5

D.

Thorpe (Preston 16A), had misinterpreted the information entirely (Preston 15A). Preston brought this to Thorpe's attention and the need for him to re-evaluate, to do his home work again because he was off base (id). At this point in Preston's view the reactor engineering credibility in their ability to tell criticality "was almost nil" (Preston 16A). 4/ Lessor also stated that reactor engineering "had lost a little credibility" by pulling out the wrong chart (Lessor 21A).

July 3 Afternoon Meeting

At the July 3rd afternoon meeting the correct portion of the chart
was used (Preston 17A). After reviewing the correct portion, the
view of reactor engineering changed from critical to it could have
been (Preston 17A). There were two camps, one saying critical on
the basis of the computer model (Preston 25) and the other saying
not critical on the basis of the charts (Preston 26 and 17A).
Thorpe had a similar view of the division at the meeting (Thorpe
9).
No one from Nuclear Engineering other than Thorpe 5/ thought
it was critical or expressed that opinion (Lenart 17A).

Thorpe argued at the meeting for criticality based on his knowledge of the core and worth of the rods (Thorpe 9). Thorpe thinks he was the only one convinced of criticality (Thorpe 10). He had been working with the rod pattern for a year, so he did not expect the other engineers to react the same way he did (Thorpe 29). Other people Thorpe said thought it might not be critical and it was too close to call. In retrospect he says they were correct. There was not enough data to say one way or the other (Thorpe 10). Thorpe does not believe the operations people disregarded his analysis. Thorpe said they look at criticality from a different perspective; they are trained to look for a certain response on the chart which "certainly was not there." (id and at 11). The operations people were not inexperienced in criticalities (Thorpe 11). Thorpe did not perceive himself as one against the world (Thorpe 19). The others had more experience in investigating problems. Rather than proceeding with a "pre-conviction of what the outcome" is going to be, they were more cautious (id). Thorpe said in retrospect the others had a "more correct position." (Thorpe 20). The record of

4/

5/

Thorpe was not questioned concerning the July 3, 1986 morning meeting with Preston nor was Preston asked who were the "Reactor Engineering people."

The term "dissenting" was used by the OI investigator in questioning Preston (Preston at 17A) and Arora (Arora at 10). None of the witnesses described either Thorpe or Lessor as a dissenter.

6

what the control rods were doing was needed (id) (Arora 9). If asked by an NRC inspector, Thorpe said he would have responded "I have a strong inclination that it was critical; but not to the point---I don't have the data to support it." (Thorpe 15)

Two other engineers at the meeting were interviewed by OI. Batch was of the view that the reactor did not go critical (Arora 11, Batch 8, 11, 13, Lessor 8A). Batch had reservations (Lenart 7A). Batch thought you needed to lay out the rod pulls on the charts (Overbeck 11A). Arora, who supervised Thorpe, did not agree with Thorpe (Arora 9).

11

Lessor thought that the reactor could have been critical (Preston
18A) (Overbeck 16). Lessor's opinion was that it was critical
(Lessor 18). He added that later in the meeting he said "you
know, I agree with you that you have to---and you know, you
can't be certain, what we have to do---I'm more confident we have
to plot the rods along the side; but I am confident you'll come up.'
(id).
He was "almost certain" that he knew what the results would
be (id). It looked to Lessor that the reactor engineer was correct
(Lessor 19). But to be sure Lessor said "you have to know the
rod pulls" (Lessor 7A). Overbeck agreed that Lessor thought if it
was not critical they were real close but Lessor wanted to see the
supporting documentation (Overbeck 16A). After hearing the view
of Batch, an experienced person, Lessor wondered if he was really
sure that he was right (Lessor 8A). Lessor would have said the
reactor went critical (Lessor 9A). Lessor said the real issue was
not criticality but the out-of-sequence rod pull (Overbeck 11A)
(Lessor 18).

Overbeck recalls that the reactor engineering view of criticality was based on computer models and he did not want to hear about computer models, he wanted to see the charts (Overbeck 14). 6/ Thorpe said that he did not base his view on the actual plant rod pulls (Overbeck 15). The charts were looked at during the meeting but were missing information (Overbeck 10A) (Thorpe 11). Overbeck and Lenart wanted the rod pulls put on the chart and an analysis done based on the chart and then use the computer models (Overbeck 16).

6/

It is noteworthy that Chrissotimos, NRC Region III Section Chief with responsibility for Fermi 2, stated to OIA that the charts are the legal records not the computer models, and that if the charts did not indicate criticality, the possible computer inconsistency was irrelevant, a moot point (Chrissotimos, October 31, 1985).

- 7

E.

Lenart says he was "tugged in both directions" and in retrospect it was obvious that he was leaning toward criticality (Lenart 8A). The preponderance of the information was not that the reactor had gone critical (Lenart 10A). However, from an "ultra conservative view" he could have relied on Thorpe and Lessor and concluded the plant went critical (Lenart 13A). But there was no need to reach an immediate decision. There was time to make sure (id). Everyone was allowed to express their views at the meeting Lenart 17). Lenard noted to OI that he weighed the various views and made his decision (Lenart 14A). He noted to OI that "it is always difficult to get an accurate and complete retraction of something that has already been stated" (Lenart 13A).

