which might arise by reason of their adoption. The recommendation of the committee was then adopted."

The progress of the reforms instituted by those who launched the idea of separate courts for children and their subsequent care and education, and secured the legislation necessary to aid in the establishment of this new order of such affairs, must indeed be gratifying. It is most refreshing to turn from consideration of those schemes which have successfully been put into operation to enrich a few people at the expense of many and look to those acts which show an unselfish devotion to efforts to raise unfortunate humanity up.

The successful lives are those which have been devoted to the good of their fellows and at whom the fingers of outraged humanity are not pointed. We call attention to the progress of the juvenile courts because many of our readers may take hold of this kind of work and in aiding to build up institutions which will make good men and

women

of thousands who are yet to be and who otherwise might go to swell the criminal class, will be building best for their own happinesssuccess and who will not be forgotten when they have done with their earthly careers.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

CARRIERS-FAILURE TO DELIVER CARS.-In a recent decision by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in the case of Mauldin v. Seaboard AirLine Ry., 52 S. E. Rep. 677, the court decided a point which will interest shippers all over the country particularly those sections where great amounts of perishable fruit is grown for the markets. It was there held that a shipper, in the absence of special contract, is not entitled to damages for failure to carry his freight caused by a sudden press of business which could not have been reasonably anticipated. The defendant requested the following as a statement of the law which was refused. "The obligation to furnish cars in this case is an obligation imposed by law, and is not as binding as if the defendant railroad had contracted to furnish the cars. In this case the defendant is not liable if it has shown a reasonable excuse for failure to furnish the cars; heavy and unprecedented traffic, not reasonably to be expected and prepared for, would excuse the railroad for a deficiency of cars." If a common carrier assumes a contractual obligation outside of and beyond the duty imposed by public policy, it must perform the contract or pay the damages, unless it can show circumstances which relieve from the performance of contracts generally, and unexpected emergencies in its business

would not be sufficient to excuse it. 4 Elliott on Railroads, § 1473. Here, however, the claim is not based on a contract, but on the ordinary public duty of the carrier to receive and transport promptly all freight offered. Promptness in transportation is of great and increasing importance, and hence common carriers should be required to use every reasonable means and to take every reasonable precaution to insure it. They should not only have ample rolling stock for the prompt dispatch of all passenger and freight business usually to be expected, but they should by all reasonable forethought and effort prepare for unusual demands for transportation. And such forethought requires not only a study of their own business, but of the industries, the development and the progress of the country whose carrying business they undertake. But this duty does not extend to the acceptance and immediate transportation of freight at all hazards and in all circumstances. The true rule is thus etated in 5 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 168: "Where there is a sudden and unusual press of business, arising from exceptional causes, and which the company could not reasonably be expected to have anticipated, it is not liable for the delay thereby necessitated, unless it had specially contracted to furnish such transportation; it is bound to provide facilities for such transportation only as might reasonably have been anticipated." Porcher v. Railroad Co., 14 Rich. Law, 181; Ayres v. Railway Co. (Wis.), 37 N. W. Rep. 432, 5 Am. St. Rep. 226; Railway Co. v. Rae, 68 Am. Dec. 574; 4 Elliott on Railroads, §§ 1470, 1473; 6 Cyc. 373.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF ONE STATE OVER AN ACT OF BIGAMY COMMITTED IN ANOTHER

STATE-THE COLLINS CASE.

From time to time there arise cases in court which, because of the importance or novelty of the point involved, the prominence of the parties, or the peculiar surrounding circumstances, attract more than the usual amount of public attention. But it is seldom that one arises which commands attention because learned attorneys institute and dignified courts retain it in violation of the very fundamental principles of all law. An instance of the latter kind is the case against George D. Collins, of San Francisco, which has occupied considerable of the time and attention of the courts of California and the Dominion of Canada for some months past. George D. Collins is an attorney who has been more or less prominent (sometimes in the invidious sense of that word) at the San Francisco bar for some time past. He is a "crimi

indictment and the attempt to retain jurisdiction violative of elementary principle, but in contravention of the express prohibition of the California Penal Code, which provides for punishment only in those cases wherein the crime is committed wholly or in part within the state. That a crime charged was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is specifically made ground for demurrer; and specific provisions are made for dismissing the jury and discharging the defendant whenever it develops in the course of the trial that "the court has no jurisdiction of the offense charged, and it appears that it was committed out of the jurisdiction of the state."

