premises for carrying on a competing business.-Waldorf-Astoria Segar Co. v. Salomon, 95 N. Y. Supp. 1053. 85. INJUNCTION-Gambling House.-A gambling house is, under the statute, a nuisance, and may be enjoined at the instance of any one injured thereby.-Ex parte Allison, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 492.

86. INJUNCTION-Persons Liable.-Where a strike had been declared against complainants by labor unions, in a suit to restrain interference with the business, held proper for the chancellor to deal with each defendant as an individual.-Uurphey & Mundy v. Terrell, Miss., 39 So. Rep. 477.

87. INJUNCTION-Restraining Commission of Crime.-It is competent for the legislature to authorize the issuance of an injunction the effect of which is to restrain the commisson of a crime.-Ex parte Allison, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 492.

88. INJUNCTION-Restraint of Criminal Proceedings.Conceding that equity will restrain a criminal prosecution under a void statute, it will not try the validity of the statute.-Littleton v. Burgess, Wyo., 82 Pac. Rep. 864.

89. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Keeping Saloon Open on Sunday. The unexplained fact of a saloon being open on Sunday in violation of Rev. Pol. Code, § 2847, is sufficient to justify a conviction of the keeper thereof.-State v. Grant, S. Dak, 105 N. W. Rep. 97.

90. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Unlawful Sale.-Where defendant hired another to sell liquor in local option territory, an indictment against defendant for a sale made by the employee properly charged that defendant made the sale.-McGovern v. State, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 502.

91. JUDGMENT-Partnership Accounting.-In partnership accounting in which defendants were ordered to transfer shares of stock to plaintiff, it was proper for the judgment not to direct transfer of any specific shares.Reilly v. Freeman, 95 N. Y. Supp. 1069.

92. JUDGMENT-Petition to Vacate.-A petition to vacate a judgment for fraud must be verified, and set forth the judgment, the facts constituting the fraud, and fully state the facts constituting the defense.-Thompson v. Caddo County Bank, Okla., 82 Pac. Rep. 927.

93. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata.-A judgment in a suit on an account by defendant against plaintiff held not res judicata of plaintiff's right to recover alleged noncredited payments not pleaded as a set-off in such action.-Seiber v. Johnson Mercantile Co., Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 516.

94. LARCENT Instructions. In a prosecution for burglary and larceny, an instruction held not objectionable for failure to require the "taking" to have been without the consent of the owner of the property.-State v. Speritus, Mo., 90 S. W. Rep. 459.

95. LIFE ESTATES-What is Income.-Surplus and undivided profits on sale of bank stock belonging to estate held to belong to the life tenants and not to remaindermen, and to be properly credited to income.-In re Stevens, 95 N. Y. Supp. 1084.

96. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS Pollution of Water Courses. In an action for the pollution of a watercourse, it was error for the court to refuse to charge that plaintiff could not recover damages to him or to his land for more than a year prior to the bringing of the suit.-Tutwiler Coal. Coke & Iron Co. v. Nichols, Ala., 39 So. Rep. 762.

97. LIS PENDENS-Application of Doctrine.-The doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to a conveyance made prior to the service of citation in a suit on account of which the doctrine is sought to be invoked.-Sparks v. Taylor, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 485.

98. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-Exemplary Damages.Malice and want of probable cause must concur in order to authorize a recovery for exemplary damages for wrongful issuance of a writ of attachment.-Faroux v. Cornwell, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 537.

99. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION Probable Cause. - One who sues out an attachment maliciously and without probable cause may be subjected to exemplary damages. -Faroux v. Cornwell, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 537.

100. MASTER AND SERVANT-Independent Contractors. -A principal is liable for the acts of an independent contractor employed by him where the work to be done is intrinsically dangerous, however skillfully performed. -Montgomery St. Ry. Co. v. Smith, Ala, 39 So. Rep. 757. 101. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injuries to Servant.-The state as an employer, is bound to use reasonable care in providing one in its service in the operation of a pile driver with machinery and appliances reasonably safe and suitable for his use, and to keep such machinery and appliances in repair.-Hazzard v. State, 95 N. Y. Supp.

1103.

102. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injury to Servant.-In a suit to recover for the death of an employee by the negligent operation of defendant's train, objections to evi. dence as to a road crossing the railroad track where the accident happened, and as to whether the engineer whistled, held properly overruled.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jones, Fla., 39 So. Rep. 485.