Preston said there was no conclusion. The meeting ended with the possibility that the reactor could either have been critical or not critical (Preston 19A) (Thorpe 23). The "company line" was "go out and find out what the answer really is" (id). 7/ Thorpe had more work to do (Thorpe 23). Lenart said the outcome was that there was a violation of procedures, additional investigation was required, and it was uncertain as to whether criticality occurred (Lenart 6). There were no conclusions (Lenart 7A). There does not appear to have been a "company position" that the plant was not critical (Thorpe 15) (Arora 11) (Lessor 9A). However, Lessor did answer that given Lenart's and Overbeck's view that they weren't critical, he assumed that was Detroit Edison's view (Lessor 10A). But in response to the question of what was the decision of the meeting Lessor said it was decided to do further evaluations. (Lessor 9A). Overbeck stated that Detroit Edison's position was that the reactor had not gone critical but there was still a controversy (Overbeck 15A, 16A).

Criticality Determination

At a

On July 4th Thorpe called Overbeck at home and told him he did
the analysis and that the reactor was critical and explained the
period of criticality (Overbeck 21 & 22). After Thorpe did his
work, Batch was satisfied the plant went critical (Batch 12).
meeting on July 5th, Overbeck agreed with engineering stating
"Okay, that's no longer an issue. The reactor was critical."
(Overbeck 25). He informed Lenart on that day (Lenart 5).

7/

The term "Corporate Position" used by OI was not used by the witnesses to describe what the company had decided. It was used in the unsigned and undated, Report of July 31, 1985 Interview of Parker.

Overbeck also announced in the July 6th staff meeting to the entire staff that the plant went critical (Overbeck 26 and 29) and that the DER evaluations were being transferred to Lessor (Overbeck 30). NRC was not informed of the criticality determination until July 15th. This occurred during a conversation between Overbeck and Byron when Overbeck corrected Byron's statement concerning the performance of operators by stating they had gone critical. Overbeck was surprised that Byron did not know the reactor had gone critical since he believed Parker was aware of the determination. (Byron statement to OIA, August 15, 1985 and October 3, 1985.)

III. NOTIFICATION OF NRC

After the July 3rd meeting, Overbeck called Parker to arrange a meeting to discuss an operator error. Parker met him and Preston about 15 minutes after the call. Parker says he was informed that (1) 11 rods had been pulled out of sequence on July 2nd, the correct rod sequence should have been 00 to 04 rather than 00 to 48, (2) rods were re-inserted and plant restarted, (3) corrective action had been taken and was described, (4) the licensee's preliminary view was that the plant did not go critical; the SRM charts did not indicate criticality but that Reactor Engineering believed that they might have gone critical based on the computer predictability model, (5) the licensee was still evaluating the situation and reactor engineering, operations and the technical group were looking into the event, and (6) the licensee recognized that the matter could be sensitive to licensing. Parker was given the DER which said the evaluation was to be done by July 9th and the plant did not go critical.

Overbeck asked Parker to touch base with him to get the full picture of what happened. Overbeck preferred that Parker contact him because of the three groups working the problem in order to get a full picture. But Overbeck said Parker could contact everybody he wanted.

Overbeck said the event could be sensitive to licensing because it involved an operator error.

Parker on July 3rd attempted to speak to Myers but Myers was unavailable so he spoke to Arora, Myers' supervisor. Parker believes he discussed criticality with Arora who said his group was assigned to look into the matter.

79-323 0 - 88 - 18

9

Parker, on July 5th, spoke to Arora. Arora said they were having a meeting on the rod pull. 8/ Arora stated that he told Parker on July 5th that the meeting was to discuss the further analysis done on the incident but did not tell him about the conclusion on criticality. (Arora 16). Parker also has said Overbeck would notify him of the final results of the review (Exhibit 19). (OIA August 23, 1985). Overbeck stated to Of that he did not know if Parker expected some further notification on the basis of further review (Overbeck 19). He told OIA that he would get back to Parker (Overbeck-OIA interview, August 14, 1985). Overbeck says he might have been "spoiled" by how Steve Dupont (apparently the former resident) and Byron, the senior resident, did business. If Overbeck told them something and did not get back to them, then they would contact him (Overbeck 23A, 24A).

There does not appear to be a material difference between Parker,
Preston, and Overbeck as to what was discussed on July 3rd.

Lessor had stated in the earlier July 3rd meeting that the resident should be informed of the issue and that the position was not unanimous. (Lessor 11A). Lessor was asked by OI "Would it be misleading to say "there was some controversy, that the company position is that we did not go critical, but that Reactor Engineering is performing an analysis of the criticality issue?" Lessor responded by saying, "No, that's a fact." (Lessor 13A)

It was

Preston states that the company errs on the side of over-reporting mat-
ters to the Resident (Preston at 32). 9/ He states that the senior resi-
dent asked him "to stop calling him all the time because, you know, we
ought to use more judgment in our attempt to contact him" (id).
not until the meeting where the issue of criticality came up that it was
decided to call the resident (id). Lenart directed that Preston and
Overbeck notify the resident (Preston 21A). Lenart instructed them to
notify the resident that we would be pursuing the investigation
"aggressively" (Preston 22A). Preston says Overbeck told Parker that
the senior resident was looking to find something wrong and it looks like
we just served NRC up a big fat juicy one on a platter (Preston 35).
OIA said that Overbeck stated that he told Parker that Byron was
looking for something to "nail" them on and this error is what Byron
needed (Overbeck-OIA interview, August 14, 1985).

The above statements came from Parker's OIA interviews on October 3, 1985 and August 23, 1985.

Preston stated that it was not unusual to report on matters to NRC and later inform NPC after a closer review that the matter was not really reportable (Preston at 46).