The California Penal Code provides that "every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another person," is guilty of bigamy.4 But this provision cannot by any stretch of the canons of the well recognized rules of construction be made to extend to any bigamous marriages except those occurring within the state; and if the intent of the legislature was to embrace any other, in so far as the section seeks to embrace bigamous marriages contracted out of the state it is a nullity. The penal laws of a state can have no extra-territorial force; they are peculiarly local to the state; they cannot be enforced by the courts of another state, and they cannot regulate the acts or conduct of denizens of a sister state, or of their own citizens while temporarily sojourning in another state. 5 The crime of bigamy is not of the nature of those crimes commenced in one state or place and continued or completed in another; such as where a person is residing in one state, there originate and concocts a crime, which he consummates in another state, by innocent agents employed by him and acting under his direction; stealing 1 Pen. Code, § 27.

2 Pen. Code, § 1004, subd. 1.

3 Pen. Code, § 1114.

+ § 281.

6

5 See Scoville v. Canfield, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 338,7 Am. Dec. 467; Delafield v. State of Illinois, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 169; Teall v. Felton, 1 N. Y. 546; Dickinson v. Dickinson's Heirs, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 110, 24 Am. Dec. 444; Folliott v. Ogden, 1 H. Bl. 127, 135; Houston v. Moore, 18 U. S. (5 Wheat.) 169, 5 L. Ed. 19; Com. monwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 540; United States v Lathrop, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 4; Suffolk Bauk v. Kidder, 12 Vt. 464, 36 Am. Dec. 354; Earthman v. Jones, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 486.

6 Cheating by means of forged writing drawn and executed in Ross County, Ohio, and published and

9

goods or property in one jurisdiction and carrying or taking same into another and there converting it to his own use; embezzling money in one county or country and taking it into another; firing shot from one country which takes effect in another; and the like. The same rules of law do not govern. The first consists of an overt act; is completed at one time and in one transaction. The others-with the exception of the last-consist of a series of nets, asportation, publication, and the like. A section of the California Penal Code provides that "upon a trial for bigamy, it is not necessary to prove either of the marriages by the register, certificate, or other record evidence thereof, but the same may be proved by such evidence as is admissible to prove marriage in other cases; and where the second marriage took place out of this state, proof of that fact, accompanied with proof of cohabitation thereafter in this state, is sufficient to sustain the charge."'10 But this is merely a rule of evidence which cannot be held to broaden the scope of the crime denounced in § 281, or enlarge the territorial jurisdiction of the court. It has no bearing whatever upon the substantive offense, and the clause "and when the second marriage took place out of this state, proof of that fact, accompanied with proof of cohabitation thereafter in this state, is sufficient to sustain the charge," is without force or effect; is a nullity.

San Francisco, Cal.

H. M. HANSON.

crime consummated in New York City, People v. Adams, 3 Den. (N. Y.) 190, 45 Am. Dec. 468, 1 N. Y. 173. See People v. Merrill, Park. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 598; Ex parte Hedley, 31 Cal. 114; King v. Burdett, 4 Barn. & Ald. 95, 179, 6 Eng. C. L. 404; In re Carr, 28 Kan. 1; Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 507; Fonte v. State, 15 Lea (Tenn.), 712; Ex parte Rogers, 10 Tex. App. 655, 38 Am. Rep. 654; Rogers v. State, 11 Tex. App. 608.

7 Kidd v. State, 83 Ala. 58, 3 So. Rep. 442; People v. Staples, 91 Cal. 23, 27 Pac. Rep. 523; Mock v. People, 82 N. Y. 285; Dixon v. State, 15 Tex. Cr. App. 480; Powell v. State, 52 Wis. 217, 9 N. W. Rep. 17.

8 Cole v. State, 16 Tex. App. 461; Reed v. State, 16 Tex. App. 586; Cohen v. State, 20 Tex. App. 224.

9 Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 44 Am. St. Rep. 75, 17 S. E. Rep. 984; United States v. Davis, 2 Sumn. C. C. 482, 485, 25 Fed. Cas. 786; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 100 Am. Dec. 89; Johns v. State, 19 Ind. 421, 423, 81 Am. Dec. 408; State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 65 Am. Dec. 452; State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331, 49 Am. Rep. 620; Green v. State, 66 Ala. 40, 41 Am. Rep. 744.