103. MASTER AND SERVANT-Laborer's Lien. In replevin for a bale of cotton, devolving burden of proof on the laborer claiming the same under a laborer's stat utory lien that the bale was not embraced in a certain trust deed held not error.-McCarty v. Key, Miss., 39 So. Rep. 780.

104. MONEY RECEIVED-Sufficiency of Evidence. - In assumpsit for money had and received under an agreement to invest it, the evidence considered, and held not to sustain a judgment against one of the defendants.Brady v. Messler, R. I., 62 Atl. Rep. 511.

105. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Defective Sidewalks. -In an action against a city for injuries to a pedestrian from a defect in a sidewalk, it was proper to admit evidence that the sidewalk on each side of the street and adjoining the point where the injury occurred was defective.-City of Rockwall v. Heath, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep.

514.

106. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Duty of Pedestrian.It is not the duty of a traveler in a public street to ascer tain whether or not the way is clear, though it is his duty after ascertaining that there is an obstruction to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury.-Montgomery St. Ry. Co. v. Smith, Ala., 39 So. Rep. 757.

107. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Injunction to Restrain Levy of Assessment. - Injunction is the proper remedy to restrain officers of a municipal corporation from levying assessments for public improvements un. der an alleged unconstitutional statute -Arnold v. City of Knoxville, Tenn., 90 S. W. Rep. 469.

108. NEGLIGENCE-Standing on Running Board of Street Car. It is not negligence per se for a passenger on a street car to stand on the running board and hold the post or handle affixed thereto, where the car is so filled that there is no room inside.-Verrone v. Rhode Island Suburban Ry. Co., R. I., 62 Atl. Rep. 512.

109. PARDON-Procedure by Indictment.-In the ab sence of statute, and unless the act constituting the violation of a condition of a pardon is itself a criminal offense, the violation of the condition is no ground for prosecution by indictment.-Ex parte Alvarez, Fla., 39 So. Rep. 481.

110. PARENT AND CHILD-Support of Child. Agreement between husband and wife for support of children by the latter held not to affect the husband's duty, as between himself and the children, to support the children. -Wright v. Leupp, N. J., 62 Atl. Rep. 464.

111. PAYMENT-Evidence.-In an action on a book ac. count, checks given by the debtor and accepted by the creditor held to relate to other transactions, and not to constitute a payment of the account. - Lewis v. Eng. land, Wyo., 82 Pac. Rep. 869.

112. PAYMENT-Presumption from Lapse of Time.-A lapse of 24 years in the presentation of a certificate of deposit for payment, with evidence of payment, raises a presumption thereof.-Rosenstock v. Dessar, 95 N. Y. Supp. 1064.

113. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Power of Attorney as Sur. viving Deceased. - In order that a power of attorney

shall survive the death of the principal, it must be given on consideration, and there must be vested in the donee some estate, right, or interest in its subject-matter.Hoffman v. Union Lime Sav. Institution, 95 N. Y. Supp. 1045.

114. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Effect of Extension of Note. That the holder of a note indulges the maker in enforcing collection held not to release the sureties where there is no binding contract to extend the note.Titterington v. Murrell, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 510.

115. RAILROADS-Establishment of Terminus.-Where a railroad projects an extension to a certain terminal point, it is not necessary that it should own property at that point in order to make its terminus there.-Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Union Springs & N. Ry. Co., Ala., 39 So. Rep. 478.

116. RAILROADS-Stock Killed on Track. A railway company is not liable in damages for stock killed on its tracks in a county in which the stock law has been adopted, in the absence of negligence in the operation of the trains killing the stock.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Tolbert, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 508.

117. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS-Description of Stolen Property. An indictment for receiving stolen goods, which describes the stolen property as "two cases containing thirty-five pairs of shoes," includes the shoes in its description of the stolen property, and not merely the boxes.-State v. Sakowski, Mo., 90 S. W. Rep. 435. 118. REGISTER OF DEEDS - Liability on Bond. The measure of liability on the bond of a recorder of deeds for negligently permitting a trust deed to be falsely marked "Satisfied" cannot exceed the amount due on the trust deed at the date of the entry of satisfaction.— State v. Green, Mo., 90 S. W. Rep. 403.

119. SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES-Failure to Pay Over Money.-Termination of the office of sheriff without his paying funds into court held not to constitute a breach of his bond.-State v. O'Neill, Mo., 90 S. W. Rep. 410.

120. SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES-Wrongful Suing Out of Attachment.-A constable levying a writ of attachment is not liable with the attachment plaintiff for the wrongful suing out of the writ in the absence of any evidence to show that the officer participated in the procurement of the writ.-Faroux v. Cornwell, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 537.

121. STREET RAILROADS-Risk Assumed in Standing on Running Board.-A passenger on a street car, who stands on the running board of the car, assumes only the risk of the ordinary motion of the car.-Verrone v. Rhode Island Suburban Ry. Co., R. I., 62 Atl. Rep. 512.

122. TAXATION-Proceding to Set Aside Assessment.A proceeding, under Rev. St. 1892, § 1542, to have an assessment declared illegal, will not extend to irregularities in publishing notices preliminary to calling an election for a subdistrict school tax.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Board of Public Instruction for Jackson County, Fla., 39 So. Rep. 480.

123. TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES-Unfair Competition. A geographical name which has long been used to indicate a particular manufactured article may ac quire a secondary meaning as the designation of a particular class of such articles, and thus become entitled to protection as a trade-mark, or serve as the basis of a proceeding to prevent unfair competition.-W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., Me., 62 Atl. Rep. 499. 124. TRESPASS TO TRYTITLE-Wrongfully Rejected Application. Where, in trespass to try title to school lands, plaintiff claimed as a purchaser, and introduced in evidence an application to purchase which had been indorsed "Rejected," it was incumbent on plaintiff to show that the application was wrongfully rejected.-Knapp v. Patterson, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 163.

125. TRIAL-Action by City to Recover Taxes.-In an action by a city for taxes, an objection to the manner in which the assessment rolls had been prepared should have been made to their introduction in evidence, and not to the testimony of the assessor, identifying the rolls. -City of Houston v. Stewart, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 49.

126. TRIAL-Delay in Transportation of Cattle.-The words "proper time," in an instruction in an action against a carrier for unreasonable delay in the delivery of cattle, held to mean "reasonable time."-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Stanfield Bros., Tex., 90 8. W. Rep. 517.J

127. TRIAL-Effect of Instructions as a Whole.-It is not necessary that all of the instructions should direct the jury to the evidence in the case, where this is done by the instructions taken as a whole.-Logan v. Field, Mo., 90 S. W. Rep. 127.

128. TRIAL-Exclusion of Witnesses.-A witness, disobeying the order excluding witnesses during the trial of a criminal case, held properly allowed to testify.State v. Ilomaki, Wash., 82 Pac. Rep. 873.

129. TRIAL-Findings of Court.-A finding that a specified sum will compensate one for a personal injury held to mean the amount necessary to compensate him as fixed by Civ. Code, § 3333.-Griffin v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., Cal., 82 Pac. Rep. 1084.

130. TRIAL-Right to Close Argument.-Defendant held not to have acquired the burden of proof with right to close the argument by admitting ordinary negligence where gross negligence was charged.-Southern Ry. Co. in Kentucky v. Steele, Ky., 90 S. W. Rep. 548.

131. TRUSTS-Advances.-Testamentary trustees held to have had authority to give a mortgage to secure advances with which to make a settlement with contestants of the will.-Fidelity Trust Co. v. Hawkins, Ky., 90 S. W. Rep. 249.

132. TRUSTS-Assent of Trustee.-The assent of the trustee is not essential to the validity of a trust instrument.-Weils v. German Ins. Co., Iowa, 105 N. W. Rep.

123.

133. TRUSTS-Delivery of Bank Book as Passing Deposit,-Delivery of a bank book will not pass title to moneys on deposit for the purpose of a proper burial and the saying of masses, unless delivered with that intent.-Hoffman v. Union Dime Sav. Institution, 95 N. Y. Supp. 1045.

134. TRUSTS-Validity.-Relations between parties to a trust deed held not fiduciary, and there was no ground such as to warrant a setting aside of the deed.-Kelly v. Ashforth, 95 N. Y. Supp. 1004.

135. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Purchaser's Duty on Notice of Equitable Right.-Purchasers of land must account to equitable title holder for so much of the pur. chase money as remains unpaid when they received notice of the latter's rights.-Sparks v. Taylor, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 485.

136. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Specific Performance.-Where, in an agreement to convey land, no time is fixed in which the conveyance is to be made, the grantor has a reasonable time in which to make it.-White v. Poole, N. H., 62 Atl. Rep. 494.

137. WATERS AND WATER COURSES Pollution of Stream.-In an action for pollution of a water course, evidence that fish had decreased in the stream, and that dead fish had been discovered therein, held admissible. -Tutwiler Coal, Coke & Iron Co. v. Nichols, Ala., 39 So. Rep. 762.

138. WITNESSES-Impeachment. - Though a witness has testified to immaterial matter, no question can be asked in regard to it for the purpose of impeachment.Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Quinn, Ala., 39 So. Rep. 756.

139. WITNESSES-Impeachment of Accused.-An accused might be impeached on cross-examination by showing that he had been charged before a justice of the peace with passing counterfeit money, and that he was then under bond to await the action of the grand jury.Childress v. State, Tex., 90 S. W. Rep. 30.

140. WITNESSES-Larceny.-In a prosecution for cattle theft, refusal of the court to permit defendant to ask a witness concerning a conversation had between himself and defendant as to certain cattle, on cross-examination, held error.-State v. Strodeinier, Wash., 82 Pac Rep. 915.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., APRIL 20, 1906.

CONCEALMENT OF PROPERTY BY OFFICERS OF BANKRUPT CORPORATION NOT PUNISHABLE.

In the case of Field v. United States, 14 Am. B. R. 507, a case arising in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, Judge Sanborn has rendered what seems to us to be an extraordinary decision. It seems that one Field was the vice-president and one of the directors of Brown-Rollosson Company, a bankrupt corporation. He was indicted under section 29b of the Bankrupt Law of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 554 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3433), and convicted of the offense of having knowingly and fraudulently concealed property which belonged to the estate of the corporation in bankruptcy from its trustee. Section 29b reads: "A person shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of not to exceed two years on conviction of the offense of having knowingly and fraudulently concealed while a bankrupt, or after his discharge, from his trustee, any of the property to his estate in bankruptcy."

The court in setting aside the conviction in the principal case, says: "Neither the offense nor the punishment here described exists under the common law. They are the creatures of the act of congress. In the absence of that act, no one could be legally punished by imprisonment for having concealed property from his trustee in bankruptcy. In the presence of the act, therefore, no one can be lawfully punished by imprisonment for this concealment who is not by the terms of the statute subject to this punishment. The act specifically designates the persons liable to the punishment which it prescribes. They are those who commit the offense denounced while they are bankrupts or after they have received their discharges in bankruptcy. Under a familiar rule, this specification by the statute of those who are bankrupts, and those who have been bankrupts, as the persons liable to the punishment, necessarily excludes all others from that liability, and no other person can be law

fully punisted under this section for the offense it denounces. As the plaintiff in error was not and never had been a bankrupt, it is difficult to perceive how he could have been guilty of the offense of having concealed while a bankrupt, or after his discharge, from his trustee, any of his estate in bankruptcy. The argument by which counsel attempt to sustain the indictment and conviction is that clause 19 of section 1 of the Bankruptcy law, 30 Stat. 544, U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3419, broadens the meaning of section 29b so that it includes the officers of a bankrupt corporation, who conceal the property of its estate in bankruptcy from its trustee, in the class subject to the punishment it prescribes. That clause reads in this way: "Persons" shall include corporations, except where otherwise specified, and officers, partnerships and women, and when used with reference to the commission of acts which are herein forbidden shall include persons who are participants in the forbidden acts, and the agents, officers and members of the board of directors or trustees, or other similar controlling bodies of corporations.' A careful reading of this clause, however, in connection with the terms of section 29b, convinces that it can have no effect to extend the terms or broaden the true interpretation of the latter subsection. All who are punishable under this subsection 29b are persons who are or who have been bankrupts. Hence none of those whom the word 'persons' is made to include under section 1, cl. 19-no officers, partnerships, women, participants in forbidden acts, agents, officers, or members of any board of directors or trustees-can be guilty of the offense specified in this subsection, unless they are either bankrupts when they conceal the property, or have been such and have obtained their discharges before that time. Present or past bankruptcy is an essential attribute of every person who may be an offender under this statute. Since the plaintiff in error was not a bankrupt when he was charged with concealing the property of the corporation, since he had never been a bankrupt and had not been discharged in bankruptcy, and since he had neither estate in bankruptcy nor trustee therein, he could not have concealed while a bankrupt, or after discharge, any of the property belonging to his estate in bankruptcy, from his trustee, and he was not

