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nity. It is, however, but an excess or excrescence of the other ssions (such as pride or avarice) or of a wish to monopolise all e good things of life to ourselves, which makes us impatient and ssatisfied at seeing any one else in possession of that to which we ink we have the only fair title. Envy is the deformed and distorted fspring of egotism; and when we reflect on the strange and disproortioned character of the parent, we cannot wonder at the perversity d waywardness of the child. Such is the absorbing and exorbitant uality of our self-love, that it represents us as of infinitely more portance in our own eyes than the whole universe put together, and ould sacrifice the claims and interest of all the world beside to the ast of its caprices or extravagances need we be surprised then that is little, upstart, overweening self, that would trample on the globe self and then weep for new ones to conquer, should be uneasy, mad, ortified, eaten up with chagrin and melancholy, and hardly able to ear its own existence, at seeing a single competitor among the rowd cross its path, jostle its pretensions, and stagger its opinion of s exclusive right to admiration and superiority? This it is that onstitutes the offence, that gives the shock, that inflicts the wound, at some poor creature (as we would fain suppose) whom we had efore overlooked and entirely disregarded as not worth our notice, hould of a sudden enter the lists and challenge comparison with us. The presumption is excessive; and so is our thirst of revenge. From the moment, however, that the eye fixes on another as the bject of envy, we cannot take it off; for our pride and self-conceit nagnify that which obstructs our success and lessens our selfmportance into a monster; we see nothing else, we hear of nothing Ise, we dream of nothing else, it haunts us and takes possession of ur whole souls; and as we are engrossed by it ourselves, so we fancy hat all the rest of the world are equally taken up with our petty nnoyances and disappointed pride. Hence the jealous leer malign' f envy, which, not daring to look that which provokes it in the face, annot yet keep its eyes from it, and gloats over and becomes as it vere enamoured of the very object of its loathing and deadly hate. We pay off the score which our littleness and vanity has been running p, by ample and gratuitous concessions to the first person that gives check to our swelling self-complacency, and forces us to drag him nto an unwilling comparison with ourselves. It is no matter who he person is, what his pretensions-if they are a counterpoise to ur own, we think them of more consequence than anything else in he world. This often gives rise to laughable results. We see the ealousies among servants, hackney-coachmen, cobblers in a stall; we re amused with the rival advertisements of quacks and stage-coach

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proprietors, and smile to read the significant intimation on some shop window, No connection with the next door;' but the same folly runs through the whole of life; each person thinks that he who stands in his way or outstrips him in a particular pursuit, is the most enviable, and at the same time the most hateful character in the world. Nothing can show the absurdity of the passion of envy in a more striking point of view than the number of rival claims which it entirely overlooks, while it would arrogate all excellence to itself. The loftiness of our ambition and the narrowness of our views are equal, and indeed both depend upon the same cause. The player envies only the player, the poet envies only the poet, because each confines his idea of excellence to his own profession and pursuit, and thinks, if he could but remove some hapless competitor out of his way, he should have a clear stage to himself, or be a Phoenix gazed by all' as if, though we crushed one rival, another would not start up; or as if there were not a thousand other claims, a thousand other modes of excellence and praiseworthy acquirements, to divide the palm and defeat his idle pretension to the sole and unqualified admiration of mankind. Professors of every class see merit only in their own line; yet they would blight and destroy that little bit of excellence which alone they acknowledge to exist, except as it centres in themselves. Speak in praise of an actor to another actor, and he turns away with impatience and disgust: speak disparagingly of the first as an actor in general, and the latter eagerly takes up the quarrel as his own: thus the esprit de corps only comes in as an appendage to our self-love. It is perhaps well that we are so blind to merit out of our immediate sphere, for it might only prove an additional eye-sore, increase the obliquity of our mental vision, multiply our antipathies, or end in total indifference and despair. There is nothing so bad as a cynical apathy and contempt for every art and science from a superficial smattering and general acquaintance with them all. The merest pedantry and the most tormenting jealousy and heart-burnings of envy are better than this. Those who are masters of different advantages and accomplishments, are seldom the more satisfied with them: they still aim at something else (however contemptible) which they have not or cannot do. So Pope says of Wharton

6

Though wondering senates hung on all he spoke,

The club must hail him master of the joke.

Shall parts so various aim at nothing new?
He'll shine a Tully and a Wilmot too.'

The world, indeed, are pretty even with these constellations of splendid and superfluous qualities in their fastidious estimate of their

