we say this, because it is clear that no settlement which did not satisfy the Radicals would be any settlement at all: that is to say, they would continue to agitate for something more through every succeeding session, to the great detriment of public business, and unsettlement of the public mind. They would keep the sore open, we may be quite sure; nor is it very uncharitable to suppose that this would satisfy them nearly as well as having it closed. At all events, we see that they are determined that it shall not be closed if they can help it, by anything in the nature of a compromise falling short of Mr Keir Hardie's ideal, which is "sweeping the House of Lords out of existence." If the veto is surrendered, the Constitution is ruined. If it is not, the war will still go on. It seems to us, therefore, that what is talked of as a third compromise, but which, after all, is only the present system more strictly defined by statute, would be preferable to anything which has as yet been put forward, though, of course, it would no more settle the question than either of the above proposition advanced by the Government, which gives no appeal to the people from the decision of a single Parliament, is manifestly inadequate. Between these two methods which seem to partake of the nature of contradictories, though not clothed in logical form, where are we to find a middle term,— in other words, a compromise. Of course we know very well that means can always be found to disguise the true nature of any compromise in which one party gets the shell and the other the oyster; it can be enveloped in a mist of words, and a network of equivocations and reservations, so as to hide it from the party whose interests are sacrificed. But we will not anticipate any further. We would only have our readers forewarned that what the Radicals desire is very likely to happen-namely, that the country will be appealed to in support of the present Government before any conclusion has been reached by the Conference, and that the total abolition of the veto, and with it of all the steadying power now vested in the House of Lords, will then form the head line of the Liberal programme. The Autumn should be given to preparations for ensuring, if possible, its defeat. If the veto of the Lords is abolished, a heavy responsibility, and a most ardous task will be thrown upon the Conservatives both in Parliament and out of it. Let the people realise this. prescriptions. Let it be enacted that any measure passed by the House of Commons in two consecutive Parliaments, with a General Election between them, shall become law automatically. But this is practically the system which, by a general understanding, prevails at this moment. The counter- care for the If they really British constitu tion, for the British social The Nationalists have two order, for the religion, moral- strings to their bow. If no ity, and rights of property settlement has been effected now openly threatened by the by the Conference when ParSocialists, they will remember, liament reassembles in Novemtoo, that if the Lords are dis- ber, then, as we have just abled, it is only the House of said, the veto resolutions must Commons that will stand be- be sent up to the Lords at tween them and the loss of once, and their rejection, of all which they prize so highly. course, would produce the Let them reflect while there is desired result. But if, as is yet time, that it is still in their not impossible, the Conference power to avert so disastrous should discover some solution a catastrophe, and what is of the problem as yet invisible more, that it never may be to the naked eye, and propose so again. some sound basis of compromise likely to be accepted by such a majority in both parties as would make its success pretty certain, in that case the Nationalists would still have the power of voting against the Budget, which would probably lead to the fall of the Cabinet, and so obtain the desired end by a different road. This is the course which, in the events supposed, it is thought they are likely to pursue. this was their reason for insisting on the Budget being "held up"-a thing once denounced by Mr Asquith himself in the most unmeasured terms. What they would ultimately gain by these tactics seems a little uncertain, but the immediate result would be to throw everything into confusion, in the midst of which the hated compromise would disappear, and the object which the Confederates have at heart be for the moment gained. It is enough now to point to the different causes which make an appeal to the country next January rather If, on the other hand, as is perhaps more likely, the General Election comes on while the veto is still intact, it will be equally incumbent on the Unionists to exhaust their utmost strength to leave no stone unturned-if so be they may relieve the Lords of some part of the responsibility that will still rest upon them. Even if they failed to secure a majority at the polls, a really powerful Opposition, numbering say some three hundred votes, could greatly strengthen the hands of the Upper House in the discharge of a Constitutional, but most onerous, and we would even say painful, duty. We ought not to leave everything to them. The strain on their constitutional prerogative has been heavy in the past. One great aim of the electors at the next General Election should be to lighten it in future. But we have not yet considered all the contingencies which may tend to necessitate a General Election in January. And more than probable, and should stimulate the Unionist party to throw themselves heart and soul into the work necessary to secure a victory, or if not victory, such a defeat as would be a moral equivalent and leave them practically master of the situation. There is no time to be lost. During the next six months something like a complete organisation of the Unionist forces may be completed, and if it is not, the party will only rue their negligence once, and that will be for all their lives. The possible reconstruction or reform of the House of Lords is an element in the controversy which must not be overlooked. If we do not treat it as one of the suggested compromises on the question of the veto, it is only because it is something more, and has a separate significance and separate importance of its own. It must necessarily influence our opinion of any particular compromise that might be offered to the country, if not indeed combined with it. But great difficulties have arisen since the first appearance of Lord Rosebery's Resolutions. At first sight these were welcomed by a large number, perhaps a majority, of the Peers, who, no doubt, are still willing to agree to some reform of the hereditary cham But we understand that, on further reflection, many of those who first accepted the elective principle as one element in the proposed reconstruction, have seen reason to reconsider the subject, with the result that a growing distrust of it has succeeded to their earlier approval. Their objection to it is, as might be expected from the character of the