amenable to the punishment prescribed by subsection 29b. The suggestion that concealment by an officer of a bankrupt corporation of the property of its estate in bankruptcy from its trustee is clearly within the mischief of this subsection, and therefore within its true interpretation, is unworthy of serious consideration. A penal statute which creates and denounces a new offense must be strictly construed. A man ought not to be punished unless he falls plainly within the class of persons specified by such a statute. An act which is not clearly an offense by the express will of the legislative department of the government must not be made so after its commission by a broad construction adopted by the judiciary. The definition of the offense and the classification of the offenders are legislative and no judicial functions, and where, as in the case at bar, a penal statute is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the courts may not lawfully extend it, by construction, to a class of persons who are excluded from its effect by its terms, because, in their opinion, the acts of the latter are as mischievous as those of the class whose deeds the statute denounces. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 96, 5 L. Ed. 37; United States v. Clayton, Fed. Cas. No. 14,814; In re McDonough (D. C.), 49 Fed. Rep. 360; United States v. Lake (D. C.), 12 Am. B. R. 270, 129 Fed. Rep. 499."

the corporation can only act by its officers and their only means of determining such misconduct is to hold such officers responsible who may be found guilty. There seems to us to be plenty of material in the act to have been the basis of an opinion which would have commanded what is right. As it is, the door is wide open for just such frauds as were committed in the principal case.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROHIBITION OF THE RAILROAD TICKET BROKerage BusiNESS.-The interesting question whether the legislature has the right to probibit the railroad ticket brokerage business is discussed in the recent case of In re O'Neill, 83 Pac. Rep. 104, where the Supreme Court of Washington upheld a statute of that state prohibiting all unauthorized business in the sale or purchase of railroad tickets. In the course of a very valuable opinion the court said: "Railway corporations exist by authority of the state, and are required to serve the public. One of the purpose of this act, as specified in its title, is, 'to prevent fraud upon travelers.' It is true there is no charge of actual fraud made against appellant; but the declared purpose of the statute is to prevent the possibility of fraud, and the method of regulation to prevent it has been violated by appellant. If it is within the power of the state to establish general rules designed to prevent fraud in the premises, appellant cannot be heard to say that the violation of those rules does not result in fraud. We are unable to see why the state which creates the corporation and requires that it shall serve the public has not the power to adopt reasonable regulative means applicable to that service, whereby no fraudulent

had concealed any of the estate of the bankrupt corporation, because, according to the above decision, the act would be that of the corporation and not the act of an officer having its affairs in charge. At least the chances of punishment would be greatly reduced by the act of incorporation. There is absolute safety for the officer of a corporation guilty of concealing a part of his estate. If the second clause above mentioned does not mean that "persons" shall include officers, in a natural construction, it is impossible to understand the object of its enactment. It seems very plain to us that the legislative act intended to provide for the punishment of officers guilty of concealing the estate of the bankrupt corporation. Public policy demands it, for

within the opinion of the legislature as it is supposedly advised from experience of citizens of the state, the sale of railway tickets by others than the railway companies and their duly authorized agents results in fraudulent imposition upon travelers, then it would seem to be within the regulative police power of the state to adopt means to prevent it. The thing to be sold, viz., the right of transportation over the railway line, originally belongs to the company and is its property. The company is under obligation to sell that property to all who apply for it and who tender the necessary price. The state, by the act in question, has said that the original holder of that property and its duly authorized agents shall alone be permitted to sell it. Appellant's position is that he has the right to traffic in the property after the railway company has sold it, and that to deprive him of that privilege is to violate a constitutional right. The mere right to continue in the future to buy and sell property