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W

th

own pretensions, for (if possible) they never give any individual
credit for more than one leading attainment. If a man is an artist,
his being a fine musician adds nothing to his fame. When the
pu
blic strain a point to own one claim, it is on condition that
the fortunate candidate waives every other. The mind is prepared
a plausible antithesis in such cases against the formidable
ecroachments of vanity: one qualification is regularly made a foil
to another. We allow no one to be two things at a time: it quite
unsettles our notions of personal identity. If we allow a man
wit, it is part of the bargain that he wants judgment: if style he
wants matter. Rich, but a fool or miser-a beauty, but vain; so
runs the bond.
But' is the favourite monosyllable of envy and self-
love. Raphael could draw and Titian could colour-we shall never
get beyond this point while the world stands; the human under-
standing is not cast in a mould to receive double proofs of entire super-
iority to itself. It is folly to expect it. If a farther claim be set up,
we call in question the solidity of the first, incline to retract it, and
suspect that the whole is a juggle and a piece of impudence, as we
threaten a common beggar with the stocks for following us to ask a
second alms. This is, in fact, one source of the prevalence and deep
root which envy has in the human mind: we are incredulous as to
the truth and justice of the demands which are so often made upon our
pity or our admiration; but let the distress or the merit be established
beyond all controversy, and we open our hearts and purses on the
spot, and sometimes run into the contrary extreme when charity
or admiration becomes the fashion. No one envies the Author of
Waverley, because all admire him, and are sensible that admire
him how they will, they can never admire him enough. We do
not envy the sun for shining, when we feel the benefit and see
the light. When some persons start an injudicious parallel between
him and Shakspeare, we then may grow jealous and uneasy, because
this interferes with our older and more firmly rooted conviction of
genius, and one which has stood a severer and surer test. Envy has,
then, some connexion with a sense of justice—is a defence against
imposture and quackery. Though we do not willingly give up the
secret and silent consciousness of our own worth to vapouring and
false pretences, we do homage to the true candidate for fame when

he

appears, and even exult and take a pride in our capacity to appreciate the highest desert. This is one reason why we do not envy the deadless because they are removed out of our way, than because all doubt and diversity of opinion is dismissed from the question of their title to veneration and respect. Our tongue, having a license, grows wanton in their praise. We do not envy or stint our admiration of Rubens,

because the mists of uncertainty or prejudice are withdrawn by the hand of time from the splendour of his works. Fame is to genius

'Like to a gate of steel fronting the sun,

That renders back its figure and its heat.'

We give full and unbounded scope to our impressions when they are confirmed by successive generations; as we form our opinions coldly and slowly while we are afraid our judgment may be reversed by posterity. We trust the testimony of ages, for it is true; we are no longer in pain lest we should be deceived by varnish and tinsel; and feel assured that the praise and the work are both sterling. In contemporary reputation, the greater and more transcendant the merit, the less is the envy attending it; which shows that this passion is not, after all, a mere barefaced hatred and detraction from acknowledged excellence. Mrs. Siddons was not an object of envy; her unrivalled powers defied competitors or gainsayers. If Kean had a party against him, it was composed of those who could not or would not see his merits through his defects; and in like manner, John Kemble's elevation to the tragic throne was not carried by loud and tumultuous acclamation, because the stately height which he attained was the gradual result of labour and study, and his style of acting did not flash with the inspiration of the God. We are backward to bestow a heaped measure of praise, whenever there is any inaptitude or incongruity that acts to damp or throw a stumbling-block in the way of our enthusiasm. Hence the jealousy and dislike shown towards upstart wealth, as we cannot in our imaginations reconcile the former poverty of the possessors with their present magnificence—we despise fortune-hunters in ambition as well as in love—and hence, no doubt, one strong ground of hereditary right. We acquiesce more readily in an assumption of superiority that in the first place implies no merit (which is a great relief to the baser sort), and in the second, that baffles opposition by seeming a thing inevitable, taken for granted, and transmitted in the common course of nature. In contested elections, where the precedence is understood to be awarded to rank and title, there is observed to be less acrimony and obstinacy than when it is supposed to depend on individual merit and fitness for the office; no one willingly allows another more ability or honesty than himself, but he cannot deny that another may be better born. Learning again is more freely admitted than genius, because it is of a more positive quality, and is felt to be less essentially a part of a man's self; and with regard to the grosser and more invidious distinction of wealth, it may be difficult to substitute any finer test of respectability for it, since it

s hard to fathom the depth of a man's understanding, but the length of is purse is soon known; and besides, there is a little collusion in the

:ase :

'The learned pate ducks to the golden fool.'

We bow to a patron who gives us a good dinner and his countenance for our pains, and interest bribes and lulls envy asleep. The most painful kind of envy is the envy towards inferiors; for we cannot bear to think that a person (in other respects utterly insignificant) should have or seem to have an advantage over us in any thing we have set our hearts upon, and it strikes at the very root of our self-love to be foiled by those we despise. There is some dignity in a contest with power and acknowledged reputation: but a triumph over the sordid and the mean is itself a mortification, while a defeat is intolerable.

ON PREJUDICE

The Atlas.] [April 11, 1830. PREJUDICE, in its ordinary and literal sense, is prejudging any question without having sufficiently examined it, and adhering to our opinion upon it through ignorance, malice, or perversity, in spite of every evidence to the contrary. The little that we know has a strong alloy of misgiving and uncertainty in it: the mass of things of which we have no means of judging, but of which we form a blind and confident opinion as if we were thoroughly acquainted with them, is monstrous. Prejudice is the child of ignorance; for as our actual knowledge falls short of our desire to know, or curiosity and interest in the world about us, so must we be tempted to decide upon a greater number of things at a venture; and having no check from reason or inquiry, we shall grow more obstinate and bigoted in our conclusions, according as they have been rash and presumptuous. The absence of proof, instead of suspending our judgments, only gives us an opportunity to make things out according to our wishes and fancies; mere ignorance is a blank canvas on which we lay what colours we please, and paint objects black or white, as angels or devils, magnify or diminish them at our option; and in the vacuum either of facts or arguments, the weight of prejudice and passion falls with double force, and bears down everything before it. If we enlarge the circle of our previous knowledge ever so little, we may meet with something to create doubt and difficulty; but as long as we remain confined to the cell of our native ignorance, while we know nothing beyond the routine of sense and custom, we shall refer everything to that standard,

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