House of Lords, a practical one, founded on the difficulty of working it. By whom are the elected Peers to be chosen? If by the same electorate as the House of Commons, they would be too much like the House of Commons itself. If by a different one, there would be constant friction between the two, and more collisions than there are now. Such, we believe, to be the impression which is now gaining ground among the Peers, and it is a question of which the Peers themselves are necessarily the best judges. But broader and deeper considerations, to which the Peers themselves cannot very well give utterance, are forcing themselves on the attention of thinking men both outside and inside the walls of Parliament. The House of Lords is our only political institution which is completely independent. The holder of a great estate, involving the discharge of great social and administrative duties, comes into the House of Lords conscious that parties and politics are not the whole world. A member of the House of Commons, when once he sets foot within those sacred precincts, finds himself at once in an atmosphere of party spirit, to which it is all but impossible that he should not more or less succumb. He is plunged at once into the thick of the party strife, amid all the heat, dust, and din, which makes it difficult for him very often to see things as they really are, or to discern the ultimate consequences of what he is immediately engaged upon. The Peers, at all events, move in a less stormy region, free from many of the distracting circumstances which agitate the House of Commons, and undisturbed by the clamour of impatient constituents exacting compliance with demands, which the unbiassed judgment of their representative would probably reject. The independent opinion of men formed in the comparatively "dry light" of the nonelective chamber has a value of its own. Though the sharp exchanges and constant intellectual friction sustained in the House of Commons are an excellent training for debate, and teach men a good deal which is only to be learned in the conflicts of a popular assembly, they are not, perhaps, quite so conducive to the dispassionate consideration of important political problems as the more equable temperature of the purely aristocratic chamber. The repose "Which marks the race of Vere de Vere," after all has its uses. At all events, it can hardly be denied that the character of the House of Lords, or of some assembly composed of similar materials, is a useful antidote to the more restless and turbulent spirit which dominates the Commons; and whether VOL. CLXXXVIII,-NO. MCXXXVIII, this quality would not be rather injured than improved by being mixed with uncongenial elements introducing a wholly different moral tone, is a question that we, for our part, rather shrink from answering. In our comparison of the two Houses we are, of course, speaking only of the rank and file in each of them. The House of Commons has nurtured many great statesmen. But these are necessarily subject to the great body of their followers, and cannot, for legislative purposes at least, permanently rise above their level. But, if we look beyond the House of Lords to the traditional and historical connection between the aristocracy and the political life of Great Britain, we shall see still greater reasons for distrusting any measure which has a tendency either to impair or to sever it. To exclude from political affairs all the higher grades of society, all the high breeding, habits of thought, manners and refinement, which distinguish aristocracies, and with them the political sagacity and practical wisdom for which they have been equally famous, would deal a fatal blow, not only to the dignity of government, but to the quality of the national character. France and America both supply object-lessons, if we only have eyes to see and ears to hear. But the danger lies deeper even than this. Both Renan and De Tocqueville agree in the assertion that the divorce of the aristocracy from politics U and government was the re- unhappy truth has recently mote cause of the French been furnished by the latest Revolution. Their separation appointment to the Indian from all local and provin- Council. cial jurisdiction, the work of Richelieu and the later Bourbons, lost them the confidence of the people, and left the Crown nothing to fall back upon when the crisis came— no body of trained statesmen capable of weathering the storm, which under different circumstances might never have occurred at all. Renan says that both the creation and the preservation of civilisation belong to the aristocracy; and he compares the elective and representative principle in terms which will, no doubt, not be very palatable to our English democrats says, "Il est incontestable," he "s'il fallait s'en tenir à un moyen de sélection unique, la naissance vaudrait mieux que l'election. Le hasard de la naissance est moindre que le hasard du scrutin. La naissance entraîne d'ordinaire des avantages d'éducation et quelquefois une certaine supériorité de race. Quand il s'agit de la désignation du souverain et des chefs militaires, le criterium de la naissance s'impose presque nécessairement. Ce criterium, après tout, ne blesse que le préjugé francais, qui voit dans la fonction une rente à distribuer au fonctionnaire bien plus qu'un devoir public. Ce préjugé est l'inverse du vrai principe de gouvernement, lequel ordonne de ne considérer dans le choix du fonctionnaire que le bien de l'État ou, en d'autres termes, la bonne exécution de la fonction. Nul n'a droit à une place; tous eu droit qui les places soient bien remplies. Si l'hérédité de certaines fonctions était un gage de bonne gestion, je n'hésiterais pas à conseiller Our own House of Lords, by common consent, discharges most efficiently the duties assigned to it, and therefore satisfies M. Renan's test. The present unsatisfactory state of France he does not hesitate to attribute to the absence of a powerful aristocratic element in society and government. And it is beyond all doubt that one object of the Radical party in England is to pave the way for the sweeping process described by Mr Keir Hardie, by gradually depriving the aristocracy of all share in the local administration of the country. This process has already gone further than it ever need have done: and if at the next general election the Radicals gain the day, we may expect to see it carried still further. Break the links which still connect together the rural population and the aristocracy, and the way will lie open to an attack upon their estates, for which it could then be shown that they no longer rendered any public service. con Then would follow other losses, which, however temptible they may appear to those superior persons in whose eyes beauty, taste, imagination, sentiment, are only so many superstitions invented by aristocrats for the purpose of persuading the vulgar that there is something worth earing for beyond these mere material A notable illustration of this wants, would be grievously felt pour ces fonctions l'hérédité." |