We had a good example in this industry of a company that had taken fire protection seriously, that had looked at the Commission's regulations, and they had said, well, it is going to cost us some money but we recognize those are the rules and we are going to do it. And that case was Calvert Cliffs Plant, Baltimore Gas & Electric in Maryland. That was a utility that hired fire protection engineers. They went about implementing the rule rapidly after the rule was adopted, and they were able to put their plant into compliance with the rule on a very expeditious basis. They were the first plant to get everything done and to have everything all fixed up.

Those guys understood what the rule required. They put their shoulder to the wheel and they got the job done.

You had this other group that was arguing not to have to do those things, and of course there ought to be a process in place to allow a utility to say, in our particular case this doesn't make sense. We had that process in place for the Fire Protection Rule, and it was the exemption process.

Every utility was free to come in and say there is a particular aspect of this rule that gives us particular difficulties. We think we can achieve the objectives of the rule in a different way, and therefore we want an exemption from this aspect of the rule, and here is what we propose as an alternative.

The advantage of that process-and in fact the court recognized that process in upholding the validity of the rule the advantage of the process is that it provides for the kind of technical review of that kind of a proposal that you want to see. The utility has to document its proposal; they have to do an analysis to show that in fact they are right and that is not going to cause a major safety problem or defeat the purposes of the Fire Protection Rule. It is reviewed by the people who really have the knowledge, the technical experts, the fire protection engineers, and then a decision is made on whether the exemption should be granted or not. And if the utility doesn't like the answer, they can always appeal that decision up the line and have some senior staff reviewers take a look at it.

The difficulty with what these utilities were proposing is that they wanted to throw that process out the window. What they wanted to do is to say, look, you have granted some exemptions in some of these areas in the past to other utilities who have asked for them; we don't even want to ask for an exemption. What we want you to do is give us an interpretation document that will allow us to go off on our own, do our analysis, and if we want to deviate from what has been the accepted interpretation of this rule, we are free to do so, as long as we maintain that analysis at the plant. Then, if your inspectors get around to it, those inspectors can then come inspect our analysis and if they have a problem with it, then they can object at that time.

The fire protection engineers and inspectors objected to this kind of a reversal of the role. First, they said, it puts the burden on us rather than the utility to find something wrong; and, second, it makes it almost impossible for us to do our job. Of course, what we need before we go out to do an inspection of the plant is to see their detailed analysis, to be able to study it in detail, for the engi

neers in Washington to be talk to the inspectors out in the field; then we will go out to the plant and see whether this makes sense. If we can't do any of that ahead of time because we don't have the analysis from the utility, it is almost impossible for us to do our job.

That was one of these objections of these people as well, and it went to the very heart of what this group of utilities was proposing, which is basically to throw out the exemption process that everybody else was using to come into compliance with the rule, and instead to have a new approach for them.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes, and I guess I would question why-would you briefly address why you thought the exemption process was not adequate in this case, why Mr. Stello had to meet with the utilities and come up with some accommodation beyond the exception proc

ess.

Mr. ZECH. I would have to consult with him on that, if I may. Mr. DEFAZIO. Go ahead.

While you are doing that, I will just read into the record from a document dated May 2, 1984, Memorandum for Robert L. Ferguson, Section Leader, Fire Protection Section, Chemical Engineering Branch DE, from five different fire protection engineers.

On page 4, these five professionals state the new interpretation regarding the nature of fire area boundaries, which states that the "boundary walls and floor-ceiling assemblies need not be continuous; conflicts with previous staff criteria as defined in the branch technical position. Therefore, the technical basis for our review has been changed. This change has been effected as a result of utility initiatives via management directive, without following usual, appropriate NRC procedures or considering relevant staff input, which I would assume would be both the exception process and/or a new rulemaking.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.-May 2, 1984 Memorandum for Robert Ferguson, from Fire Protection Engineers on Appendix R.]

Since 1982, the NRR fire protection staff has performed their review of
Appendix R exemption requests to a consistent basis. This basis has
been formally issued in Generic Letter 83-33. New interpretations of
the basic Appendix R requirements have been developed.
These new

interpretations are contrary to existing guidance and will permit
neither a timely nor consistent resolution of Appendix R deviations.
Specific recommendations for resolution of the issues are proposed.

Background

by whom? where? doc.?

