Our object in this strategy, according to Mr Wilson, is "to prevent the enemy's ships from getting to sea." Is this our true interest, or is it not? I think it is not. Nelson has left it on record that, so far from desiring to prevent the French from getting to sea, he had, on the contrary, offered them every opportunity and inducement to do so, because, in his opinion, it was at sea that he could "realise the hopes and expectations of his country." Has the situation altered in this respect since Nelson's day? I do not think that it has altered, or will alter, until we can destroy the enemy's ships in their ports by the attacks of squadrons of dirigibles which we have not yet built.

What is required by Mr Wilson for his strategy? "A base favourably placed from the strategic point," he says. But then he lets us down by declaring that "up to date no such base has been created." He also desires "a very large

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of destroyers and again relapses into an attitude of dejection by adding that we require a much larger force than we at present possess." His opinion of submarines varies according to the side with which these vessels act. He says that the submarine is " "extremely vulnerable above water," "at the mercy of the weakest ship which mounts a quick-firing gun," "moves so slowly under water that it can accomplish nothing against modern warships on the open sea," and finally, "cannot easily detect an enemy." But then, when in need of submarines for the uses of his own strategy, Mr Wilson veers round and declares that the submarines of our blockading squadrons will be "a tremendous menace to an enemy seeking to put to sea." He thus endeavours to get the best of both worlds. In short, Mr Wilson flouts, not my strategy, but Nelson's; asks our Navy to act from a non-existent base; admits that his strategy requires forces which have not been created; and rates the submarine at one moment as blind, slow, useless, and vulnerable, and at the next moment as a tremendous menace. The fogs which pre

vail in the North Sea are not apparently limited to that interesting theatre.

Now I will turn to another hostile critic, namely, Mr Bellairs, who, like Mr Wilson, has done good service for the State by his fearless criticism of naval deficiencies. Mr Bellairs, I think, left the Navy 2 F

in 1902, and as our first submarine had at that time scarcely taken the water, I am in doubt whether this critic is practically acquainted with this class of vessel. Very naturally, as an ex-sailor, Mr Bellairs attacks me on a technical point. In his first article in the 'Pall Mall Gazette' of May 31, he says that before people can agree to my revolutionary conclusions, they must set one part of my article against another. He singles out my passing remark that "submarines may be able to lay lines of mines," and declares that this "deserves to rank with a mythical German ship" which was once said by a distinguished politician to carry 30,000 mines. I then find myself reproved in the heavy father style for suggesting an absurdity.

to

The trouble with some of our naval critics is that they have been spoilt. They seem think, because they are so seldom tackled, and because they often write hastily and without weighing their words, that no one will ever question their dogma, and that every one else must be afflicted with their hasty temper. My first article was written in more or less popular style, and did not enter very much into detail, but for every statement in it upon matters of fact, and for a great number of the statements on matters of opinion, I can produce naval support. So far from mine-laying by submarines being mythical and impracticable, one of our leading submarine and torpedo ex

perts-namely, Captain Murray Sueter, R.N.-declares in his masterly treatise on 'The Evolution of the Submarine Boat' that "the use of these craft for this purpose is quite practicable and could be developed." Captain Sueter shows that if the superstructure were recessed mines could fit in snugly, and that by arranging pneumatic releasing gear on the Drzewiecki system of firing torpedoes, "no insurmountable difficulty need be experienced in fitting submarines for this service, should it appear desirable to do so." Thus my myth is supported by the best expert opinion, and I recommend Mr Bellairs, if he attacks me again, not to expose his vitals to return thrusts in such a careless manner.