of the class of railway transportation, which is primarily owned by the railroad company to be sold to the individual traveler for transportation, and not for the purpose of subsequent traffic therein for speculation and gain, we think cannot be such an individual property right as comes within the constitutional provisions, when considered as against the regulative power of the state concerning such transportation, and in the interest of protecting the property rights therein of the great number of people who become the owners of such property. Such traffic bears an 'important relation to the welfare of the general traveling public who are patrons of the railway companies, quasi-public orporations created to serve the public." That such legislation such as was upheld in the present case can be properly classified as a police regulation has been held in a number of states. Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552, 30 Am. Rep. 238; Burdick v. People, 149 Ill. 600, 36 N. E. Rep. 948, 24 L. R. A. 152, 41 Am. St. Rep. 329; State v. Corbett, 57 Minn. 345, 59 N. W. Rep. 317, 24 L. R. A. 498; State v. Bernheim, 19 Mont. 512, 49 Pac. Rep. 441; Jannin v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 631, 51 S. W. Rep. 1126, 62 S. W. Rep. 419, 96 Am. St. Rep. 821. While not expressly discussed, yet the police power in the premises was necessarily recognized in State v. Ray, 109 N. Car. 736, 14 S. E. Rep. 83, 14 L. R. A. 529, and Commonwealth v. Keary, 198 Pa. 500, 48 Atl. Rep. 472. It was also expressly stated in some of the decisions that such legislation does not deprive one of his property without due process of law. While that subject was not particularly discussed in the opinions of all the cases cited, yet such was the necessary effect of the decisions. In Ex parte Lorenzen, 128 Cal. 431, 61 Pac. Rep. 68, 50 L. R. A. 55, 76 Am. St. Rep. 47, the same was, in effect, held with relation to an ordinance of San Francisco, requiring that street car transfer tickets should be issued and delivered within the car from which the transfer is made, and received only within the car to which it is made, and forbidding any person, except the conductor or agent of the street car line, to give, sell, or issue any transfer check.

The defendants chief reliance in the principal case was upon the authority of the famous case of People v. Warden of Prison, 157 N. Y. 116, 51 N. E. Rep. 1006, 43 L. R. A. 264, 68 Am. St. Rep. 763. The majority opinion in that case was written by Chief Justice Parker, and held a statute of similar import to our own to be unconstitutional as taking property without due process of law and as interfering with the liberty of the citizen. There were three dissenting judges, and two somewhat extended dissenting opinions were written. Some of the opinions in cases we have cited above have referred to that case, and have followed the reasoning and conclusions of the dissenting judges, rather than the argument of Judge Parker. The court in the principal case, in concluding its argument on this point said: "Everyone has the natural and

constitutional right to pursue a lawful business; but we do not think he has such right to traffic in the transportation of a railway company, without its permission or authority, as against the power of the state to regulate the sale of such transportation in the interest of the general public. A legislative act should be upheld, unless there are clear constitutional reasons for holding otherwise. We are not convinced that such reasons exist in this case, and we are disposed to adopt the views of what we are constrained to believe is the weight of authority having reference to decisions upon statutes treating of the same subject-matter in sister states. The arguments of the other courts may not be as elaborate as that of Judge Parker. His distinguished personality as a jurist and otherwise should cause his opinion and argument to receive much consideration, but his conclusions are not supported by the decisions of the other courts."

THE DOCTRINE OF PREVIOUS JEOPARDY.

The doctrine of previous jeopardy is sacred with the English speaking people. It is imbedded in the bed rock of our law. It stands as a safeguard against oppression and wrong. It is the beacon-light of modern civilization and clarifies the gloom of the dark ages. Without this principle despotism thrives; within its effulgent light it shrivels as overtender plants in the noon-day's sun. Without it, criminals might be made to pay the penalty of their crimes as often as it might please the whim or caprice of his government to try him. Without it, there could be no security from injustice and wrong. Without it, our liberties would not, and could not, be guaranteed to us. But with it, when one has once paid the penalty for wrong-doing, and this is as near as it is possible to right the wrong when once done, he is a free man in every sense of the word and is capable of feeling and acting it. look the world in the face and say, "you cannot touch me; I have expiated my crime; I am now a free man, entitled to all the rights under the government that is accorded to every other citizen." Being once in jeopardy, one cannot again be tried for the same offense, whether the prosecution was successful or unsuccessful in establishing his guilt. This is guaranteed to the citizens of the United States by our national and state constitutions. But what is jeopardy? Jeopardy

Then it is that he can