10 § 1106.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACTS PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JUVENILE COURTS.

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION OF ARTHUR E. CHRISTENSEN, IN BEHALF OF HARRY BENSON, A MINOR, FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Utah, February 28, 1906.

Inferior courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and not those whose decisions are necessarily subject to review and therefore juvenile courts may be estab lished by law by the legislature without making provision for appeal, and such a law is not violative of any constitutional limitation in reference to the establishment of "inferior courts."

Classification of minors, by themselves, and matters relating to them and distinguishing the laws in regard to them, violates no constitutional provision and that therefore the establishment of a juvenile court, with jurisdiction limited solely to minors, is constitutional.

The jurisdiction of juvenile courts over delinquent minors is purely equitable and has its foundation in the ancient right of equity to appoint a guardian or assume parental care over infants who seem to be neglected or wanting in proper supervision.

The legislature may limit the jurisdiction of juvenile courts to cities of a certain size without violating any provision of the constitution.

Enforcing the provisions of the juvenile court act defining a delinquent child to be one who violates a statute of the state and providing for his commitment to the State Industrial school if, in the opinion of the court, such commitment is necessary, is not a criminal proceeding, and the care and training of such a boy in such an institution is not imprisonment.

HOWELL, D. J.: The petition herein, which is in behalf of Harry Benson a minor of the age of seventeen years, sets out that he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the Superintendent of the State Industrial School. The cause of such restraint is alleged to be a pretended commitment based upon an order and judgment of the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake City, and such commitment is alleged to be illegal for the following reasons, first, that the act of the legislature creating juvenile courts is unconstitutional and void, and secondly, even if it is not that the procedure therein provided for the trial of juvenile delinquents is unconstitutional and void, wherefore, the petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus be directed to the said Superintendent of the State Industrial School commanding him to have the body of said Harry Benson before the court, together with the cause of his detention, and that he be restored to his liberty. The return of the superintendent to the writ of habeas corpus alleges that he has the said Harry Benson under his control as Superintendent of the State Industrial School, by virtue of a commitment issued by the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake City, and that the same is due and adequate

authority according to law, for him to retain con trol of the said Harry Benson. Wherefore, having fully answered said petition and made return to said writ of habeas corpus, he prays to be hence dismissed.

Attached to the petition is the complaint under oath of the probation officer of the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake City, charging that the said Harry Benson, being a child eighteen years of age, or under, and not being an inmate of the State Industrial School or of any institution incorporated under the laws of the state of Utah, for the care and correction of delinquent children, with having unlawfully become a delinquent child by violating Section 4175 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, by willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and against the will and consent of one F. O. Haymond, taking and carrying away from the possession and person of said F. O. Haymond six dollars lawful money of the United States of America, the same being the personal property of the said F. O. Haymond, whereby, and by force of the statute in such case made and provided, the said child is deemed a juvenile delinquent person. He therefore prays that the said child may be corrected and cared for according to law. Upon this complaint were predicated all the proceedings in the juvenile court, a transcript of which was by consent of counsel herein introduced in evidence, and discloses the following facts: After the complaint had been read to the said Harry Benson, and the court had refused to allow him to plead to it, or to grant him a jury trial, the judge, over the objection of the guardian ad litem, and counsel for the boy, that he could not be compelled to give evidence against himself, examined him not only as to his commission of the crime with which he was charged, but as to his habits and mode of life. It developed from the questioning that the boy's parents reside at Canal Dover in the State of Ohio; that he had left home some months prior to the time he was apprehended, and during that time had traveled as far west as Los Angeles, California; that at Sacramento he had met Charles Morehead, a young man twenty-three years of age, and together they had come to Salt Lake City; that neither had any money upon their arrival nor any friends, and after being there several days, and after having several conferences they had determined to "hold up some one," Morehead having brought a gun along with him when he lef home, but they did not have the courage to do it; that finally it became necessary, as the boy said, to do it and accordingly they waylaid a pedestrian one evening, the boy holding the gun in his face, while his companion went through his pockets, procuring something over a dollar, which was divided equally between them, and with which they rented a room. After the judge had elicited this story from the boy, and after a police officer had related under oath a confession made to him by the boy, and the man who had been robbed identified the boy, the court adjudged him a de

