failed to maintain discipline. those of Gustavus Adolphus Only a lay historian, militarily in 1630 A.D., when the Swedish ignorant, could imagine that king crossed the Baltic to strike an army which had been al- at the seat of the Imperial lowed to run to seed could carry power. And each force, small out the complex Roman battle as it was, had been welded drill and develop its prepara- by the training genius and pertions to a pitch of efficiency sonal magnetism of its leader that not only gained the ap- into a superb instrument of proval but aroused the enthu- war-a cadre or framework for siasm of this expert commis- later expansion. sion. On their return to Rome the warmth of their praise induced the Senate to vote that Scipio should cross to Africa, and that he should be given permission to select himself, out of those forces which were in Sicily, the troops which he wanted to accompany him. The irony of this grudging and tardy permission lies in the clause in italics. He was given their blessing, and that was all. For a venture of such magnitude he was worse supported by the Senate than even Hannibal by Carthage. Of Roman troops, apart from his own volunteers, he had in Sicily only the 5th and 6th Legions, the remnant of those who had fought at Cannæ, and who, in punishment for the defeat, had been sentenced to serve in exile in Sicily. A less understanding commander might well have hesitated to rely on troops suffering such a degradation. But Scipio realised that they were burning to wipe off the unjust stigma of disgrace. There is a striking parallel between the situation and numbers of Scipio in 204 B.C. and Not only were Scipio's means slender, but the African situation had changed for the worse during the year's delay forced on him by the need to raise and train his expeditionary force, in default of Rome's aid, a delay still further protracted by the Locri inquiry. Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, on his return from Spain had checkmated Scipio's newly-won influence over Syphax, by giving the king his daughter Sophonisba in marriage, and in return got Syphax to renew his pledge of alliance with Carthage. In the spring of 204 B.C. Scipio embarked his army at Lilybæum (modern Marsala), and sailed for Africa, disembarking at the Fair promontory (now Cape Farina), a few miles from the important city of Utica. The first step was clearly to gain a secure base of operations, and with this aim his preliminary move was against Utica. His fleet was despatched there forthwith, while the army marched overland, his advanced guard cavalry encountering a body of 500 Carthaginian horse who had been sent to reconnoitre and interrupt the land ing. After a sharp engagement these were put to flight. A still better omen was the arrival of Masinissa, true to his word, to join Scipio. Livy states that the earlier sources from which he compiled his history differed as to the strength of Masinissa's reinforcement, some saying that he brought 200 horse, and some, 2000. Livy accepts the smaller estimate, for the very sound reason that Masinissa after his return from Spain had been driven out of his father's kingdom by the joint efforts of Syphax and the Carthaginians, and for the past year and more had been eluding pursuit by repeated changes of quarter. An exile, who had escaped from the last battle with only sixty horsemen, it is unlikely that he could have raised his band of followers to any large proportions. Meanwhile the Carthaginians despatched a further body of 4000 horse, mainly Numidians, to oppose Scipio's advance, and gain time for Syphax and Hasdrubal to come to their aid. This cavalry force posted itself at Salaeca, but Masinissa lured them out by a process of tactical pin-pricks, and then retiring slowly drew them on towards rising ground behind which Scipio's cavalry were concealed. When the moment was ripe, Scipio encircled the flank of Hanno's cavalry, while Masinissa, turning about, attacked them in front. Scipio followed up this success by a seven days' circuit through the countryside, clear ing it of cattle and supplies, and creating a wide devastated zone as a barrier against attack. Security, both in supply and protection, thus effected, he concentrated his efforts on the siege of Utica, which he wanted for his base of operations. Utica, however, was not destined to be a second Cartagena. Though he combined attack from the sea by the marines with the land assault, the fortress defied all his efforts and ruses. Hasdrubal, by this time, had collected a force of 30,000 foot and 3000 horse, but with painful recollections of the maulings he had suffered in Spain, did not venture to move to Utica's relief until reinforced by Syphax. When the latter at last came, with an army stated to have been 50,000 foot and 10,000 horse, the menace compelled Scipio to raise the siege-after forty days. Faced with such a concentration of hostile force, Scipio's situation must have been hazardous, but he extricated himself without mishap, and fortified a camp for the winter on a small peninsula, connected to the mainland by a narrow isthmus. This lay on the eastern or Carthage side of Utica-thus lying on the flank of any relieving force, and was later known Castra Cornelia. The enemy then encamped some seven miles farther east, covering the river Bagradas. as If there is a parallel between Scipio's landing in Africa and up his strength and supplies for the next spring's campaign. Besides the corn he had collected in his preliminary foraging march, he obtained a vast quantity from Sardinia, and also fresh stores of clothing and arms from Sicily. Gustavus's landing in Germany, devoted the winter to building there is a still more striking parallel between their action during the first season on hostile soil. Both campaigns to the unmilitary critic appear limited in scope compared with the avowed object with which they had set forth. Both generals have been criticised for overcaution, if not hesitation. And both were justified not only by the result but by the science of war. Scipio and Gustavus alike, unable for reasons outside their control to adjust the means to the end, displayed that rare strategical quality— of adjusting the end to the means. Their strategy foreshadowed Napoleon's maxim that "the whole art of war consists in a well-ordered and prudent defensive, followed by a bold and rapid offensive." Both sought first to lay the foundations for the offensive which followed by gaining a secure base of operations where they could build up their means to a strength adequate to ensure the attainment of the end. Nor is this campaign of Gustavus's the only military parallel with Scipio's that history records. For the action of Wellington in