, etc., May 12, 1840. House Document, No. 206. Twenty-sixth Congress, First Session. THE present age is essentially pacific. It very justly holds in abhorrence all wars of mere ambition, waged for personal or national aggrandizement. The feelings that prompted the conquests of Alexander and Napoleon, are no longer harbored in the minds of sound thinking men. Some good reason is now required by public opinion for the wholesale sacrifice of human life. Even the absolute sovereign must allege some excuse or justification for a resort to arms, before he can venture to command the lives and services of his subjects. After all the discussions that have taken place on this question, the opinion of the age seems finally to have settled down upon the conviction, that "war is to be considered as a mere choice of evils, and is only to be resorted to when forced upon us by actual hostilities, or by aggravated injustice deliberately inflicted and obstinately persisted in." This conclusion results from enlarged views of public policy, a knowledge of the true principles of political ethics, and a fuller recognition of the divine precepts of Christian morality. Certainly such a state of feeling holds out strong hopes to the philanthropist; he must see in it much to encourage him in the establishment of such institutions as tend to harmonize the conflicting interests of nations, and he may justly anticipate that in time much will result from it. Still it can hardly give rise to the expectation of a long-continued universal peace. The lessons of experience, the deductions of reason, and the more sure word of prophecy, teach him that the earth must yet be swept by severe and desolating wars. No nation, then, can expect that others will always act towards it on the principles of justice and benevolence, or that it can for ever escape the destiny which has thus far awaited every great social community. Justice and mercy will generally be reciprocated; but, by avoiding every encroachment on the rights of others, we cannot always secure quiet to ourselves; whilst the world continues to be filled with beings of passion and interest, conflicts of nations must be expected. No matter how powerful a nation may be, nor how isolated a country, or how pacific the policy of its government, and the habits of its people, it will nevertheless be continually exposed to war. Sometimes it will be compelled to fight in self-defence, war being actually forced upon it, and proper preparations for such an event cannot be neglected with impunity. But the United States are urged to adopt measures of defence by stronger reasons than mere abstract principles of national policy. Our geographical position, and ordinary foreign relations, are not such as to offer any strong guarantee of security. Europe looks, with distrust and fear, at the rapid dissemination of our liberal principles. The unsettled governments of Texas and Mexico, and the new republics of the south, cannot be regarded without concern. The recently emancipated population of the West Indies naturally feel a strong sympathy with the slaves of our southern states, and are ready to embroil us in a servile war. Our restless population are pushing their settlements towards the Pacific, among numerous warlike tribes of Indians, and into contact with the colossal power of Russia. Our relations with Canada, always full of difficulty and danger, have now become a subject of intense solicitude, and call for the utmost prudence and circumspection. In our intercourse with the British provinces we seem continually treading on halfsmothered embers, that are ready to burst forth into a consuming flame. The published misrepresentations of travellers, the base slanders of a corrupt press, the unjustifiable interference of a portion of our citizens in the recent Canadian revolt, and the difficulties resulting from the arrest and trial of McLeod, have tended much to alienate the two nations. All these things, taken in connection with the British government's persisting in her claims to a portion of our territory in the northeast, and the complicated difficulties of our possessions in the far west, render it not improbable that we may soon be plunged into the horrors of a severe and bloody war. To avoid this calamity no preventive means should be neglected. Diplomacy should be exerted to the utmost. All proper concessions should be made, all doubtful points of etiquette yielded. But, above all, constant attention must be paid to the measures of defence. To prevent an attack, we must show ourselves able to meet it. So long as men are influenced by interest, the surest guarantee of peace is an abundant preparation for war. The usual means of national defence may be divided into active and passive; the latter consisting in fortifications, and the other in men, field artillery, ships, and floating structures of every description. In other words, the measures resorted to for protection from foreign force, are, 1. The maintenance of a large standing army. 2. A superior naval force. 