linquent and ordered him committed to the State Industrial School, "to be there received, cared for, and educated until he shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years, unless sooner released, as provided by the laws of the state and those governing the State Industrial School." The proceedings throughout were evidently not regarded by the court as a criminal prosecution, but rather as an inquiry to determine whether the boy should be sent to another court for trial as a felon, or whether he should be saved from the stigma of a penitentiary sentence and treated as a fit subject for "reformation and insruction." The court proceeded consistently upon the theory that its sole function was to glean such facts as would enable it to tell whether the boy was entitled to be looked upon as past redemption, and therefore to be sent hence to be given a trial in a criminal court, or whether being a minor, the state should not attempt to redeem him from his wandering habits and wayward life. The proceedings were therefore necessarily conversational and informal, but they were on that account all the more effective.

The grounds set out in the petition, and upon which it is contended by counsel for the said Harry Benson that the act creating the juvenile court which committed him to the State Industrial School is unconstitutional, are as follows:

1. That the legislature has no power to create a court from which there is no appeal. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1).

2. That the act of the legislature creating juvenile courts contains more than one subject. Art. VI, Sec. 23).

3. That the legislature is inhibited from enacting any special law punishing crimes and misdemeanors, or regulating practice in courts of justice. (Art. VI, Sec. 26, Subd. 5 and 6).

4. That inasmuch as such courts are only created in cities of the first and second class, it violates the requirements that where a general law can be applicable no special law shall be enacted, and that all laws of a general nature shall have uniform application. (Art. VI, Sec. 26; Art. I, Sec. 24).

The act creating the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake City, and other juvenile courts, is found in Session Laws of Utah, 1905, p. 182, and is entitled: "An act providing for juvenile courts, providing for the appointment of probation officers, outlining their duties and specifying their compensation; providing a method of procedure against juvenile delinquents, specifying places for their temporary and permanent detention, and the compensation for their care; providing for the time and place of trial; defining delinquent child and delinquent person; 'providing punishment for all delinquents." Section 1 of the act, so far as material here, provides that "in cities of the first and second class there is hereby created a special court, to be known as the juvenile court, which shall have jurisdiction in all cases relating to children, including juvenile

delinquents, as described in section 6 of this act, and of the hearing and punishment of all delinquent adult persons, as described in section 7 of this act. This court shall have jurisdiction in all cases where the custody or legal punishment of children is in question. It also provides for the appointment of the judge of the court and its clerk. Section 2 provides for probation officers and prescribes their compensation and duties, among which is: "to be present in court to represent the interests of the child when the case is heard, to furnish to the court such information and assistance as the court may require, and to take charge of any child before and after trial, as may be directed by the court." Section 3 provides that all proceedings shall be by complaint of sworn statement, to be filed as in other cases under the general laws of the state. "In any such complaint or sworn statement filed under this act, the act or acts claimed to have been committed by the child proceeded against shall in a general way be stated therein as constituting such child a juvenile delinquent child or person." Section 4 provides for the procedure in juvenile courts and also creates a juvenile department of the district court, outside of counties containing cities of the first and second class. Section 5 provides for the disposition of delinquent children and reads as follows: "Disposition of delinquent children. In any case of a delinquent child coming under the provisions of this act, the court may continue the hearing from time to time, and may commit the child to the care of the probation officers, and may allow the child to remain in its own home subject to the visitation of the probation officer; such child to report to the court or probation officer as often as may be required, and subject to be returned to the court for further proceedings whenever such action may appear necessary; or the court may cause the child to be placed in a suitable family home, subject to the friendly supervision of the probation officer and the further order of the court; or it may authorize the child to be boarded out in some suitable family home, in case provision is made by voluntary contributions or otherwise for the payment of the board of such child, until suitable provision be made for the child in a home without such payment, or the court may commit such child to the State Industrial School, or the court may commit the child to any institution within the county, incorporated under the laws of the state that may care for children or which may be provided by the state or county suitable for the care of children, or to any state institution which may now or hereafter be established for the care of boys and girls. In no case shall a child, proceeded against under the provisions of this act be committed beyond the age of twenty-one. A child committed to any such institution shall be subject to the control of the board of managers of such institutions, and the said board shall have power to parole such child on such conditions as it may prescribe, and the