fortifying and retiring behind the lines of Torres Vedras in 1810 to checkmate the French superior concentration of force is a vivid reminder, both topographical and strategical, of Scipio's action in face of the concentration of Syphax and Hasdrubal. But, as usual, while seeking to develop his own strength, he did not overlook the value of subtracting from the enemy's. He reopened negotiations with Syphax, "whose passion for his bride he thought might now perhaps have become satiated from unlimited enjoyment." In these he was disappointed, but they afforded him the opportunity to reconnoitre the enemy's camp, with a view to a plan that he had conceived whereby to weaken the enemy and anticipate the attack that he feared owing to the enemy's heavy superiority of numbers. Some of his earlier messengers to Syphax had reported that the Carthaginians' winter huts were built almost entirely of wood, and those of the Numidians of interwoven reeds and matting disposed without order or proper intervals, and that a number even lay outside the ramparts of the camps. This news suggested to Scipio the idea of setting fire to the enemy's camp and striking a surprise blow in the confusion. Therefore in his later embassies Scipio sent certain expert scouts and picked centurions dressed as officers' serIn this secure retreat Scipio vants. While the conferences were in progress, these rambled posted his Numidians, because through the camps of Syphax of their knowledge of the camp, and Hasdrubal, noting their to cut off the various exits of approaches and entrances, the escape. As had been foreseen, times and methods of station- once the leading Romans had ing guards and outposts. set the fire alight it spread rapidly along the first row of huts, and in a brief while the whole camp was aflame, because of the closeness of the huts and the lack of proper intervals between rows. When the negotiations ultimately broke down, Syphax and Hasdrubal decided to take the offensive, but Scipio anticipated them. Even in his final preparations he sought to mystify and mislead the enemy in order to make his surprise more effective. The orders issued to the troops spoke of the surprise being aimed at Utica; he launched his ships and mounted on board siege machines as if he was about to assault Utica from the sea, and he despatched 2000 infantry to seize a hill which commanded the town. About the first watch of the night chosen the troops for the real stroke were formed up in march order and moved off on their seven-mile march, and about midnight arrived in the vicinity of the hostile camps. Thereupon Scipio divided his force, placing all the Numidians and half his legionaries under Lælius and Masinissa with orders to attack Syphax's camp. He instructed them that he would wait to launch his attack on Hasdrubal's camp until Lælius had set fire to the other camp, and with this purpose marched his own men at a slow pace. Fully imagining that it was an accidental conflagration, Syphax's men rushed out of their huts unarmed, and in a disorderly flight. Many perished in their huts while half asleep, many were trampled to death in the frenzied rush for the exit, while those who escaped the flames were cut down unawares by the Numidians posted at the gates of the camp. Meanwhile in the Carthaginian camp, the soldiers, aroused by the sentries' report of the fire in the other camp, and seeing how vast was the volume of flame, rushed out of their own camp to assist in extinguishing the fire, they also imagining it an accident and Scipio seven miles distant. This was as Scipio had hoped and anticipated, and he at once fell on the rabble, giving orders not to let a man escape to give warning to the troops still in the camp. Instantly he followed up this by launching his attack on the gates of the Lælius and Masinissa, divid- camp, which were unguarded ing their force, attacked the as a result of the confusion. camp from two directions simul- By the cleverness of his plan taneously, and Masinissa also in attacking Syphax's camp first, he had turned to advantage the fact that a number of the latter's huts were outside the ramparts and so easily accessible, and had created the opportunity to force the gates of the better protected Carthaginian camp. 66 The first troops inside set fire to the nearest huts, and soon the whole camp was aflame, the same scenes of confusion and destruction being here repeated, and those who escaped through the gates meeting their fate at the hands of Roman parties posted for the purpose. Hasdrubal at once desisted from any attempt to extinguish the fire, as he knew now from what had befallen him that the calamity which had overtaken the Numidians also was not, as they had supposed, the result of chance, but was due to the initiative and daring of the enemy." He therefore forced his way out, and escaped, along with only 2000 foot and 500 horsemen, half-armed, and many wounded or scorched. Syphax, who had also escaped, probably with a larger proportion, retired to a fortified position at Abba, a town quite close. Scipio, after his dispersion of the enemy's field forces, turned his attention to the siege of Utica, in order to gain the secure base which he wanted as a prelude to further operations. It is evident that he intentionally refrained from pressing the retreat of Syphax, for such pressure, by forcing the latter to fight, would tend to pour fresh fuel on a fire that was flickering out of itself. In this hope he was disappointed, for when Syphax had actually decided to retire to his own country, the pleadings of Sophonisba and the more material encouragement caused by the arrival of a force of Spanish of Spanish mercenaries led him to rejoin Hasdrubal for a fresh effort. Emergency levies brought up their strength, but Scipio gave them no time to consolidate into an effective force, for, by a rapid five days' march with his whole force light marching order-he struck and and dispersed them utterly. in -- Hasdrubal, with his Carthaginian survivors, found shelter in Carthage, and Syphax, with his cavalry, retreated home to his own capital, Cirta. Night put a stop to the scene of carnage, and next day Scipio sent Masinissa and Lælius in pursuit of Syphax, while he himself cleared the surrounding country, and occupied its strong places as a preliminary to a move on Carthage. Here fresh alarm had been caused, but the people were more staunch in the hour of trial than it is the tendency to suppose. Few voices were raised in favour of peace, and energetic measures were taken for resistance. At the same time, the Senate decided to send the fleet to attack the Roman ships at Utica and attempt to raise the siege, and as a further step the recall of Hannibal was decided on. |