But I have not yet done with this critic. He says that the supporters of the submarine "almost despair of obtaining over 10 knots in the submerged position"; he says that we may "dismiss from our minds" my forecast that submarines may eventually be able to do much more than all that destroyers can do now; and he says that I"am not aware that surface speed can only be obtained at the expense of submerged speed."

expense of speed submerged. The Gymnote had a speed of 6.5 knots on the surface and of 6 knots submerged. These speeds have both steadily risen, though according to Mr Bellairs the submerged speed should have fallen as surface speeds increased. The latest type is designed for 20 knots on the surface and 12 submerged. It is obvious that the duplication in the source of power is not in theory advantageous. But the submarine must in practice carry ballast, and as electric accumulators which require no air, are noiseless, give out no gases, and allow an invisible course to be followed under water-give this ballast in a form that is useful for many purposes, I am inclined to think that duplication of sources of power has certain compensations which we should not despise.

I do not think that submarine officers are seeking just now for much greater submerged speeds. The question is a wholly different one. When naval architects first concerned themselves with the submarine, all energy was concentrated upon obtaining speed submerged. The lines of the salmon-that is to say, a blunt head with a fine run aft-naturally presented themselves as nature's model, and for several years attention was concentrated upon this type. I do not know whether Mr Bellairs is acquainted with the report of the Philibert Commission, but I always date from the Report of that Commission in 1905 the birth of a quite dif

ferent idea for the use of the submersible boat. The idea was that flotillas were not always engaged against the enemy, and that the submarine-I retain our name, though I prefer the other should be so constructed that she might have better speed upon the surface, and only take cover in presence of the enemy. This idea, which is now in course of receiving its natural development abroad, is approved by all our officers of submarines who have spoken or written to me upon this interesting subject, and, for all that I know to the contrary, the Admiralty may concur with it.

Now, I need scarcely point out that better speed on the surface requires a built-up forecastle, a fine run aft, and great length compared to beam. Practical officers of submarines prefer this conception, because it enhances the offensive value of their vessels, improves their habitability, and adds to their sea-going usefulness. Navies are not always in contact with the enemy. For one day of battle there may be weeks or months of manoeuvre, feint, or evolution. The rifleman does not take cover on the line of march, and why should the submarine?

Only one or two of my critics appear to have the faintest conception of the coming type of submarine and of the extraordinarily interesting developments to which it must give rise. When I heard of the latest type of submersible under construction abroad-a vessel of 900 tons surface displace

Your theories are all very fine, say another batch of critics, but they have their counterpart in those of the "Jeune École" in France, and every one knows that this school wrecked the French Navy. I can only suppose

that these critics are not well

aware of the facts. Fifteen years ago, in the pages of The Nineteenth Century,' I described the naval policy of France, and gave my reasons for disagreeing with the ideas which lay at the base of the proposals of Admiral Aube and M. Gabriel Charmes. These authorities and their followers hoped to assail England with success by the war against commerce, and they expected to control the Channel by the action of torpedo - boats. I showed in my article my reasons for believing that these ideas were fallacious. It is a longish argument, which I cannot repeat now, but it was based on the fact that the means of that day did not appear to justify the hopes of Admiral Aube and his disciples. Neither the submarine, nor the modern mine and torpedo, nor the airship, had then appeared, and, differing in this from the naval critics, it is with these new means of war that I am concerned, and not with those that are out of date.

I do not think that the "Jeune École" wrecked the French Navy, because this Navy is still formidable. The ills from which the French

When I began this reply to my critics I thought I should have a bone to pick with certain papers whose contributions on naval subjects are usually very well weighed and written by competent hands. I am referring specially to 'The Glasgow Herald,' The Western Morning News,' 'The Naval and Military Record.' These papers have done me the honour to comment at some length upon my article on submarines, and in a critical vein. But, after reading their comments again, I find myself so much in agreement with them that it is hardly worth while now to take up the few points upon which I differ from their talented correspondents. They have not given me any valid reasons for altering the opinion which I ventured to express on the future rôle of the submarine, but I have weighed their comments very carefully, and am very grateful for them. As for the naval editor of The Army and Navy Gazette,' I notice that he declares that the functions of the Dreadnought are to keep the ring, and to leave the preliminary struggle to swarms of small