3. The construction of a system of fortifications on the frontiers and interior strategic points of a country. Some countries, on account of their geographical position, or the character of their people or institutions, are weak in one of these elements of defence. But in the same proportion that the strength of any one of these is diminished, should that of the others be increased. We have no large standing army; our regular force consists of a very few troops, commanded by well-educated officers, who are capable of constructing all temporary means of defence, and qualified to organize and discipline, if necessary, a larger army raised from the militia. The aggregate of our regular army, as authorized by law, is twelve thousand five hundred and thirty-nine, including officers, noncommissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates, which is divided into a general staff; medical, pay, and purchasing departments; a corps of engineers; a topographical corps; an ordnance department; two regiments of dragoons, four of artillery, and eight of infantry. The general staff is composed of one major-general, two brigadiers-general, one adjutant-general, and six assistants, two inspectors-general, one quartermaster-general, with four assistants and deputies, four quartermasters and twenty-eight assistants, one commissary-general, with one assistant and six commissaries. Each of the other corps and departments is placed under the direction of its chief, and the regiments of the line are each commanded by a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, and a certain number of subalterns. This small body of men is charged, in time of peace, with most arduous and important duties, and in the hour of danger, by its skill and experience, will Fortification is defined, the art of disposing the ground in such a manner as to enable a small number of troops to resist a larger army the longest time possible. If the work be placed in a position of much importance, and its materials be of a durable nature, it is called permanent; otherwise it receives the appellation of field, or temporary. Field works are properly confined to operations of a single campaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied only for a short period. Generally these works are of earth, thrown up by the troops in a single day. They are intimately connected with a system of permanent fortifications, but, from the facility of their construction, no provision need be made for them before the actual breaking out of war. Indeed they could not well be built before hostilities commenced, as their locality in each case must be determined by the position of the hostile forces. From the nature of the case, permanent fortifications are the most safe, economical, and efficient means of defence for this country. They possess most of the conservative properties of a large standing army, with none of its objectionable features. They require but little expenditure for their support; in time of peace they withdraw no valuable citizens from the useful occupations of life; they can exert no influence corrupting to public morals, or dangerous to public liberty. But in time of war they offer a strong obstacle to Π the invader. The most warlike nations have uniformly shown a reluctance to attack a country that was well fortified. But before illustrating the use of permanent military works, we must give a summary of their general advantages, which are applicable alike to all countries. 1. They are superior to the other means of defence in the economy of their support, and their perfect safety in time of peace. 2. In all military operations time is of the highest importance. An equilibrium can never long exist in the open field between forces that are nearly equal; such a contest can seldom be kept up more than a few hours. But even where they are very unequal, and the weaker party is supported by fortifications, an equilibrium may be sustained for many months, and, time being allowed for deliberation, such new schemes may be devised as to cause the scale to preponderate on the side of the smaller force. 3. Troops in a fort may select their opportunity for fighting. If in the field, with a strong place of retreat in their rear, they can offer, or refuse battle, according to the probability of success. Moreover, when once engaged they are less influenced by fear, having a safe retreat behind them. 4. If an invading army pass a line of forts, it is exposed to an attack in rear, and a reserve larger than the garrisons of this line must be left to observe it. But being separated from this reserve, and also from his magazines, the invader will, in all probability, be subjected to the horrors of a partizan warfare. It is therefore estimated, by the best military writers, that an army, supported by forts properly arranged, can repel a force six times larger than itself. Where a country is invaded, a large number of undisciplined troops are suddenly called into action. Probably only a small number of these will meet the invader, and, from not knowing his designs, much time will be lost in marches and countermarches, exposing their stores and magazines, and inevitably destroying much property in the country through which such troops pass. Moreover, without places of resort, a whole defensive army of inexperienced troops would most likely be cut off. Under these circumstances, the expenses of a single campaign would be sufficient to place the country in a tolerable state of permanent defence, and any one of these permanent works would enable a small force to hold out till succor could be obtained elsewhere. One por |