During our reviews of a significant number of Appendix R exemption requests, it became apparent that many utilities had not assessed compliance with the Rule on the basis of valid fire areas as defined in our Branch Technical Position. In addition, some utilities did not provide complete fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems on the basis of recognized industry practice (as defined by the National Fire Protection Association) and sound fire protection engineering principles. As a result, Generic Letter 83-33 was issued to further clarify our position and to avoid future conflict. To the extent that utilities significantly deviated from these positions, resolution was attained through the exemption process under the time constraints imposed by 10 CFR 50.48. Since April 1982, when the staff began reviewing significant numbers of exemption requests, a consistent basis has been established for the level of safety that must be achieved in order to deviate from the Rule. Contrary to this established guidance and against specific recommendations. by the staff, new guidance, in the form of intepretations of Appendix R, was developed in support of the Regional Appendix R workshops.

comples?

made up of: # + Qual.?

Robert Ferguson

1.

Prevailing Staff View

-2

The recently drafted "Interpretations of Appendix R" states that
licensees, that have not assessed compliance with Section III.G
of Appendix R on the basis of fire areas or with the provision of
fire detection and suppression systems throughout a fire area as
delineated in Generic Letter 83-33, must perform an "evaluation to
assess the adequacy" of fire area boundary construction, and detection
and suppression system coverage. This evaluation does not have to be
submitted on the docket for NRR review as is currently done under the
exemption process and no guidance is furnished as to the nature of the
evaluation.

If, during the audit, the inspection team takes issue with the adequacy
of fire area boundaries or the extent of fire suppression and detection,
the licensees would present the evaluation as justification for the
existing configuration and attempts at resolution would be undertaken.
If the issue(s) could not be resolved, it (they) would be deferred as
an "unresolved item" for subsequent NRR action.

Originators Opinion

Appendix R was promulgated as a means of expediting resolution of post-
Browns Ferry SER fire protection open items and to provide a basis for
consistent resolution of them. The lack of a requirement in the new
"Interpretations" for timely, advance documentation of the licensee's
analyses of deviations from the staff positions of Generic Letter 83-33
undermines the basis for originally promulgating Appendix R because,
by requiring no prior review and deferring resolution of issues to the
audit, a significant time delay will result. In addition, due to the
varying composition of the audit teams, the resolution of technical
issues may vary to a significant degree. For example, under similar
conditions at different plants, one audit team may accept a partial
fire suppression system while another team may insist upon complete
area-wide protection.

Additional Appendix R audits are scheduled to occur well into the future. It is also anticipated that unresolved audit issues would require NRC action, which would necessitate further delays. These delays would not be expected under the staff's previous approach because all significant technical issues would be resolved by NRR in advance of the audit.

To the extent that plant modifications would be necessary to satisfy staff concerns, these modifications would be further delayed because agreement as to the nature of the modifications would not be reached until some time after the audit. Whereas, under our previous approach, agreement is reached at an earlier stage and the schedule for completing the modifications commences well in advance of the audits, normally at the time the SER is issued.

Under the new interpretations, no specific guidance is provided to the
utilities regarding the nature of the evaluations that they are expected
to perform. Based on the staff's previous experience, we feel that
licensees are likely to conduct evaluations which vary significantly
as to the degree of comprehensiveness, completeness, and the application
of sound fire protection engineering principles. Consequently, the staff
is likely to find that all relevant considerations have not been taken
into account and that an equivalent level of safety has not been provided.
For example, a utility may conclude as some have attempted that a
particular fire protection configuration, such as a partial height fire
barrier between redundant shutdown divisions, is adequate based on an
assumption that no "credible" fire will occur. However, there is no
generally recognized method to predict the location, magnitude and
resulting damage of a fire in any location, consequently design basis
protection is mandated by the rule.

Licensees, confronted with the inadequacy of their evaluation at the
time of the audit, may request additional time to conduct a more
thorough evaluation or refer the matter to NRR for approval, similar
to the exemption process. This will only result in further delays
toward eventual Appendix R compliances

In addition to the time considerations involved, areas that are not
in compliance with the Rule may be construed by some utilities as
being acceptable although the same conclusion will not be held by the
staff. Therefore, under this approach, there is no way to ensure a
consistent level of fire safety.

key

Under the new interpretations, licensees that have already committed to
fire protection modifications in conjunction with previously requested
and approved exemptions may now elect to delete their commitments from
these modifications and propose a new approach which may provide a lesser
degree of safety and which would not be ultimately acceptable to the
staff.

Under the new interpretations, greater reliance is placed upon the
Appendix R audit. However, an audit, by its very nature, is a limited
scope effort. Only a sampling of areas and systems is reviewed. Since
it is a limited effort, the staff would not have reasonable assurance that
all potentially significant safety problems were discovered.

If, under the new interpretations, an audit team discovered a number of
safety problems within some areas of the sample, there is no mechanism
to resolve the larger question of the adequacy of the protection in
the un-audited areas. As a result, more areas of the plant may be
in non-compliance with potentially serious consequences if a fire
should occur.