Proof of the discipline of Scipio's troops is that the massacre ceased on a signal after the citadel surrendered, and only then did the troops begin pillaging. The massacre, however difficult for modern minds to excuse, was a military measure, and the conduct of the action was not impeded by the individual's desire to obtain loot or souvenirs "-an undisciplined impulse which has affected even recent battles.

the moral effect of this idea, tor rather than mere insensate he made practical use of less slaughter. divine guides. The 500 passed without difficulty through the lagoon, reached the wall, and mounted it without opposition, because all the defenders were engaged in bringing succour to that quarter in which the danger appeared." "The Romans havThe Romans having once taken the wall, at first marched along it, sweeping the enemy off it." They were clearly imbued with the principle that a penetration must be promptly widened before it is deepened-a principle which in the war of 1914-18 was only learnt after hard lessons at Loos and elsewhere. Next they converged on the landward gate, already assailed in front, and taking the defenders in rear and by surprise, overpowered the resistance, and opened the way for the main body of the attackers. The walls thus captured, Scipio at once exploited his success. For while the mass of those who had by now scaled the walls set about the customary massacre of the townsmen, Scipio himself took care to keep in regular formation those who entered by the gate, and led them against the citadel. Here Mago, once he "saw that the city had undoubtedly been captured," surrendered.

If the massacre of the townspeople is revolting to modern ideas, it was the normal custom then and for many centuries thereafter, and with the Romans was a deliberate policy aimed at the moral fac

VOL. CCXX.-NO. MCCCXXXII.

The massacre, moreover, was partly offset by Scipio's generous, if diplomatic, conduct to the vanquished, once the initial ruthlessness had achieved its purpose of quenching the citizens' will to resist. Of the 10,000 male prisoners, he set free all who were citizens of New Carthage and restored their property. The artisans, to the number of 2000, he declared the property of Rome, but promised them their freedom when the war was over if they "showed goodwill and industry in their several crafts." Finally, he won new allies for himself by his kindness to the Spanish hostages, for instead of retaining them in his custody as unwilling guarantees, he sent them home to their own States.

out various drill movements; his own ground, and in addithe second day they had to polish up, repair, and examine their arms; the third day they rested; and the fourth they carried out weapon training"some of them sword-fighting with wooden swords covered with leather and with a button on the point, while others practised javelin-throwing, the javelins also having a button on the point." On the fifth day they began the course again, and continued during their stay at Cartagena. "The general went round to all the works with equal attention. At one time he was employed in the dockyard with his fleet, at another he exercised with the legions" (Livy).

Then, when the walls had been repaired, he left adequate detachments to hold the city, and set out for Tarraco with the army and the fleet.

With Cartagena in his grip, Scipio had gained the strategical initiative, which is by no means identical with the offensive. To attack the Carthaginian field armies while he was still markedly inferior in numbers would be to throw away his advantage and imperil all that he had gained. On the other hand, he held the key to any possible Carthaginian move. If they moved to regain Cartagena, itself impregnable if adequately garrisoned, and still more so when the defender had command of the sea, he lay on their flank with his main striking force. If they moved against him he would have the advantage of choosing

tion Cartagena would threaten their rear, for his command of the sea would enable him to transfer forces there. If they remained passive, and this inaction proved their choice, they would suffer the handicap due to the loss of their base, depot, and main line of communication with Carthage. Nothing could have suited Scipio better, for the respite allowed the moral effect of Cartagena's capture to sink into the minds of the Spanish, and allowed him also time to win over fresh allies to offset his numerical handicap. The result proved the soundness of his calculations, for during the next winter Edeco, Andobales, and Mandonius, three of the most powerful chieftains in Spain, came over to him, and most of the Iberian tribes followed their example.

The outcome was that Hasdrubal Barca, faced with this shifting of the balance, felt forced to take the offensive. This gage, Scipio, thus reinforced, was not loth to accept, for it promised him the chance to deal with one hostile army before the others had joined it.

While Hasdrubal was still preparing, Scipio moved. The army of Hasdrubal lay in the district of Castalon near the town of Baecula, on the upper reaches of the Baetis, to-day called the Guadalquiver. the approach of the Romans he shifted his camp to an admirable defensive positiona small but high plateau, deep enough for security, and wide

answer to those, mainly civil join Hasdrubal Barca. This historians, who decry Scipio on the score that he allowed Hasdrubal to quit Spain and move into Italy on his ill-fated attempt to join Hannibal. It is interesting to note that Hasdrubal followed the route of Wellington after Vittoria, making his way to the northern coast of Spain, and crossing by modern San Sebastian and the western gap where the Pyrenees slope down to the sea.

To pretend that Scipio, had he remained on the defensive, could have barred this passage is absurd, based as he was on the eastern coast. Either of the other Carthaginian armies could have contained him while Hasdrubal slipped through one of the numerous western passes, or, again, if he attempted so distant a move through wild and mountainous country, not only would he have exposed his base, but have invited disaster. But for Scipio's offensive and victory at Baecula, Hasdrubal could have entered Gaul in force and thus have avoided the two years' delay -so fatal to the Carthaginian cause-enforced by his need to recruit and reorganise his army in Gaul before passing on.

arrival, too late to save the latter from defeat, served to bring about a conference to settle their future plans. Realising that Scipio by his diplomacy and his victories had gained the sympathies of almost all Spain, they decided that Mago should transfer his forces to Hasdrubal Barca, and go to the Balearic Isles to raise fresh auxiliaries; that Hasdrubal Barca should move into Gaul as soon as possible before his remaining Spanish troops deserted, and then march on into Italy; that Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, should retire into the remotest part of Lusitania, near Gades-modern Cadiz,where alone the Carthaginians might hope for Spanish aid.

The chronology of these years is somewhat difficult to determine, but the victory at Baecula seems to have been in 208 B.C.

The next year, however, Scipio's hold on the country was threatened afresh. A new general, Hanno, had come with a fresh army from Carthage to replace Hasdrubal Barca. Mago also had returned from the Balearic Isles, and after arming native levies in Celtiberia, which embraced parts of modern Scipio then fell back on his Arragon and Old Castile, was base, and spent the remainder joined by Hanno. Nor was of the summer in exploiting the the threat only from one direceffect of his victory by securing tion, for Hasdrubal, son the alliance of most of the Gisco, had advanced from Gades Spanish States. His wisdom in into Baetica (Andalusia). not following up Hasdrubal was Scipio moved into the interior justified by the fact that within against Hanno and Mago he a few days after the battle of might find Hasdrubal across Baecula, Hasdrubal, son of his rear. Therefore he detached Gisco, and Mago arrived to his lieutenant, Silanus, with

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