SCOTT V. NEGRO LON DON. But it is clearly to be inferred from the 4th section taken together with the words of the oath, that the oath will protect the owner's title, only to such slaves as he shall bring with him when he comes to reside in Virginia. The words are, that nothing in the act shall extend to him who may incline to remove, if, within sixty days after "such removal," he shall make oath that he has not "brought with him any slaves," with an intention of selling them. It is not meant to say, that the slave must come in at the same instant with the owner, but it must be all part of one transaction. The son never brought the slave into Alexandria. He was not brought with the intent of residing here with the son. Suppose the son had never come to reside in Alexandria, and the slave had been kept by the father, in Alexandria, more than a year, what could prevent the slave from obtaining his freedom? Could it be ob jected, that the father was not the true owner, and that the slave was kept there without the knowledge and consent of the son? Again, suppose the son had not come till after the slave had been kept in Alexandria a year by the father, and the son should then, within sixty days after his removal, take the oath, would that destroy the slave's right to freedom? If it would not, it must be because the son could not connect the importation of the slave, with his own removal. Why could he not connect an importation made thirteen months before his removal, as well as an importation made eleven months before his removal? Is it because a right to freedom had vested in the slave before the removal of the son? That cannot be; because the proviso says, that nothing in the act contained, shall extend to those who may incline to remove, if, within sixty days after such removal, they will take the oath. The word nothing refers as well to the year's residence, as to the first importation of the slave. It might be said, therefore, that the son did incline to remove; and within sixty days after such removal, did take the oath, and, therefore, he is not to be affected by the year's residence. The length to which this argument may be carried, shows its sophistry. It leads to the entire destruction of the 2d section of the act; for if the true owner may come, and make oath after one year, he DON. may after fifty. The proviso, therefore, must be limited SCOTT to an importation of the slave with his owner. Upon NEGRO LON this construction, it will read thus: "Provided that nothing in this act shall extend to those who shall remove with their slaves, and who shall, within sixty days after such removal, take the oath." But the son did not remove with his slave, and, therefore, is not within the benefit of the proviso. Jones, in reply. A slave does not, under this act, gain his freedom, unless he was brought in by his true owner. The acquisition of freedom by the slave, is a part of the penalty upon the owner, for violating the law. The freedom can only be acquired in a case where the owner is liable to the penalty of 200 dollars, under the 3d section. When the owner and the slave do not come in at the same time, the sixty days begin to run from the time of the removal of the master. If the owner comes before the slave has resided one year in Virginia, it is suffi cient, February 19. MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court. This case arises under a clause, in an act of the Virginia assembly, giving freedom to slaves who shall be brought thereafter into that state, and kept therein one whole year together, or so long at different times as shall amount to one year; and under a proviso of the same act, that it shall not extend to any person who may incline to remove from any of the United States, and become citizens of this, if, within sixty days after such removal, he shall take an oath which is prescribed in the act. The negro London was brought from Maryland into Alexandria, where he was hired out, in the year 1802; some months after which, his master, the plaintiff in error, also removed into Alexandria, and within the year from the time the negro was brought in, and alse within the sixty days from the time the plaintiff in error removed to Alexandria, the oath prescribed by the law was taken. No right to freedom having vested in London at the time this oath was taken, the question is, has it brought the plaintiff within the proviso of the act? That the plaintiff is within the letter of the proviso, is unquestionable. He is a person who inclined to remove from one of the United States, into Virginia, who actually did remove, and who took the requisite oath within the limited time. But it is contended, in behalf of the defendant in error, that the acts of bringing the negro into the state, and of removing into it, must be concomitant, in order to bring the case within the proviso: Or in other words, that the owner must be a person inclining to remove into the state," at the time the slave was brought in. This inac curacy of construction seems to be founded on the idea, that the penalty of forfeiting the property, accrues on bringing the slave into the state, whereas, it attaches on his continuance in the state for twelve months. Till such continuance has taken place, the offence has not been committed. If then, all the acts which bring a person within the proviso, are performed before the right to freedom is vested, and before the provisions of the act have been infracted, it seems to the court, that the rights of the party remain unaffected by the act. If London had been ordered to Maryland for a day, and then brought with his master into Alexandria, the construction of his counsel would be satisfied; and it seems strange, where the letter of a law has not been violated, that such an unimportant circumstance should affect its' spirit. Unless this mode be admitted, of coming within the proviso, a person inclining to remove into Virginia, whose slaves had preceded him, though not for one year, could not bring himself within, or avoid the forfeiture, although permitting them to come into that state was no SCOTT offence; a construction of the act which the court cannot think consistent with its spirit or letter. This court is, therefore, of opinion, that the circuit court erred in directing the jury that, under the circumstances stated, the plaintiff below was entitled to his freedom, and doth reverse the judgment rendered by the circuit court, and remand the cause for further proceedings. Judgment reversed. V. NEGRO LON DON. WISE. WITHERS. WISE v. WITHERS. A justice of the peace, in the district of Columbia, is an officer of the government of the ERROR to the circuit court of the district of Columbia, in an action of trespass vi et armis, for entering the plaintiff's house, and taking away his goods. The defendant justified as collector of militia fines. The plaintiff replied, that at the time when, &c. he was one of the United States justices of the peace, for the United States, county of Alexandria. This replication, upon a gene- and is exempt ral demurrer, was, by a majority of the court below, from militia adjudged bad; whereupon the plaintiff sued out a writ of error, and the questions made on the argument were, duty. not exclusive jurisdiction of that question, 1. Whether a justice of the peace, for the county of and its senAlexandria, was liable to do militia duty? and 2. Whether an action of trespass will lie against the officer who makes distress, for a fine assessed upon a justice of the peace by a court martial? upon tence is noa conclusive. Trespass lies against a collector of mili tia.fines, wno distrains for fine imposed a person not C. Lee, for the plaintiff in error. This case depends by a court the act of congress of March 3d, 1803, entitled martial, upon an act, more effectually to provide for the organiza- liable to beention of the militia of the district of Columbia," vol. 6, rolled in the p. 237. militia the 66 WISE The 6th section says, "that the commanding officers WITHERS of companies, shall enrol every able bodied white male, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, (exCourt martial cept such as are exempt from military duty, by the laws having no ju- of the United States) resident within his district." risdiction in such cases. The act of congress of the 8th of May, 1792, vol. 2 p. 93, 2, exempts from militia duty," The Vice24 President of the United States; the officers, judicial and executive, of the government of the United States; the members of both houses of congress, and their respective officers; all custom-house officers, with their clerks; all post-officers, and stage-drivers, who are employed in the care and conveyance of the mail of the post-office of the United States; all ferrymen, employed at any ferry on the post-road; all inspectors of exports; all pilots; all mariners actually employed in the sea-service of any citizen or merchant within the United States; and all persons who now are, or may hereafter be, exempted by the laws of the respective states." This act applies not only to such officers as then existed, but to all such as might thereafter be created. If the plaintiff is an officer, judicial or executive, of the government of the United States, he is exempted. In Marbury's case, ante, vol. 1, p. 168, this court decided, that a justice of the peace, for the district of Columbia, was an officer, and that he became such as soon as the commission was signed, sealed, and ready to be delivered. If the commission, therefore, is a criterion, to decide who is an officer, we are at a loss to conceive what objection can be taken. The justices of the peace for the district of Columbia, are appointed by the president of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, and are commissioned by the president. Their powers and duties are prescribed by the act of congress, ing the district of Columbia, vol. 5, p. 271, § 11. Whether those powers are judicial or executive, or both, is immaterial. 66 concern |